Upper Tribunal (Immigration and asylum chamber), 2020-03-24, HU/08668/2018

JurisdictionUK Non-devolved
Date24 March 2020
Published date07 April 2020
Hearing Date14 February 2020
StatusUnreported
CourtUpper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Appeal NumberHU/08668/2018

Appeal Number: HU/08668/2018


Upper Tribunal

(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: HU/08668/2018



THE IMMIGRATION ACTS



Heard at Field House

Decision & Reasons Promulgated

On 14 February 2020

On 24 March 2020




Before


THE HON. MR JUSTICE LANE, PRESIDENT

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HANSON

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SHERIDAN



Between


UZMA YOUNUS

(NO ANONYMITY DIRECTIOn MADE)

Appellant

and


THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent



Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr M Sarwar, Legal representative, Lexton Law Solicitors

For the Respondent: Mr T Lindsay, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer



DECISION AND REASONS

  1. By a decision promulgated on 25 November 2019 (a copy of which is attached) the Upper Tribunal set aside a decision of the First-tier Tribunal promulgated on 14 May 2019. We now re-make that decision.


  1. Background

  1. The appellant is a citizen of Pakistan who was born, and has spent nearly all of her life, in the United Arab Emirates. On 2 May 2016, whilst pregnant with her first (and only) child, she travelled to the UK from Dubai as a visitor with leave until 6 July 2016.

  2. On 4 July 2016 she applied for leave to remain in the UK on the basis that she was 30 weeks pregnant and had been advised that it was not safe for her to travel because of previous miscarriages (“the 2016 application”). In the 2016 application she requested six months leave.

  3. On 6 September 2016 the appellant gave birth to her daughter, who is a British citizen.

  4. The appellant’s partner (who is her child’s father) is a British citizen who has two teenage sons (born in February 2003 and September 2004) from a previous relationship.

  5. In January 2018 the appellant varied her application in order to apply for leave to remain on the basis of her family life with her partner and child (“the 2018 application”).

  6. On 19 March 2018 the respondent refused the application on the basis that:

    1. the appellant did not qualify for leave as a partner under Appendix FM of the Immigration Rules because (i) she had not provided evidence to show she had been living with her partner for at least two years and therefore she was not a “partner” as defined in GEN.1.2. of Appendix FM of the Immigration Rules; and (ii) she was in the UK as a visitor and therefore by operation of E-LTRP.2.1 of Appendix FM was not eligible to be granted leave as a partner even if (which was accepted) there would be insurmountable obstacles to family life with her partner continuing outside the UK;

    2. she did not meet any of the private life routes to leave under paragraph 276ADE(1); and

    3. refusing leave would not result in an unjustifiably harsh consequence that would breach Article 8 because, having entered the UK as a visitor, she had no legitimate expectation of being able to remain permanently; and her daughter’s rights as a British citizen would not be denied by her removal because the child could remain in the UK with her father.

  1. Scope of the Appeal and Issues in Dispute

  1. Mr Lindsay, in his skeleton argument, accepted that:

    1. there are insurmountable obstacles to the appellant’s family life continuing outside of the UK; and

    2. it would not be reasonable or proportionate for the family unit to be indefinitely separated.

  2. He stated that, on the facts of the case, the appellant is expected to leave the UK for only a limited period of time in order to apply for entry clearance to join her partner and that the “narrow issue” in the appeal is whether her temporary removal from the UK is proportionate. In his submissions, Mr Lindsay clarified that it is the respondent’s case that the appellant will be able to travel to Pakistan in order to apply for entry clearance and that it is not contended that she would be able to return to the United Arab Emirates.

  3. The appellant’s primary case is that respondent’s assumption that she would be able to re-enter the UK from Pakistan is mistaken as she would be unable to satisfy the financial eligibility requirements for entry as a partner. Accordingly, she contends that her appeal should be allowed because the consequence of her removal will be permanent, or at least long-term, exclusion from the UK which the respondent has conceded is not reasonable or proportionate.

  4. In the alternative, the appellant argues that if (which she does not accept) she would be able to re-enter the UK after only a limited period of time, her removal wound be disproportionate under article 8 ECHR for three reasons.

  5. First, she argues that her removal would be disproportionate because she meets the requirements of the Immigration Rules (both under para. 276ADE(1)(vi) and Appendix FM) and satisfying the Rules is determinative of an article 8 appeal, as explained by the Senior President of Tribunals (Sir Ernest Ryder) in TZ (Pakistan) and PG (India) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 1109 at paragraph 34:

[W]here a person satisfies the Rules, whether or not by reference to an article 8 informed requirement, then this will be positively determinative of that person's article 8 appeal, provided their case engages article 8(1), for the very reason that it would then be disproportionate for that person to be removed.”

  1. Second, she submits that there is a principle, derived from the House of Lords’ judgment in Chikwamba v SSHD [2008] UKHL 40, that there is no public interest in removing a person from the UK in order to make an entry clearance from abroad that would be certain to succeed (referred to by Mr Sarwar as the “Chikwamba principle”). The appellant’s case is that as she would succeed in her application from outside the UK it follows that she falls squarely within the Chikwamba principle and her appeal should be allowed on that basis.

  2. Third, she argues that it would not be reasonable to expect her daughter to leave the UK (even for a temporary period, whilst her application for entry clearance is pending) and therefore, in accordance with s117B(6) of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”), the public interest does not require her removal.

  3. The appellant has advanced a further argument as to why it would be unlawful to remove her from the UK. This contention is that she is entitled to a right of residence in order to avoid her daughter being deprived of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of her European Union Citizenship rights in accordance with Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi (Case C-34/09) and Patel v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] UKSC 59.

  1. Evidence

Evidence of the appellant

  1. The appellant adopted her witness statement dated 15 April 2019.

  2. In the statement she stated that she lives with her partner, who is her fiancé.

  3. She also stated that she is the main carer for their daughter and that her partner finds it difficult to undertake day-to-day care for the child. She stated that if she were to leave the UK she would bring her daughter with her as her partner would not be able to combine caring for her with his work commitments as well as the care he provides for his two sons (from a previous relationship) on weekends and during school holidays. In oral evidence, she explained that her daughter started nursery in November 2019 and commented that this is going well.

  4. The appellant also stated in her statement that she was born in Dubai where she has lived most of her life. In oral evidence, she stated that her mother died in 2012, she has three siblings in Dubai, and her brother and father live in the UK.

  5. Both in her statement and orally the appellant stated that she has only ever been to Pakistan on short visits (staying in hotels, rather than with family or friends) and that she does not have any family members in Pakistan upon whom she could rely for support. She stated that she had not even visited Pakistan until she was 15 years old and that she would find it very difficult to settle and integrate into Pakistan.

  6. She stated that she cannot return to Dubai as she does not have a valid visa.

  7. She also stated that her partner “will not allow” her to take their daughter abroad.

  8. The appellant was asked by Mr Lindsay whether, when she stated in the 2016 application that she only wished to remain in the UK for a further 6 months her intention, at that time, was to return to Dubai or relocate to Pakistan. The appellant’s response was that she would have tried to return to Dubai but following the expiry of her visa at the end of 2016 this was no longer an option. She also stated that because her father was now living in the UK she was unable to renew her visa to live in Dubai. She stated that she did not remember when her father moved to the UK.

  9. When asked by Mr Lindsay why she did not leave the UK as she said she would in the 2016 application, she responded that she did not receive a response to her application from the Secretary of State. She also stated that her daughter had asthma, flu and respiratory problems and because of this her partner did not allow her to take the child out of the...

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