Upper Tribunal (Immigration and asylum chamber), 2021-06-03, HU/12362/2017

JurisdictionUK Non-devolved
Date03 June 2021
Published date18 June 2021
Hearing Date05 May 2021
StatusUnreported
CourtUpper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Appeal NumberHU/12362/2017

Appeal Number: HU/12362/2017

IAC-AH-SAR-V1


Upper Tribunal

(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: HU/12362/2017



THE IMMIGRATION ACTS



Heard by Skype at Field House

Decision & Reasons Promulgated

On 18 December 2020

On 03 June 2021

And in person on

5 May 2021



Before


UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RINTOUL

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BLUNDELL



Between


MR ALBAN VELAJ

(ANONYMITY DIRECTION NOT MADE)

Appellant

and


THE Secretary of State FOR THE Home Department

Respondent



Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr C Thomann, instructed by the Government Legal Department

For the Respondent: Mr Georget, instructed by Malik & Malik Solicitors



DECISION AND REASONS

  1. The Secretary of State appealed with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Ian Scott, promulgated on 18 July 2019, allowing Mr Velaj’s appeal against the decision of the Secretary of State made on 2 October 2017 to refuse his human rights claim, the Secretary of State having made a deportation order against him. For the reasons set out below, that decision was set aside.

  2. As the decision of the First-tier Tribunal has been set aside to be remade, we refer to Mr Velaj as the appellant and to the Secretary of State as the respondent as indeed they were in the First-tier Tribunal.

  3. The appellant is a citizen of Kosovo who entered the United Kingdom in 1998 and claimed asylum. He was joined here by his wife, elder children and his mother. Two further children were born in the United Kingdom. They are all now British citizens; the appellant’s application was refused in light of his criminal record at the time.

  4. On 17 May 2011 the appellant was convicted of smuggling 3.97 kilograms of a class A drug (cocaine) into the United Kingdom and sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment. It was for that reason that the Secretary of State made the deportation order against him.

  5. The appellant appealed under Section 82(1) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”) on human rights grounds with reference to Article 8 but at the appeal raised a new matter: that he had a derivative right of residence in the United Kingdom under the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016 (“the EEA Regulations”). The Secretary of State consented to that matter being considered.

  6. The judge heard evidence from the appellant, his wife and two elder daughters. In her evidence Mrs Velaj said [51], [52] that she would not go to Kosovo with the appellant as she could not leave his mother and the children in the United Kingdom.

  7. The judge found that: -

      1. a parent of a British Citizen child is entitled to a derivative right of residence when parental responsibility is shared with another person, if (Regulation 16(5)(c)) the child would be unable to reside in the United Kingdom if both primary carers left the United Kingdom for an indefinite period, even if the other carer/parent is a British citizen;

      2. the appellant shares equal parental responsibility for his son with the wife/mother and the son would be unable to reside in the United Kingdom or another EEA state if both the appellant and his wife left the United Kingdom for an indefinite period; and,

      3. accordingly, the appellant had a derivative right to reside in the United Kingdom under the 2016 Regulations;

      4. there was a right of appeal as the issue relating to Regulation 36(5) requiring a valid national identity card had been conceded by the Secretary of State [69] to [71];

      5. Exception 3 set out in Section 33 of the UK Borders Act 2007 applied as the appellant had a derivative right to reside in the United Kingdom under the Regulations which give effect to the EU treaties [73 to 74];

      6. having had regard to Regulation 27 and Schedule 1 of the EEA Regulations he was not satisfied that the appellant represented a risk or danger to society [80] despite the conviction for a serious offence and lengthy prison sentence;

      7. further, there are circumstances in this case such that there were very compelling circumstances sufficient to overcome the public interest in the appellant’s deportation for the purposes of Section 117C(6) of the 2002 Act [90] given the hardship that had been caused to the appellant’s wife and taking account also the best interests of his son.

  8. The Secretary of State sought permission to appeal on the basis that the judge had erred in misinterpreting Regulation 16 which, she contended, would apply only if both carers intended to leave the United Kingdom, which was not the case. It was also averred that the judge had failed properly to explain how there were very compelling circumstances over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2 of Section 117C of the 2002 Act as, on the facts of this case, it could not even be shown that the “unduly harsh” test had been met.

  9. On 19 August 2019 First-tier Tribunal Judge S P J Buchanan granted permission on all grounds.

Procedural History

  1. The appeal was initially set down for hearing on 5 November 2019 but was adjourned to permit the Secretary of State to file amended grounds which was done on 17 December 2019. A subsequent hearing set down for 30 April 2020 was adjourned in light of COVID and although the Tribunal provisionally considered disposing the issue of error of law by way of written submissions, this was not possible, and the appeal was listed for oral hearing on 18 December 2020. At the end of that hearing we announced our decision that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error of law, was to be set aside, and was to be remade on a date to be fixed. The appeal then re-convened on 5 May 2021.

Amended Grounds of Appeal

  1. The Secretary of State averred in her amended grounds that:

      1. the First-tier Tribunal had no jurisdiction to consider an appeal under the EEA Regulations as there had been no decision under the Regulations, this error not being cured by the Presenting Officer’s consent for the matter to be considered;

      2. the First-tier Tribunal erred in considering the derivative right of residence strengthened the appellant’s Article 8 claim it being applicable only to deportees who are unable to establish any otherwise available entitlement to remain, in this case under the Human Rights Convention;

      3. it was for the appellant to show that the child would be compelled to leave the United Kingdom were he (the appellant) to be deported, the First-tier Tribunal’s decision pre-empting the Secretary of State’s decision and misconstruing the scope and purpose of Regulation 16;

      4. the First-tier Tribunal erred in pre-empting the Secretary of State’s decision as to whether, if there were a Zambrano right to reside, there were nonetheless grounds of public policy, public security and public health to justify deportation, reaching an erroneous conclusion on that issue;

      5. the First-tier Tribunal’s conclusions that there were very compelling circumstances were inadequately reasoned and unsustainable.

Hearing on 18 December 2020

  1. We were, to an extent, assisted by a skeleton argument served in advance although for the reasons we address below, these did not address several material issues and it was only as a result of our own directions and reading beforehand that material and relevant issues came to light.

  2. That said, however, there was a significant narrowing of the issues in dispute which assisted the Tribunal. The Secretary of State did not pursue her amended ground (i) and it was agreed by both representatives that it would be sensible in hearing oral argument for us to consider ground (iii) first, it being agreed that if there was no derivative right that could be relied upon, then grounds (ii) and (iv) would not be relevant.

  3. The thrust of Mr Thomann’s submissions was that the scope of the derivative residence as explained by the CJEU in Zambrano [2011] EUECJ C-34/09 and subsequent cases including Chavez-Vilchez [2017] EUECJ C-133/15 as well as in the decisions of the domestic courts is such that the derivative right did not apply to circumstances here where one parent, a British citizen, had no intention of leaving the United Kingdom and thus there would be somebody to care for the British citizen child such that he would not be compelled to leave the United Kingdom or for that matter the EU. He submitted therefore that there were no rights under EU treaties which were engaged and that insofar as the Regulations went further would not create a treaty right.

  4. Mr Thomann submitted further that although an issue might arise in the case of a mother being removed and the third country national being a very small child, that was not applicable here. He submitted that, further, Regulation 16 ought to be interpreted on a purposive basis such that it would conform to the express view of the Court of Justice.

  5. Mr Georget conceded that, given the appellant’s wife’s evidence that she would not leave the United Kingdom, it would...

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