Upper Tribunal (Immigration and asylum chamber), 2021-03-30, PA/07718/2019

JurisdictionUK Non-devolved
Date30 March 2021
Published date14 April 2021
Hearing Date12 March 2021
StatusUnreported
CourtUpper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Appeal NumberPA/07718/2019

Appeal Number: PA/07718/2019 (v)


Upper Tribunal

(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/07718/2019 (v)



THE IMMIGRATION ACTS



Heard via Skype for Business at Field House

Decision & Reasons Promulgated

On 12th March 2021

On 30th March 2021




Before


UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RIMINGTON



Between


Mr D D M

(anonymity direction MADE)

Appellant

and


THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent



Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr P Georget, Counsel instructed by Malik & Malik Solicitors

For the Respondent: Mr S Kotas, Home Office Presenting Officer



DECISION AND REASONS

  1. The appellant appeals with permission against the determination of First-tier Tribunal Judge M A Khan promulgated on 2nd December 2019 and dismissing the appellant’s appeal against the decision of the Secretary of State for the Home Department dated 30th July 2019. The Secretary of State refused the appellant’s protection and human rights claim. The appellant is an Iraqi national born on 1st April 1982 and of Kurdish ethnicity, born in Makhmour, Iraq. In 2001 he clandestinely entered the United Kingdom at the age of 19 years and claimed asylum in June 2001 on the basis that he was at real risk of serious harm from the Jaff tribe in the Iraq Kurdish region and that he had evaded military service, which had resulted in him being detained and tortured. His asylum claim was refused on 20th June 2001 and his appeal against the refusal was dismissed on 14th November 2001.

  2. On 21st February 2006 he was convicted of two counts of using false instruments and failing to surrender to bail and sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment. On 13th August 2006 a deportation order was signed. His appeal against that order was dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal on 20th October 2006 and he became appeal rights exhausted on 30th October 2006.

  3. Following further submissions the deportation order was revoked but the Secretary of State refused the protection and human rights claim on 1st October 2012. An appeal was dismissed on 20th February 2013 by the First-tier Tribunal.

  4. In January 2019 the appellant travelled to France and claimed asylum. He was told that his claim had to be considered by the UK authorities and he was returned to the UK in March 2019. He made further submissions which were refused in the decision dated 30th July 2019 and owing to his criminal record it was concluded he fell within the exclusion criteria under Rule 339D(iv). It was decided that he did not qualify for asylum or humanitarian protection, but his appeal was considered under paragraph 399 of the Immigration Rules although he has neither a partner nor children in the United Kingdom. The Secretary of State considered whether he met the private life exception to deportation set out at paragraph 399A of the Immigration Rules, but his claim was refused.

  5. The appellant submitted that his return to Iraq without a reasonable prospect of him obtaining a CSID would breach his Article 3 rights and that his circumstances taken cumulatively constituted very compelling circumstances such as to displace the public interest in his deportation.

  6. First-tier Tribunal Judge M A Khan dismissed his appeal under the Immigration Rules, Articles 2 and 3 and 8 of the ECHR and also dismissed a protection appeal.

  7. Permission to appeal was sought on four separate grounds as follows.

Ground 1, a flawed approach to credibility

  1. It was submitted that the judge placed undue reliance on adverse credibility findings made previously such that he lost sight of his obligation to assess the appellant’s credibility for himself. The appellant had been tendered for evidence and had given oral testimony. The basis of the judge’s adverse credibility finding was based on the mother’s death certificate and findings of adverse credibility in previous decisions but there was no independent assessment of the appellant’s oral testimony in the instant case, and any findings thereto were invisible in the determination. Following Djebbar [2004] EWCA Civ 804 at paragraph 30 it was said of the guidance in Devaseelan v SSHD [2002] UKIAT 00702 that, the most important feature of the guidance is that the fundamental obligation of every Special Adjudicator independently to decide each new application on its own individual merits was preserved. As per Djebbar the judge should have taken into account the appellant’s oral evidence to decide whether he departed from the previous findings on credibility but instead at paragraph 44 the judge remarked that since the appellant has been found not be credible on three previous hearing, (sic) there is not a great deal he can say now to this Tribunal, which would (sic) credible and/or consistent”.

Ground 2

  1. A central feature to the appellant’s account was that he did not have a Civil Status Identity Document (CSID). At paragraph 28 the judge recorded a submission that there was no evidence that he was in possession of a CSID but that the judge failed to give any proper consideration to this crucial aspect of the appellant’s claim save for a one sentence reference at paragraph 60. This was woefully inadequately reasoned and that was an error of law. It was never even the Secretary of State’s own position that the appellant had access to his CSID but that the appellant could obtain another card. The judge’s alternative finding that the appellant could obtain his CSID with the help of his family in Iraq demanded explanation. Even if the appellant’s mother was alive, which was denied, given the patrilinear registration system in Iraq this would be of no assistance.

Ground 3

  1. There were procedural irregularities and unfairness. At paragraph 56 the judge stated: In the light of his lengthy avoidance of the immigration authorities in the UK and due to credibility finding (sic) by three previous Tribunals and fourthly by this court, I do not accept his evidence that her went to France in January 2019.

  2. The appellant’s travel to France was not in dispute and no issues thereon were raised in the Secretary of State’s decision letter nor in any cross-examination. This matter only arose as a result of the judge’s questioning and the appellant was not put on notice that this would be an issue and the judge at 16 incorrectly recorded Belgium instead of France. In YHY (China) (AP), Re Judicial Review [2014] CSOH 11 it was held that there was a procedural unfairness where points which were not previously taken against the appellant were taken by a judge unless there was proper notice.

Ground 4, inadequate consideration under Article 8

  1. The judge appeared to treat the previous determination as conclusive of the issue contrary to the principles of Devaseelan. It was submitted that the judge failed to assess properly the proportionality of the appellant’s deportation and the individual merits of the case for himself. There was no consideration of the appellant’s length of residence in the UK, his absence from Iraq, the difficulties he may face upon return to Iraq and any difficulties in obtaining a CSID upon return nor of his medical issues, all of which should have been considered.

  2. The permission to appeal granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Ford failed to comply with the guidance in Safi & Ors (permission to appeal decisions) [2018] UKUT 388 such that unless the permission is restricted under the “Decision” heading, any ostensible restriction of permission in the “Reasons” section will not restrict the grant of permission and the actual decision does not restrict the grant of permission in any way.

  3. At the hearing before me Mr Kotas did not seek to argue with Mr Georget that the permission was restricted.

  4. Mr Georget argued at the hearing that it was not just a question of consideration of the CSID standing or falling with credibility and an assessment of the appellant’s ability to obtain a CSID needed to be considered objectively, and separately from any credibility considerations, of where the appellant could in fact obtain such a card or replacement.

  5. Mr Kotas submitted that the appellant gave oral evidence and repeated his claim and the judge dealt with the death certificate, finding it was not a reliable document, and that was rationally open to the judge. It was open...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT