Upper Tribunal (Immigration and asylum chamber), 2019-10-23, PA/01720/2018

JurisdictionUK Non-devolved
Date23 October 2019
Published date13 January 2020
Hearing Date02 October 2019
StatusUnreported
CourtUpper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Appeal NumberPA/01720/2018

Appeal number: PA/01720/2018


Upper Tribunal

(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/01720/2018



THE IMMIGRATION ACTS



Heard at Field House  

Decision & Reasons Promulgated

On 2 October 2019

On 23 October 2019



Before


UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’CALLAGHAN



Between

M. K.

(ANONYMITY DIRECTION CONFIRMED)

Appellant

and


THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent



Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr. B. Bedford, Counsel, instructed by Farani Taylor Solicitors 

For the Respondent: Miss. R. Bassi, Senior Presenting Officer



DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

  1. This is an appeal against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge I. M. Scott (‘the Judge’), issued on 28 June 2019, by which the appellant’s appeal against a decision of the respondent to refuse to grant him international protection was dismissed.

  2. First-tier Tribunal Judge Ford intended to grant permission on one narrow ground, as explained in her reasons which I address below. However, permission was stated as ‘granted’ in the Tribunal's standard document and there were no words of limitation upon such grant. The appellant therefore enjoys permission to appeal on all issues: Safi and others (permission to appeal decisions) [2018] UKUT 00388 (IAC); [2019] Imm. A.R. 437.

Anonymity

  1. The Judge issued an anonymity direction. The parties did not request that the order be set-aside and I confirm the direction accordingly:

Unless the Upper Tribunal or a Court directs otherwise, no report of these proceedings or any form of publication thereof shall directly or indirectly identify the appellant. This direction applies to, amongst others, the appellant and the respondent. Any failure to comply with this direction could give rise to contempt of court proceedings. I do so in order to avoid a likelihood of serious harm arising to the appellant from the contents of the protection claim being publicly known.’

Background

  1. The appellant is a national of India who hails from the State of Harayana, which is located in the north of the country and surrounds the capital, New Delhi. He worked as an engineer before travelling to this country.

  2. He met his ex-wife in February 2006 and the relationship commenced in July 2006. After her family found out about the relationship, they began to threaten him. Her father is a police officer and the appellant began to receive threatening telephone calls from the police station at which he worked. The appellant was required to attend the police station and was beaten by several police officers, including his ex-wife’s father. The couple were kept separated and unable to talk to each other for some weeks, but they then managed to make arrangements to meet again. His ex-wife commenced a nursing course and was able to live away from home and so they were able to rent a room and live together. In 2007 the appellant was disowned by his family who were against the relationship because they belong to the Hindu Brahmin caste, whilst his ex-wife is Sikh. His ex-wife became pregnant and her family sought to persuade her that she undergo an abortion. She refused to do so, stating that she would kill herself if forced to abort her child. Having confirmed her position, her family insisted that the couple marry and then leave the country immediately, for reasons of honour, as the baby would be born within nine months of the marriage. The couple were married in April 2010. Unfortunately, the child was lost before birth.

  3. The appellant arrived in the United Kingdom on 23 January 2012 as a Tier 4 (General) Student. His ex-wife had arrived a month earlier but did not meet him at the airport. The appellant found out that she was having an affair and soon after his arrival he moved out of their accommodation. The appellant attempted suicide in July 2012 by cutting his neck and wrists. He had previously suffered mental health problems whilst in India. After his suicide attempt, he returned to India in July 2012 but had no contact with his family. His relationship with his ex-wife come to an end. With the support of her family she demanded 1.5 million rupees. He was able to pay half of this sum but continued to receive threats in relation to the remaining balance. He received the last threat in 2013. He cannot pay the outstanding sum. He travelled back to this country on 4 December 2012.

  4. In the meantime, the appellant’s second wife entered this country in April 2011 as a Tier 4 student. They met in January 2013 and the relationship began soon afterwards. They conducted a religious marriage in March 2013 and have lived together since this time. The couple have a child who is now four years old. He has a speech and language problem for which he is receiving therapy. At the date of the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal the appellant's wife was expecting their second child.

  5. The family of the appellant’s second wife are angry about the marriage because he has not divorced from his ex-wife and they are from different castes, Sikh Minhas. Members of her family approached the appellant’s brother in India, and he was required to establish that the appellant’s family had disowned him. They have reported to a friend of the appellant that they will kill him if he returns to India. They live in the Punjab, some 200 miles from the appellant’s family home.

  6. The appellant sought asylum on 18 June 2016 and was interviewed. The respondent refused the asylum application by way of a decision dated 20 January 2018.

Hearing before the FtT

  1. The appeal came before the Judge sitting at Taylor House on 7 March 2019. The Judge found both the appellant and his wife to be credible as to their evidence. As to the application for international protection, the Judge determined that the appellant was unable to establish that he is a member of a particular social group, at [53] and [54]:

It was not suggested that any of those persons whom the appellant fears who wish to do him harm would be motivated to do so for reasons of race, religion, nationality, or political opinion.

As regards the remaining Convention reasons, membership of a particular social group, the appellant belongs to the Brahmin caste and has twice married Sikh women from lower castes. While that has not been well-received by his own family or by the families of his wives, there is no evidence that persons in his situation are perceived or treated differently by society and/or the law in India. That being so, I conclude that the appellant is not a member of a particular social group for the purpose of the Refugee Convention.’

  1. In refusing the appeal on humanitarian protection grounds, the Judge accepted that the appellant had established that substantial grounds existed as to his facing a real risk of suffering serious harm if he were to be returned to his home area in India, finding at [57]:

Threats of harm have been made against him and there have been two instances of physical assault on him, once when he was beaten by his ex-wife’s father and other police officers in a local police station, and once when he was attacked in a market in October 2012 by his ex-wife’s uncle and four other men. Although those incidents happened some years ago, it is reasonably likely that the animosity which gave rise to them still endures, connected as it is with matters of family honour.’

  1. The Judge proceeded to find that ‘the appellant could safely relocate to another part of India, which is a vast and populous country, and that it would be reasonable to expect him to do so’, reasoning at [59]:

In relation to finding a safe place in which to relocate, the background country information indicates that there is in general a sufficiency of protection in India, in terms of a system of criminal law which the authorities are able and willing to operate and from which the appellant would not be excluded. Although his ex-wife's father is in the police and it was he and other police officers who first beat the appellant, the background information shows that each state and union territory in India has its own, separate, police force. The evidence and the conclusions of the Upper Tribunal in MD (same-sex oriented males: risk) India CG [2014] UKUT 00065 (IAC) also indicate that there would be very little chance of the appellant being located elsewhere in India by any of those who might wish to do him harm. Although it appears that his return to India in July 2012 was detected by his ex-wife's uncle, there are many other international airports in India and the evidence (as already noted) is that there would be little chance of his arrival elsewhere being discovered. The absence of a central registration system was noted by the Upper Tribunal in MD (India). For the same reason, the need to obtain a registration card for access to public services, etc. is very unlikely to lead to the appellant’s return being noticed.’

  1. The Judge further determined that the appellant could access mental health care in India and even if he were to require more specialised psychiatric services in the future, it not having been established that he requires such services at this time, it was open to him to seek them by relocating to a major city or travelling there from wherever he...

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