US nuclear weapons and non-proliferation
| Author | Matthew Kroenig |
| Date | 01 March 2016 |
| Published date | 01 March 2016 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343315626770 |
| Subject Matter | Research Articles |
US nuclear weapons and non-proliferation:
Is there a link?
Matthew Kroenig
Department of Government and School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Abstract
According to a widespread conventional wisdom, there is a link between US nuclear weapons and nuclear prolifera-
tion and, therefore, in order to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to other states, the US government must first
make changes to its own nuclear arsenal. This article challenges the notion that US nuclear posture has a significant
bearing on the proliferation and non-proliferation behavior of other states. Contrary to the received wisdom in policy
circles, this article maintains that state decisions on nuclear non-proliferation issues are driven by a range of other
security, economic, and political factors and, once these considerations are taken into account, there is little if any
remaining variance to be explained by US nuclear posture. Using a dataset on US nuclear arsenal size from 1945 to
2011, this article examines the relationship between the size of the US nuclear arsenal and a variety of nuclear non-
proliferation outcomes. It finds that there is no evidence of a relationship between the size of the US arsenal and: the
exploration, pursuit, or acquisition of nuclear weapons by other states; the provision of sensitive nuclear assistance to
non-nuclear weapon states; and voting on non-proliferation issues in the United Nations Security Council. The
results are robust to alternate conceptualizations and measurements of US nuclear weapons and in various sub-
samples of data. This article breaks new ground on an empirical research agenda on how the nuclear policies and
postures of the major nuclear powers affect the spread of nuclear weapons and has important implications for nuclear
security policy.
Keywords
arms control, nuclear proliferation, nuclear weapons, sensitive nuclear assistance, United States
In the 2010 National Security Strategy of the United
States of America, US President Barack Obama placed
nuclear non-proliferation first in a list of ‘top national
security priorities’. To counter the spread of nuclear
weapons, he promised a ‘comprehensive non-
proliferation and nuclear security agenda’ that begins
with ‘reducing our nuclear arsenal’ (White House,
2010: 4). In an updated 2015 strategy, Obama repeated
and re-emphasized this message (White House, 2015: 2–
11). Proponents of this policy, including many senior
US national security officials and policy analysts, believe
that the US nuclear arsenal is an important determinant
of proliferation decisions in other states and that the
United States can dissuade nuclear proliferation else-
where by reducing the size of its own nuclear arsenal.
As Choubey (2008: 3) explains, ‘A renewed debate on
the desirability and feasibility of nuclear disarmament
has emerged among US policy makers and influential
people on both sides of the political aisle. The notion
that preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is much
harder without also reducing their number seems to be
motivating much of this interest.’ Indeed, encouraged in
part by a belief in this relationship, the United States has
taken steps in recent years, including agreeing to reduce
the size of its strategic deployed nuclear arsenal to levels
not seen since the early 1950s in the New START
Treaty signed with Russia in 2010.
According to this conventional wisdom, there is a link
between the US nuclear arsenal and the spread of nuclear
weapons to other countries and, in order to prevent
Corresponding author:
mhk32@georgetown.edu
Journal of Peace Research
2016, Vol. 53(2) 166–179
ªThe Author(s) 2016
Reprints and permission:
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343315626770
jpr.sagepub.com
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