Using Private‐Public Linkages to Regulate Environmental Conflicts: The Case of International Construction Contracts

Published date01 March 2002
Date01 March 2002
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6478.00212
AuthorOren Perez
JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY
VOLUME 29, NUMBER 1, MARCH 2002
ISSN: 0263-323X, pp. 77–110
Using Private-Public Linkages to Regulate Environmental
Conflicts: The Case of International Construction Contracts
Oren Perez*
The article takes a pluralistic view of the `trade-environment'conflict by
exploring one of the settings of this conflict: the lex constructionis
international construction law. It seeks to unravel the way in which the
unique structural-cultural attributes of this legal domain have affected its
environmental (in)sensitivity. The article’s main argument in that context
is that the contractual tradition of the lex constructionis (as manifested in
the standard contracts that dominate this field) and its unique insti-
tutional structure, have created a culture of ecological indifference. This
culture has important practical consequences because of the deep
ecological problematic of international construction projects. The article
develops an alternative contractual model, which depicts the construc-
tion contract as a semi-political mechanism, rather than a private tool.
This conceptual change seeks to break the public/private separation that
characterizes the contractual discourse in the international construction
market. The article explores, further, whether this alternative contractual
vision could be realized in practice, and proposes several implementing
modules which could further this goal. While the article explores a
particular international regime, its methodology and conclusions – in
particular, the political-constitutional interpretation of the contract and
the critique of the public/private dichotomy (see sections III.3 and III.4) –
should be relevant to the regulation of many other (national or
international) environmental dilemmas.
The tension between environmental concerns and the global economic
system has been a recurrent theme in the recent wave of anti-globalization
protests – from Seattle 1998 to Quebec and Genoa 2001. The environmental
‘cause’ was invoked again and again in numerous street protests, pamphlets,
77
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*Faculty of Law, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, Israel 52900
The article draws on the research I did for my PhD thesis during 1997–2000 at the
London School of Economics and Political Science. It has benefited from the comments
of my two supervisors at LSE, Professor Gunther Teubner and Mr. Damian Chalmers. I
would also like to thank Professor Sol Picciotto for his comments on an earlier draft of
this article.
and radical websites. The apparent unity of action, which seemed to conjoin
these multiple acts of protest, is, however, highly misleading. In the first
place, the image of a single-minded, homogeneous movement is clearly
unfounded. Behind the protests at Seattle, Quebec, and Genoa lies an
amalgam of different groups and multiple ideologies. But this apparent unity
is misleading also in that it has projected a false picture of a unified global
economic system. The description of the Bretton Woods triad and the
multinational enterprises community as a kind of monstrous, anti-social and
anti-environmental transnational cartel is clearly too simplistic as a
characterization of the global economic field. This article rejects this
simplistic binary story. It pursues a different narrative, which is based on the
following thesis: the trade and environment conflict should not be seen as a
uni-dimensional problematic, a clear binary discord, but, rather, as a
reflection of multiple dilemmas – constituted and negotiated by a myriad of
institutional and discursive networks.
Developing an understanding of this conflict requires a multi-dimensional
perspective. One of the major blind spots of the current legal research in this
context is its myopic focus on the World Trade Organization. The ‘trade and
environment’ research programme has failed to take into account the
pluralistic nature of the contemporary global legal sphere. Far from being
homogenous, this sphere consists of multiple systems, which include, on the
one hand, traditional, treaty-based legal structures (for example, the WTO or
the IMF), and, on the other, a-national, or private legal networks (for
example, the lex mercatoria); together, this diverse network constitutes a
complex web of transnational governance.
1
The influence of this ‘web’ has
not been confined, however, to the economic realm; it has encroached deeply
into various aspects of our civic life – including the environment.
The thesis of global legal pluralism reconstructs the ‘trade and
environment’ conflict, then, as a multi-faceted dilemma, which is not
limited to the WTO. It makes clear that international trade – with its various
ecological side-effects
2
– is governed by multiple systems of law rather than
78
1
These a-national, or private networks, are not made of the familiar legal sources of
public international law, such as international treaties and state-practice, but are, rather.
the result of (private) norm production by trade associations, independent professional
organizations, commercial arbitrators, and multinational enterprises. See G. Teubner,
‘‘‘Global Bukowina’’:Legal Pluralism in the World Society’ in Global Law Without a
State, ed. G. Teubner (1997) 3. The establishment of the WTO did not impede the
growth of these a-national systems of law. On the contrary, the economic environment
of expanded international commerce, which was facilitated and encouraged by the
WTO, provided fresh stimulus to these processes of private rule-making.
2
For those who still doubt the existence of these side-effects, see, for example, R. Jha
and J. Whalley, ‘The Environmental Regime in Developing Countries’ (paper pres-
ented at a NBER/FEW conference on ‘Distributional and Behavioural Effects of
Environmental Policy’, Milan, 11–12 June 1999, available at
cidtrade> and W.D. Sunderlin et al., ‘Economic Crisis, Small Farmers’ Well Being,
and Forest Cover Change in Indonesia‘ (2001) 29 World Development 767.
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by any single system. A proper analysis of the trade-environment conflict
must be sensitive, therefore, to the composite nature of contemporary global
law. This article takes a closer look at one of the ‘private’ manifestations of
this multi-faceted conflict: international construction law (the lex
constructionis) – an important branch of the lex mercatoria.
3
The relevance
of this field of law to environmental studies stems from the fact that
construction activities – particularly those associated with large infra-
structure projects – can generate significant environmental damage.
4
Any
construction activity modifies the land or habitat in which it is taking place.
This damage, is highly varied, and includes loss of biodiversity, reduction in
the stability of land formations, and contamination of water resources. The
large volume of waste generated by construction operations can cause further
environmental degradation.
5
The interference of the construction activity in the eco-system and human
community, which hosts it, could give rise to bitter social disputes, driven by
conflicting interests, values, and discourses. This article explores the way in
which international construction law has confronted this construction-
environment dilemma. While this exploration takes place in the context of a
particular legal regime, its methodology and conclusions – in particular, the
critique of the private/public regulatory separation and the cooperative
regulatory model (which are developed in sections III.3 and III.4) – should
be relevant to many other environmental dilemmas taking place at national
or transnational levels. This alternative regulatory vision is consistent with
the increasing recognition among environmental researchers that, to be
successful, environmental policy must adopt a multi-dimensional strategy.
6
The article proceeds as follows. Section I outlines the environmental
world-view, which guides the discussion in the rest of the article. This world-
view is based on a political interpretation of the ecological ‘project’. Section
II considers the nature of the lex constructionis as an autonomous system of
law, and attempts to unravel the reflexivity structure of this legal system,
79
3 The term ‘lex constructionis’ was first suggested in C. Molineaux, ‘Moving Toward
a Construction Lex Mercatoria: A Lex Constructionis’ (1997) 14 J. of International
Arbitration 55.
4 See, for example, the discussion in G. Ofori and P. Chan, ‘Contractual Provisions
For Sustainability in Construction in Singapore’ (1999) 16 International
Construction Law Rev. 241.
5 Construction activities also have indirect environmental effects, related to the impact
of the construction activity on the general sustainability of the local or global
economy, due to their intensive resource utilization and energy use. Ofori and Chan
note, for example, that in monetary terms construction activity utilizes up to seven
times as much wood, minerals, water, and energy as the rest of the economy (id., p.
242). This article focuses, however, on the direct effects.
6 See, for example, T. Tietenberg and D. Wheeler, ‘Empowering the Community:
Information Strategies For Pollution Control‘ (paper delivered at the Frontiers of
Environmental Economics Conference, Virginia, 23–25 October 1998, available at
the World Bank website, NIPR programme).
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focusing on two key factors: its communicative patterns and its
organizational features. This dual exploration points to two prominent
features of the lex constructionis: that its main communicative channel is
standard model-forms, and that its norm-production activity is controlled by
few non-state actors. The article focuses on one key international player –
the International Federation of Consulting Engineers (FIDIC) – which plays
a dominant role in the international construction market.
Section III seeks to decode the linkage between the structural-cultural
attributes of the lex constructionis and its environmental (in)sensitivity. It
argues that the contractual tradition of the lex constructionis, in particular, its
distinction between the ‘public’ and ‘contractual’ orders, have generated a
legal culture that was highIy inattentive to the ecological aspects of
construction practice.
7
This has important practical consequences because of
the deep environmental problematic of transnational construction projects.
My goal is not confined, however, to an articulation of institutional
‘blindness’. I am interested also in developing pragmatic alternatives. To this
end, I draw a distinction between the contractual heritage of the lex
mercatoria and a counter contractual vision, which depicts the construction
contract as a semi-political mechanism, rather than a strictly private tool.
This conceptual change seeks to break the traditional separation between the
‘public’ and ‘private’ realms – a division that characterizes most of the
standard contracts in the construction market.
Of course, the main challenge lies in developing detailed normative/
institutional configurations that would enable the realization of this
‘political/constitutional’ understanding of the contract. These configurations
should have a reasonable ‘fit’ with the commercial constraints of the
transnational construction market. The article offers some practical
reflections, which seek to respond to this challenge.
80
7 In exploring this ‘inattentiveness’ I was guided by the idea that any communicative
structure (for example, the legal system) is necessarily ‘blind’, or ‘closed’ to some
features of the world. This blindness, or closure, reflects the fact that communication
emerges as a product of coordinated selections at the level of inter-subjective
interactions. It is, in other words, the result of a social process, by which a unique
domain of possibilities is singled-out collectively, and provides a background for
further selections. The emergence of communication (or societal meaning) thus
comes, necessarily, at the expense of some other potential distinctions (or selections)
which were successfully excluded. Any observer – whether a human being or a
social system – by founding his or her observation on this distinction rather than any
other, would fail to see what this distinction excludes. Only a second observer can
view this failure – but he or she, also, would be subject to the limits of his or her own
point of view. See N. Luhmann, ‘‘‘What is the Case’’ and ‘‘What Lies Behind It?’
the Two Sociologies and the Theory of Society’ (1994) 12 Sociological Theory 126,
137. Note, however, that this closure is not all ‘bad’. It also enables the system to
act. Thus, changing too much can also be risky – it could undermine the capacity of
the system to react to external perturbations.
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I. THE POLITICS OF ECOLOGICAL CO-EXISTENCE
Construction activities constitute a highly visible ecological threat.
Environmentalists tend to view this industry, primarily, as a source of
ecological disturbance and disfigurement. Indeed, over the last years
construction practice has been portrayed, increasingly, as an ecological culprit.
This process of ‘demonization’ is at odds with the positive role that
construction practice has played during human history – in providing basic
human needs, such as safe dwelling and a tamed environment. The sharp
contrast between these two articulations constitutes a difficult dilemma. In
developing a legal response to this dilemma I want to contrast between two
different environmental world-views, Both have emerged as a counter-response
to the capitalist vision of ‘nature-as-a-resource’. The first has been mostly
associated with the ‘deep-ecology’ movement, which interprets the idea of
‘environmentalism’ as a new form of ethic, which ‘gives to nature a social role
beyond being a means for human well-being’.
8
This alternative, non-
anthropocentric ethic sees the motif of ‘domination of nature’ as the main
malady of modern society, leading to two possible resolutions of the nature/
society opposition. The first seeks to replace the hierarchical approach to
nature, which is characteristic of contemporary society, with an ideology of
strict bio-egalitarianism. The second seeks to conflate the nature/society
distinction, and to replace it by a holistic vision, in which the boundaries
between humanity and nature are completely dissolved.
The practical implications of these interpretations remain unclear. Strict bio-
egalitarianism can only lead to social paralysis. If both humans and nature are
sanctified, how are we supposed to mediate between them if a conflict arises?
The holistic vision is no less problematic. If humanity and nature are conflated
into a unitary (non-hierarchical) whole, which becomes the primary object of
moral deliberation, how should we understand its various components and
envision their intricate relations (for example, in the context of a construction-
induced conflict?). It seems that the only way in which these interpretations
could be implemented in practice is through a strategy of strict ‘social
asceticism’, which would call for a complete withdrawal from the industrial
system and a return to a pre-capitalist society.
9
Only by adopting this vision of
stern ‘minimalism’ could the idea of nature as the embodiment of non-
instrumental moral value be given full effect
Bruno Latour’s environmental philosophy evolved as a counter-thesis to
the ideas of deep ecology. It offers, I believe, a more reasonable framework
for thinking about the construction-environment dilemma. Instead of calling
for bio-spherical egalitarianism or for the sanctification of nature, Latour
81
8 K. Eder, The Social Construction of Nature: A Sociology of Ecological
Enlightenment (1996) 207. See, further, A. Naess, ‘The Shallow and the Deep,
Long-Range Ecology Movement: A Summary’ (1983) 16 Inquiry 95.
9 See D. Forman, ‘Putting the Earth First’ in Debating the Earth: The Environmental
Politics Reader, eds. J.S. Dryzek and D. Schlosberg (1998) 358.
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argues that ecological dilemmas should be conceptualized as political
dilemmas. This political vision is based on a radical shift in the way in which
ecological dilemmas are observed; a shift from essences to relations. Latour
is not interested in investigating the essence of things, in attributing a-priori
labels to either humans or non-humans. His interest lies elsewhere: in
developing rich articulations of the intricate ways in which humans and non-
humans commingle and interact, and of the ways in which this commingling
transforms thern both (in terms of preferences, properties, and so on).
10
Construction activity is a rich source of such commingling: it provides the
setting for a very ‘tight’ or ‘intimate’ (in terms of space and time)
commingling between humans, eco-systems, and technologies.
But the move from essences to associations does not change just the way
in which nature-society dilemmas are observed.
11
It also reformulates their
resolution path – from the ethical to the political. To understand this change,
Latour argues, ‘one has to abandon the false conceit that ecology has
anything to do with nature as such’. Rather, political ecology needs to be
seen as ‘a new way to handle all the objects of human and non-human
collective life’; it is ‘a collective experimentation on the possible
associations between things and people without any of these entities being
used, from now on, as a simple means by the others’.
12
By designating this
new ‘collective’, Latour seeks to reformulate our understanding of politics
and polity. He thus challenges not just the deep ecologists’ dance between
sanctification and equality, but also the traditional conceptions of politics
and democracy, which have constructed these notions as exclusively human
constructs.
Conceptualizing ecology as a political endeavour means – in contrast to
the visions of bio-spherical egalitarianism or human domination of nature –
that the rights of both humans and non-humans cannot be decided a priori.
Rather, these rights can only emerge and be negotiated through a revised –
‘ecologized’ – political process. The main challenge lies, of course, in
developing practical institutional structures in which this new ‘ecologized’
82
10 You could feel, act, and be considered as a bourgeois, ecologically indifferent citizen
for a long period but then the risk of a bulldozer transgressing on your neighborhood
could turn you into a ‘green warrior’ or a green voter. And similarly, the bulldozer –
once a ‘neutral’ technical artifact – could be transformed into an anti-nature token.
See B. Latour, Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies (1999)
174–215.
11 This move does not mean that we have to abandon all our prior distinctions. One
such basic distinction is between communicating beings, non-communicating
beings, and societies (networks of communications). See N. Luhmann, Ecological
Communication (1989). However, the political shift proposed by Latour provides
one possible (and in no sense privileged) standpoint from which the relations
between these distinct realms could be conceptualized.
12 See B. Latour, ‘To Modernize or to Ecologize? That is the Question’ in Remaking
Reality: Nature at the Millennium, eds. N. Castree and B. Willems-Braun (1996)
221, 234.
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polity could be realized.
13
It is on this point that the law and legal scholars
can make their most substantial contribution. Devising regulatory structures
is, after all, what the law has been doing from the moment it emerged into
the social plane.
From this perspective, the solution to the construction-environment
dilemma lies in the political domain. My critique of the lex constructionis
follows this line of thought in that it does not attempt to proceed,
deductively, from some universal solution to the trade and environment
conflict. Rather, I explore the cultural and institutional features of this body
of law, and examine how it could be transformed in order to facilitate a more
inclusive ‘ecological dialogue’ which will give nature a more ‘proper’ voice
vis-a
`-vis its human associates.
II. THE FEATURES OF THE LEX CONSTRUCTIONIS AS AN
AUTONOMOUS LEGAL SYSTEM
1. The basic structure of the international construction market
The international activity in the construction market takes place in a limited
segment of the global construction market – that which involves large-scale
projects (such as airports, harbours, sanitary schemes, mines, petrochemical
plants, and so on).
14
The international market for construction services has
expanded substantially over the last decade;
15
supported by the conclusion,
in 1995, of the WTO Agreement.
16
Construction projects are a multi-party
operation. As such, they generate a complex web of contracts.
17
In
international projects, the principal parties are generally the host nation’s
government, the project sponsors, lenders, contractors, operators, and
insurers. The contractual framework can vary substantially between different
83
13 Latour, op. cit., n. 10, p. 214.
14 For a more detailed discussion see the WTO report ‘Construction and Related
Engineering Services: Background Note by the Secretariat’ (1998).
15 id., para. 12. The size of this market is huge. In most industrialized economies the
share of construction in total GDP is between 5 and 7 per cent (id., para. 7).
Construction services are traded, primarily, through the establishment of commercial
presence at the site of the works, either by local subsidiaries or through joint
ventures between foreign and domestic firms. A good proxy for the scale of the trade
in construction services is the total revenues of the top 225 international contractors.
According to the WTO, total revenues have grown between 1994 and 1996 from
$62,219.4 millions to $126,777.2 millions, a 104 per cent increase (id., table 1, p. 9).
This economic expansion is likely to yield a parallel expansion in the legal universe
that supports the global trade in construction services.
16 Particularly important in this context are the new General Agreement on Trade in
Services (‘GATS’), and the Plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement
(Annex 4 to the WTO Agreement), both signed at Marrakesh on 15 April 1994.
17 For a more detailed description of this complex contractual framework, see G.D.
Vinter, Project Finance (1998).
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project types, However, most construction projects include the following
three basic types of contracts: a construction agreement, in which the project
company and the contractor agree on the terms of the project; funding
agreements between the project company and the lenders; and insurance
contracts. Where the construction project concerns either an infrastructure
service (public utility) or the extraction of natural resources, the contractual
framework might include, in addition, a concession agreement in which the
host government grants the project company a long-term right to engage in
the relevant industry, and an operation agreement, which sets the conditions
for the operation of the service.
18
Of this complex contractual web, international construction law deals,
principally, with the construction agreement. In that respect, the lex
constructionis does not represent the whole legal complexity of the
construction endeavour. However, from an environmental perspective, the
construction agreement is probably the most interesting element of this
contractual web, as this is the ‘legal space’ which deals directly with the
ecological-physical aspects of the project. Any attempt to influence the
environmental impact of a construction project should focus, therefore, on
the structure and content of the construction agreement.
2. The emergence of the lex constructionis: basic communicative patterns
The lex constructionis is a product of standardized contracts, technical
guidelines, and arbitration awards.
19
Standard contractual forms constitute,
however, the most important element in this discursive universe: they form
the principal communicative channel through which the lex constructionis
evolves, and maintains its reflexivity.
20
While even the most popular forms
are rarely used unamended,
21
they have a profound effect on the formation of
normative expectations in this market. They underpin the negotiation
process, and accompany the construction process from beginning to end. The
common usage of standard contracts generates substantial economic
advantages, which seem to ensure the durability of this practice. It has
84
18 A common type of operation agreement is an output purchase agreement which
commits the host country, over a specified period, to purchase a minimum quantity
of the project’s output at an agreed price.
19 See B.J. Tieder, ‘The Globalization of Construction – Evolving Standards of
Construction Law’ (1998) 15 International Construction Law Rev. 550, and
Molineaux, op. cit., n. 3.
20
See J. Sweet, ‘The American Institute of Architects: Dominant Actor in the
Construction Documents Market’ (1991) Wisconsin Law Rev. 317, and Tieder, id., p.
552. There are significant linkages and cross-dependencies between domestic-oriented
forms and internationally-oriented standard contracts, see, for example, H. Lloyd,
‘Prevalent Philosophies of Risk Allocation – An Overview’ (1996) 13 International
Construction Law 502. For reasons of space I do not consider these interlinkages here.
21 See W. Hughes and D. Greenwood, ‘The Standardisation of Contracts For
Construction’ (1996) 13 International Construction Law 196, 204.
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reduced the transaction costs of entering into an international project and has
contributed to the evolvement of tendering as a conventional method of
obtaining competing quotations.
22
Public international law (both customary
and treaty law) has played, in contrast, a very limited role in the development
of the lex constructionis.
23
Standard model forms constitute, then, the main channel through which
the lex constructions transforms itself. There are, however, several other
important communicative channels. Of these the most important is
international arbitration. Most of the transactions in the international
construction market are subject to arbitration agreements. This means that
the majority of construction-disputes are being adjudicated before private
arbitrators, usually in one of the main international arbitration centres.
24
However, the capacity of the arbitration channel to instigate legal change is
limited, due to several features of the international arbitration field: the lack
of precedential practice, the absence of institutional cohesion (which
prevents the evolvement of organizational custom), and the lack of a wide
and timely circulation of judgments.
25
The increasing dominance of the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) International Court of
Arbitration might rectify, in the future, this lack of organizational cohesion,
and could thus increase the role played by the arbitration channel in the
evolution of the law.
26
The work of scholars constitutes another important
communicative channel. Scholarly publications are a particularly important
source of internal observation for the lex constructionis because, unlike
85
22
By ensuring a common basis for the evaluation of tenders, see N. G. Bunni, The FIDIC
Form of Contract: The Fourth Edition of the Red Book (1991) 3. The WTO
Agreement on Government Procurement, which is based on the idea of equal access to
governmental contracts, has also contributed to the expansion of the tendering method.
23 The intervention of public international law in the construction market was generally
limited to projects with transboundary effects. For a general discussion, see R.
Lefeber, Transboundary Environmental Interference and the Origin of State
Liability (1996) 19–46.
24
See Lloyd, op. cit., n. 20, p. 509. National courts, particularly in England and Wales, are
another source of interpretation. Arbitration awards frequently refer to decisions of
national courts, see the extracts of ICC arbitral awards on construction contracts, which
appeared in the ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin, vols. 2(1), 9(1), and 9(2).
25 Whereas new electronic forms of storing legal data, such as Lexis and Westlaw, have
changed significantly the pattern of communication in other legal spheres
(particularly in the United States of America), in the arbitration world, awards are
still available only in a printed form, with poor devices for sorting and ordering, and
even that only after a substantial delay. As was noted above, the ICC has made some
effort to rectify this problem by publishing extracts from ICC arbitral awards.
26 The prominence of the ICC arbitration centre seems to be guaranteed by the
common stipulation in FIDIC’s contracts that a contractual dispute should be
submitted to ICC arbitration if it can not be resolved in a less contentious way: see
C. Wade, ‘FIDIC’s Standard Forms of Contract – Principles and Scope of the Four
New Books’ (2000) 17 International Construction Law Rev. 5, 9. Other arbitration
centres, such as the London Court of International Arbitration, have failed, so far, to
establish themselves as prominent players in the construction arbitration market.
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arbitration awards which tend to provide an extremely scattered and episodic
portrait of the law, the work of scholars provides a comprehensive and
updated observation of the law – particularly of new standard forms.
27
Unlike domestic legal systems, in which legal change is effectuated
through two different processes – legislation and judicial decisions – the lex
constructionis changes principally through the channel of standard con-
tractual forms. Its reflexivity structure is thus much more limited than that of
domestic legal systems. This observation leads to two related predictions.
First, that the lex constructionis would be much more influenced by its
history: legal practices might persist even when the historical conditions in
which they were formed cease to be relevant. Because of its limited
reflexivity, we might reasonably expect such persistence to be more per-
vasive within the lex constructionis than in a domestic system of law.
Second, the evolutionary path of the lex constructionis should be much more
sensitive to the institutional nature and structure of the organizations which
control the production of standard forms.
28
I will revisit these predictions in
the course of the discussion of the openness of the lex constructionis to
environmental considerations (section III below). The following section
examines the institutional structure of the lex constructionis.
3. The institutional setting of the lex constructionis: exclusion and dominance
The international market for standard construction contracts is dominated by
a small group of international organizations.
29
This private control of the
norm-production process stands in contrast to the WTO realm in which the
norm-production process is divided between a contractual, inter-state realm,
and an independent judicial system. The main players are the International
Federation of Consulting Engineers (FIDIC),
30
the International European
Construction Federation (FIEC), the British Institution of Civil Engineers
(ICE), the Engineering Advancement Association of Japan (ENAA), the
American Institute of Architects (AIA),
31
and the International Bank for
86
27 See, for example, the commentaries on FIDIC’s Red Book by E.C. Corbett, FIDIC
4th – A Practical Legal Guide: A Commentary on the International Construction
Contract (1991), and Bunni, op. cit., n. 22. Forums like the International
Construction Law Review fulfil a similar role. The capacity of scholarly publications
to effectuate legal change remains, however, quite limited.
28 Neither of these predictions should lead, a priori, to a conclusion that the lex
constructionis is inefficient or ecologically indifferent. One cannot rule out the
possibility that a legal system will develop very sensitive private-legislative
mechanisms that will compensate for the absence of judicial innovations.
29 For a recent survey of these organizations, see Tieder, op. cit., n. 19, pp. 554–79.
30 The acronym stands for the French title: the Federation Internationale des
Ingenieurs – Conseils.
31 Although AIA model forms are not meant to be used in international projects, their
widespread use in the United States market (Sweet, op. cit., n. 20) has turned them
into a significant transnational benchmark.
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Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank).
32
Other key
contributors are UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT, through their more general
work on universal contract models.
33
UNCITRAL was involved also in
specific work on the construction market.
34
International legal firms are
another important player.
35
I would like to focus, however, on one prominent player in this group –
the International Federation of Consulting Engineers.
36
This does not imply
that the other players are not important, but FIDIC enjoys a dominant
position which justifies, I believe, this special attention. The discussion that
follows examines closely the structure of FIDIC’s contractual products, and
the institutional framework that facilitates the norm-production process.
37
I
will nonetheless make comparative references to the contractual products of
two other organizations: ENAA and the ICE.
FIDIC was founded in Belgium in 1913.
38
It is an association of national
87
32 The World Bank’s operational directives have a large influence on the operations of
other public lending bodies such as the Asian Development Bank, see Tieder, op.
cit., n. 19, p. 555. To some extent the World Bank also influences the lending
practices of private financial institutions.
33 See Tieder, id., pp. 558–72. In that context, the publication, in 1994, of UNIDROIT’s
Principles of International Commercial Contracts was particularly important.
UNIDROIT’s principles set themselves with the ambitious task of creating a model
contract law for cross-border transactions, see K.P. Berger, ‘The Lex Mercatoria
Doctrine and the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts’
(1997) 28 Law and Policy in Internalional Business 943. UNCITRAL’s most
important contribution was the adoption, in 1993, of the Model Law on Procurement
of Goods, Construction and Services. This model law deals, however, only with pre-
contractual selection practices, and does not address contract performance issues or
the settlement of disputes (Tieder, id., pp. 561–2).
34 In 1988 UNCITRAL published its ‘Legal Guide on Drawing Up International
Contracts for the Construction of Industrial Works’ (1988) which was quite widely
used, especially by developing countries. Another and more recent contribution is a
‘Legislative Guide on Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects’ (2001).
35 See Y. Dezalay and B. Garth, ‘Merchants of Law as Moral Entrepreneurs:
Constructing International Justice from the Competition for Transnational Business
Disputes’ (1995) 29 Law and Society Rev. 27.
36 For the central role of FIDIC in the construction market see ICC, ‘Extracts of ICC
Arbitral Awards on Construction Contracts Referring to the F.I.D.I.C. Conditions’
(1991) 2 ICC International Court of Arbitration Bull. 15. The ICC notes in the
introduction to this collection that: ‘In recent years construction disputes have
represented some 21 per cent of cases submitted annually to ICC arbitration. A
significant portion of these construction cases is governed by the F.I.D.I.C. .. .
Contract (International) for Works of Civil Engineering Construction or on
conditions modeled on the F.I.D.I.C. Conditions’ (id., p. 15).
37
This aspect of FIDIC’s work has received little attention in the legal literature. Most of
the literature consists of legal analysis of FIDIC and other international standard forms.
38 The following description is based on a paper by John Bowcock who was the
chairman of FIDIC’s Contracts Committee at the time: J. Bowcock, ‘The Four New
FIDIC Forms of Contract – Introduction’ (FIDIC New Contracts Launch Seminar
Series, September – December 1998), available at .
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member associations; thus, it does not include as members individual firms
of consulting engineers. The original founding countries were France,
Belgium, and Switzerland. FIDIC’s current membership circle transcends the
limited European membership of its inception period. By September 2001
FIDIC’s membership encompassed si xty-seven national member
associations representing some 560,000 professionals.
39
FIDIC is governed
by an executive committee and several specific committees and task
groups.
40
FIDIC has dominated the market for international construction documents
since the 1960s, with its standard forms of contract for engineering
construction and for the provision of mechanical and electrical plant. The
first form, ‘Conditions of Contract for Works of Civil Engineering
Construction’, which came to be known as the ‘Red Book’, was used
mainly for large projects, such as infrastructure and hydropower. The second
form, ‘Conditions of Contract for Electrical and Mechanical Works
including Erection on Site’ (also called the ‘Yellow Book’) – was used
mainly for the construction of industrial sites. Both forms have been in
widespread use for several decades.
41
FIDIC’s Red Book was particularly
dominant in the world market.
42
The prominent status of the Red Book was
affirmed by the World Bank, which has incorporated it into its standard
bidding documents for procurement of works.
43
Other private associations,
such as the British Institution of Civil Engineers and ENAA of Japan, have
88
39 The information was drawn from FIDIC’s website,
default.asp>, visited on 26 September 2001.
40 These include an Assessment Panel for Adjudicators, Business Practices Committee,
Contracts Committee, Capacity Building Task Force, Integrity Management Task
Force, Quality Management Task Force, Sustainable Development Task Force, and a
Risk Management Forum. The data were drawn from FIDIC’s website,
, visited 26 September 2001.
41 The Red Book was first published in 1957 and its fourth (and last) edition was
published in 1987. The Yellow Book’s third edition was published in 1987.
42
For a comprehensive commentary on the Red Book, see Corbett, op. cit., n. 27,
and Bunni, op. cit., n. 22. The Red Book has been amended several times since
1987. In 1999 FIDIC published a new series of contracts, which replaced the
Red Book. The detailed discussion below is based on FIDIC new contractual
products which, as will be explained below, are quite different from their
predecessors.
43 See the World Bank Standard Bidding Documents for Procurement of Works
(‘SBDW’) May 2000, electronic version available at
opr/procure/workspage.html>, visited 25 September 2001). The SBDW are based on
the fourth edition of the Red Book (1987, reprinted 1992 with amendments) and thus
do not reflect, as yet, FIDIC’s most recent forms. See, also, Molineaux, op. cit., n. 3,
p. 59. Additional indication of the normative status of FIDIC’s model forms can be
found in the recent decision of the World Bank to base its new trial edition (2000) of
Bidding Documents for Procurement of Simple Works (of Small Value, Short
Duration and Low Risk) on FIDIC’s ‘Short Form of Contract’ (1999). A copy of this
sample document is available on the World Bank website, id.
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also produced important standard documents;
44
however, none of these
documents has received the same kind of international stature that was
achieved by FIDIC documents, in particular by the Red Book.
The process through which FIDIC has produced its most recent
contractual products provides a good illustration to the institutional bounds
of the lex constructionis (or, in other words, to the openness of the norm-
production process). These bounds tend to perpetuate the ecological
insensitivity, discussed in the following section. In 1994 FIDIC decided to
update the Red and Yellow Books, by initiating a long and varied
consultation process.
45
This consultation process was mainly restricted,
however, to FIDIC’s natural audience: its members and other relevant groups
such as law firms, contracting groups, and financing institutions.
46
The
consultation process did not extend beyond the limited circle of the potential
users of FIDIC’s forms. FIDIC has not consulted other groups, such as
environ-mental and labour groups, despite the fact that international
construction projects can have a large influence on the life of the people
that these groups represent.
The institutional process behind the production of FIDIC’s new contracts,
reveals, therefore, a clear pattern of exclusion: the contracts were formulated
in the closed organizational sphere of the construction industry (including
related affiliates like financial institutions).
47
Groups which were not part of
this closed circle were left out. The exclusion of other voices, such as those
of environmental groups, provides one explanation for the environmental
insensitivity of FIDIC contracts, which will be considered in more detail in
section III below. However, it would be wrong, I believe, to explain this
insensitivity simply in terms of cartelistic behaviour.
48
The cultural
orientation of FIDIC cannot be reduced to the business interests of its
members. This non-economic background (to which I shall return in section
IV below) indicates that the organizational closure, which was sketched
above, could be altered.
89
44 See Tieder, op. cit., n. 19, pp. 576–9.
45 See, Wade, op. cit., n. 26.
46 id., p. 7.
47 The drafting process within other professional associations seems to follow a similar
pattern of exclusion. See, for example, the discussion of the American Institute of
Architects model contracts in T.L Stipanowich, ‘Reconstructing Construction Law:
Reality and Reform in a Transactional System’ (1998) Wisconsin Law Rev. 463, 526.
48 For this type of argument in the context of standardization, see G. Spindler, ‘Market
Processes, Standardisation, and Tort Law’ (1998) 4 European Law J. 316.
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III. ENVIRONMENTAL CLOSURE AND STANDARD
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS
1. FIDIC’s model forms: a general exposition
This section seeks to expose and criticize the environmental record of the lex
constructionis. Whereas the domestic scene, particularly in the United States
of America and Europe, has experienced a burgeoning wave of legal
innovations, covering different aspects of the environmental problematic –
from corporate liability (moving from traditional notions of individual
liability to new forms of collective liability), pollution control (using market
mechanisms rather than strict emission standards), to new regulatory tools
(such as broad disclosure requirements and eco-labelling),
49
the lex
constructionis has shown little ‘environmental’ innovation. It has maintained
in general an attitude of indifference toward environmental problems. This
section seeks to explore the nature of this indifference through a close
examination of some of the model forms that dominate the global
construction market, in particular the new series of contracts which was
published by FIDIC in 1999. I will try to assess to what extent these model
forms incorporate and give voice to general environmental concerns.
50
Two
other model forms, ENAA’s Model Form of International Contract for
Process Plant Construction (ENAA Model Form) and the ICE New
Engineering Contract (NEC) will be used as an additional comparative
source. I have chosen these two model contracts as a second point of
reference, because, although they do not enjoy the same universal stature as
FIDIC’s contracts, they are also used commonly in international projects.
51
90
49 See, for example, G. Teubner, ‘The Invisible Cupola: From Causal to Collective
Liability’ in Environmental Law and Ecological Responsibility , eds. G. Teubner, L.
Farmer and D. Murphy (1994) 17–48, discussing new doctrines of collective
liability, and Tietenberg and Wheeler, op. cit., n. 6, pointing to information
strategies as a new form of environmental regulation.
50 The analysis of FIDIC’s new forms does not intend to provide a comprehensive
analysis of their provisions. For a more general analysis, see, for example, P.L.
Booen, ‘The Three Major New FIDIC Books’ (2000) 17 International Construction
Law Rev. 24, and Wade, op. cit., n. 26.
51 As was noted before, one indication of the international status of FIDIC’s Red Book
was its adoption by the World Bank. The ENAA’s Model Form of International
Contract for Process Plant Construction was also adopted by the World Bank, and is
used in its ‘Standard Bidding Documents for Supply and Installation of Plant and
Equipment’ (November 1997, revised January 1999), electronic version available at
. For a commentary on
ENAA’s Model Form, see T. Wiwen-Nilsson, ‘The 1996 Edition of the ENAA
Model Form – International Contract for Power Plant Construction – A Brief
Review’ (1997) 14 International Construction Law Rev. 273. ICE’s NEC series,
which was first published in 1993 (a second edition was published in 1995), has also
significant international profile: see M. Barnes, ‘The New Engineering Contract –
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Before proceeding to review the environmental aspects of FIDIC’s new
contracts it might be worthwhile to consider the general structure of the three
model forms, which constitute the core of FIDIC’s new contracts-series.
FIDIC’s new line of contracts
52
reflects a change of thought in FIDIC. The
new contracts focus more on the apportionment of responsibilities between
the parties, than on the project’s type. Thus, the emphasis was shifted from
‘civil’ versus ‘electrical and mechanical’ works to ‘works being designed by
the Employer’ versus ‘works being designed by the Contractor’.
Accordingly, the special task-group established for this purpose decided to
develop a new construction book to be used for building/civil/ engineering
works designed by the employer or by his representative, the engineer
(henceforth, the Construction Contract). Conversely the new Plant &
Design-Build Book was designed to be suitable for plant/building/
engineering works designed by (or on behalf of) the contractor (henceforth,
the Plant Contract).
53
In addition, FIDIC issued a completely new model
form, based on a two-party approach, entitled the EPC Contract.
54
Both the new construction contract and the plant contract kept the
traditional three-party structure, which was used in the contracts’ previous
editions. Within this framework, the engineer, whom the employer (the
procurer of the works) employs for this purpose, administers the contract,
monitors the construction work, and certifies payments. Whenever the
engineer is required to determine any contentious matter or settle any claim
for time extension or extra costs, he or she is first required to consult with
each of the parties in an endeavour to reach agreement. If agreement is not
achieved, the engineer is required to make a fair determination in accord-
ance with the contract. If the engineer’s determination is not agreed by
either of the parties, or if a dispute otherwise arises, the parties can forward
91
An Update’ (1996) 13 International Construction Law Rev. 89, 95. The NEC series
comprises six different options, which all share the same core clauses. I will use the
NEC option F: Management Contract (November 1995) as my reference document.
52 The contracts were published initially in 1998 in a test edition. All my comments
refer to the 1999 edition of the contracts.
53 See Wade, op. cit., n. 26, p. 8. In the construction jargon the term ‘employer’ refers
to the entity which initiated the project. In many cases this would be a governmental
body of some sort; the term ‘contractor’ refers to the entity which would be
responsible for the actual execution of the project.
54 These three short titles are used in FIDIC publications, the full names being:
‘Conditions of Contract for Construction (for Building and Engineering Works
Designed by the Employer)’; ‘Conditions of Contract for Plant and Design-Build
(for Electrical and Mechanical Plant, and for Building and Engineering Works,
Designed by the Contractor)’; and ‘Conditions of Contract for EPC Turnkey
Projects’ (EPC stands for engineering, procurement, construction). See FIDIC, ‘New
Documents Ready For Edmonton’ (1998) 1998/2 FIDIC Q. Report 2. A fourth form,
which was also published in 1999 – Short Form of Contract – deals mainly with
small-value and simple projects. It is thus less relevant to the international market,
and will not be referred to in the following.
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the dispute to a dispute adjudication board (DAB).
55
If either party does not
accept the DAB’s decision and the parties fail to reach an amicable
settlement, the matter must be finally settled by international arbitration,
usually under the ICC Rules.
56
During the work on updating the Red and Yellow Books it became
apparent to the special task group that there is a demand in the market for a
contract that takes a two-party approach, where the engineer plays a less
prominent role in the administration of the contract resulting in the EPC
contract.
57
This demand was a reflection of the increase in the number of
privately financed international projects.
58
The move toward private forms
of financing triggered the development of several new models of project
delivery. These include the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) model, and the
Build-Own-Operate (BOO) model. In these concession-type arrangements a
private company
59
(the concessionaire) is granted the right and obligation to
provide an infrastructure service, usually by the state or a municipality.
60
The service, whether gas, power, water, transport, sanitation, or
telecommunications, is provided under terms and conditions specified in a
contract or licence. The concessionaire takes over operational responsibility
and at least part of the commercial risk of service provision.
61
By granting
the concession the state eliminates the need to pay for the construction
services once the work is completed.
ln such projects, the concessionaire takes most of the responsibility for the
financing, construction, and operation of the project. The uncertainty
associated with BOO or BOT projects includes, in addition to the ‘normal’
risks associated with the construction process, also the risks associated with
the project’s future cash flow. In order to limit their risk exposure, the
lenders seek to limit the uncertainties associated with the contract, both by
92
55 The DAB comprises one or three persons, which should be jointly appointed by the
parties, either at the commencement of the contract or on an ad hoc basis. The
concept of DAB was imposed on FIDIC by the World Bank, which was not happy
with the original Red Book framework, which appointed the engineer – despite
being paid by the employer – as the internal disputes-adjudicator of the contract. The
DAB concept is discussed in more detail below.
56 See, Wade, op. cit., n. 26, pp. 8–9.
57 id., p. 9.
58 id., p. 10, and World Bank ‘Privatization and Environmental Assessment: Issues and
Approaches’ in Environmental Assessment Sourcebook Update No. 6. (1994).
59 The construction company and the operator of the infrastructure service may be
different entities.
60 I am interested here mainly in those concession arrangements, which include both a
‘service’ element (the operation and maintenance of the facilities and the supply of
the infrastructure service) and a ‘construction’ element (the design and construction
of the new infrastructure). However, some concession arrangements may include
only a service element.
61 See P Guilaim and M. Kerf, ‘Concessions – The Way to Privatize Infrastructure
Sector Monopolies’ World Bank Public Policy for the Private Sector Series, October
1995, 4 at .
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eliminating the ‘engineer’ as an independent contractual persona with semi-
arbitral powers, and by placing the majority of risks associated with the
construction of the facility (for example, market and technical risks) on the
construction contractor.
62
The EPC Contract reflects the special
requirements of privately financed models by placing the total responsibility
for the design and construction of the infrastructure or other facility on the
contractor, and providing a higher degree of certainty that agreed contract
price and time will not be exceeded.
2. Environmental concerns and FIDIC model contracts
The way in which FIDIC (and other) contracts deal with environmental
issues reflects a commitment to a strict public/private dichotomy, and their
understanding of environmental responsibility is very much a product of this
dichotomy. In analysing the contractual treatment of environmental
problems I will use the concept of environmental impact assessment (EIA)
as my focal point. EIA constitutes today the preferred regulatory response to
the construction-environment dilemma, aiming to provide a comprehensive
framework in which the ecological impacts (including long-term effects) of
construction activities can be assessed and dealt with. The EIA doctrine is
based on the idea of ex-ante assessment – on the adoption of a forward-
looking approach, which seeks to examine the environmental impacts of a
project at an early stage. Because the EIA process is conducted before the
commencement of the construction project – with all the financial
commitments that come with it – it opens the way for an early detection
of ‘environmental’ mistakes (for example, problems of location, or basic
design flaws). EIA enables, therefore, the prevention of nonreversible
actions and costly financial commitments. EIA also provides a mechanism
for blocking those construction activities, which are completely untenable
from an environmental perspective. The extent to which FIDIC’s new
contracts incorporate the concept of ‘environmental impact assessment’ can
provide, therefore, a good indication of their ecological ‘sensitivity’.
Before turning to the detailed assessment of FIDIC forms, it is important to
make more explicit the ecological challenge that is faced by the lex
constructionis (this would help us to assess the environmental ‘failings’ of
this legal system). The scope of this challenge is determined by the sequential
fashion in which the construction process is observed by the law. The standard
construction contract (FIDIC’s or any other) does not normally govern the
contractual phase in which the EIA process takes place. The construction
contract regulates the ‘main phase’ of the construction project, the detailed
design and execution. In contrast, the EIA process is usually part of a ‘pre-
contract’ evaluation process, in which the procurer of the works assesses the
feasibility of the development plan and considers possible alternatives. This
93
62 See Wade, op. cit., n. 26, p. 11.
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assessment process comprises, usually, in addition to the EIA element, other
studies which examine, for example, the financial feasibility of the project, and
its compatibility with local land-use requirements.
63
This stage is governed by
a separate set of consultancy contracts, and by extra-contractual legal
requirements.
64
The construction contract holds, then, a posterior position in
this contractual sequence.
The legal separation between the different phases of the construction
project creates two difficulties. The first concerns the issue of implementa-
tion and monitoring. the second has to do with unforeseen contingencies.
The first problem points to the need for a contractual mechanism, which
could ensure that the conclusions of the EIA are actually implemented.
Proper monitoring procedures should form an essential element of any such
mechanism. The importance of follow-up mechanisms stems from the fact
that both the regulatory authority and the developer may find it tempting to
use the EIA as a ‘pseudo-analysis’.
65
From the authority’s perspective, the
EIA process could be perceived solely as a pre-decision mechanism, which
culminates in the authority’s final decision to grant (or refuse) a develop-
ment consent, and as such has no post-decision (for example, monitoring)
implications. From the developers’ point of view, once the project is granted
a formal consent, they have little interest in developing and implementing a
monitoring and post-auditing programme, which would enable them to
implement the EIA conclusions (and provide the authority with a convenient
supervising mechanism). The EIA literature points, indeed, to that lack of
proper post-EIA monitoring as one of the key problems in the current EIA
practice, both in the developing and developed world.
66
The issue of unforeseen contingencies points to a different problem,
which stems from the (unwarranted) tendency to treat the conclusions of the
EIA process as a closed and final set of prescriptions. This perception
ignores the fact that the EIA process, which is conducted before the
commencement of the project, cannot provide a complete description of the
94
63 See, for example, UNCITRAL (1988), op. cit., n. 34, pp. 9–13.
64 The separation between these two phases is further exacerbated by the fact that in
most cases the preliminary studies will not be conducted by the contractor that
would be engaged to construct the works, but by another firm (mainly because of the
risk of conflict of interests). In complex projects this principle could, however, be
compromised (id., p. 12).
65 ‘Pseudo-EIAs’ indicates those EIAs which are carried out with the single objective
of getting the project cleared. irrespective of the true environmental costs. See A.K.
Biswas, ‘Summary and Recommendations’ in Environmental Impact Assessment for
Developing Countries, eds. A.K. Biswas and S.B.C. Agarwal (1992) 240–1.
66
For a discussion of the problem of compliance monitoring in the context of the
developing world see id.; and see, also, for example, B. Dipper et al., ‘Monitoring and
Post-auditing in Environmental Impact Assessment: A Review’ (1998) 41 J. of
Environmental Planning and Management 731, 735 (discussing the EU), and L. Canter
and R. Clark, ‘NEPA Effectiveness – a Survey of Academics’ (1997) 17 Environmental
Impact Assessment Rev. 313, 323–4 (discussing the United States of America).
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project’s ecological impacts. Once the project unfolds there are bound to be
some environmental ‘surprises’. Coping with the problem of unforeseen
contingencies requires more than a mere implementing mechanism. It
requires the development of reflexivity procedures, which would encourage
the parties to reassess the environmental impacts of the project (even when
such impacts have no functional implications), and would provide the parties
with clear procedures through which the original design or work-programme
could be updated in response to such contingencies.
The discussion so far has pointed to two main legal challenges (both
related to the sequential nature of the construction process): post-EIA
monitoring and unforeseen contingencies. None of these problems is treated
by FIDIC contracts (or by the ENAA and NEC forms). For reasons of space I
will not enter here into a detailed description of the contracts.
67
I will only
make some brief references to the actual – and unsatisfactory way – in which
FIDIC contracts deal with the environmental issue. A direct reference to
environmental concerns can be found only in one clause, which is common
to the construction, plant, and EPC contracts. Article 4.18, which is titled
‘Protection of the Environtnent’, provides that:
The Contractor shall take all reasonable steps to protect the environment (both
on and off‘the Site) and to limit damage and nuisance to people and property
resulting from pollution, noise and other results of his operations.
The Contractor shall ensure that emissions, surface discharges and effluent
from the Contractor’s activities shall not exceed the values indicated in the
Employer’s Requirements, and shall not exceed the values prescribed by
applicable Laws.
68
While the inclusion of Article 4.18 in FIDIC’s new forms does reflect an
awareness of environmental issues, its limited coverage means that it cannot
provide an adequate response to many environmental concerns. The duty of
care imposed on the contractor by Article 4.18 is limited to the contractor’s
operations on and off the site; it does not cover the broader and long-term
ecological impacts of the construction project as a whole.
69
Moreover, this
provision makes no attempt to deal with the challenges of post-EIA
monitoring or unforeseen contingencies. The ENAA’s model form and the
Institution of Civil Engineers NEC do not include even such a limited
provision.
95
67 For a more detailed discussion, see O. Perez, ‘Ecological Sensitivity and Global
Legal Pluralism: Rethinking the Trade and Environment Debate’ (PhD thesis,
London School of Economics and Political Science, 2001) ch. 6.
68 Article 4.18 of the construction contract uses the term ‘specification’ instead of
‘employer’s requirement’.
69 Article 4.18 can be enforced, of course, only by the employer. The question is
whether the employer will bother to enforce this provision in those cases in which its
breach does not affect the successful completion of the project. I did not find
examples for such litigation with respect to FIDIC contracts (which does not
necessarily say that there were no such incidents).
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FIDIC’s new contracts do not include any other clear environmental
provisions, or, to that extent, any direct reference to a pre-contractual EIA
statement. This is also the case with respect to the NEC and ENAA’s model
form. The main other (indirect) route through which the ‘environmental’
issue enters into the contractual universe of the industry’s standard forms
concerns the contracts’ general compliance provisions, which require the
parties to comply with the applicable laws of the host country in the design
and execution phases of the project.
70
These would include, of course, any
environmental regulation, The underlying assumption behind these
provisions is that it is the responsibility of the ‘external’ law to regulate
the environmental aspects of the construction activity, including the EIA
process, and any post-EIA requirements. The compliance provisions
construct the ecological side-effects of the construction activity, as a ‘public
order’ dilemma – a dilemma that lies outside the contractual realm – and as
such should be regulated by the state which hosts the construction project.
3. Critique of the contemporary contractual response to the environment-
construction dilemma
The response of the lex constructionis to the construction-environmental
dilemma is, then, based primarily on a strategy of deference, which seeks to
externalize the responsibility for regulating the environmental aspects of the
construction activity to the ‘extra-contractual’ realm of the law of the host-
state. This is achieved through the employment of ‘compliance’ provisions,
which appear in most of the standard forms. The fundamental assumption
behind the deference model is that the contract is a private ordering device.
As such it cannot and should not interfere with the kind of issues that fall
under the ambit of the ‘public order’. Since environmental problems are seen
as part and parcel of this ‘public order’ they are envisaged as falling outside
the boundaries of the contractual regime. The contractual order has, under
this vision, no original role to play in the field of public order. Its only
contribution is to provide legally recognized addressees to which external
orders may be directed. The environmental closure of the lex constructionis
is a clear product of this private/public divide.
This sharp distinction between the private and public orders, which
characterizes the lex constructionis, has strong roots within the lex
mercatoria. The purpose of the lex mercatoria was understood, historically,
as protecting business expectations; the primary task of the lex mercatoria
was to render business relations more calculable.
71
The lex mercatoria was
96
70 See Articles 1.13, 2.2, of the construction contract, and Articles 1.13, 2.2, 5.4 of the
plant and EPC contracts. See, also, Articles 9.3, 9.4, 10.3, and 10.4 of the ENAA
model form, Articles 18.1, 31.2, 95.3 (health and safety requirements), and 19.1 and
21.2 (general compliance requirements) of the NEC.
71 See H. Collins, ‘Formalism and Efficiency: Designing European Commercial
Contract Law’ (2000) 1 European Rev. of Private Law 211, 216–17.
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seen, therefore, as having no interest in other forms of expectations. This
‘interest’ had to be imposed from the outside. The growing debate among
scholars and practitioners of international arbitration with respect to the
linkage between mandatory rules of law and the lex mercatoria is one
example of the influence of this legal conception.
72
The question underlying
this debate was to what extent mandatory rules of law, or issues of ‘public
policy’, should interfere with the ‘law of the contract’, This question has
usually arisen in proceedings for enforcement of foreign arbitral awards,
where the ‘public policy’ argument was invoked as a ground for refusing
enforcement. The question has become especially important in the field of
competition law, An increasing number of cases deal with the question
whether an international contract, which is seen as inconsistent with the
competition laws of the country in which it was made or was intended to be
executed, should be given effect.
73
While there are varying opinions with respect to how far mandatory rules
can interfere with the realm of the lex mercatoria, and how the content of
these rules should be determined,
74
the legal debate is, nonetheless, based on
the shared and uncontested assumption that the private realm of the lex
mercatoria can make no positive contribution to the realm of public order.
The debate has focused exclusively on the question whether public law can
(and should) encroach into the private order of the contract. The opposite
question has never been discussed.
75
As one ICC arbitrator has put it:
‘Agreements and contractual obligations may not be extended to the field of
public orders’.
76
97
72 The New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards recognizes the violation of public policy (or ordre public) as a ground for
refusing recognition/enforcement of foreign awards (see Article V.2). A similar
provision is included in UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration (1985), see Article 36.
73 The two leading cases are the US Supreme Court decision in Mitsubishi v. Soler 473
US 614 (1985), a case involving the applicability of the US Sherman Act to an
arbitration conducted under Swiss law, and the European Court of Justice decision in
Case C-126/97 Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton International NV [1999] ECR
1–3055, where the ECJ considered this question in light of the EU competition rules.
For a more detailed discussion of these cases, see A. Sheppard and N. Nassar, Final
Report on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of Arbitral Awards (2000) 19–20,
and D. Hochstrasser, ‘Choice of Law and ‘‘Foreign’’ Mandatory Rules in
International Arbitration’ (1994) 11 J. of International Arbitration 57, 75–9.
74 For a detailed discussion of this debate see Sheppard and Nassar, id, and
Hochstrasser, id.
75 This question was discussed, however, in the domestic context, see, for example,
note, ‘Private Law Making by Trade Associations’ (1949) 62 Harvard Law Rev.
1346, 1367 and M.C. Dorf and C.F. Sabel, ‘Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism’ (1998) 98 Columbia Law Rev. 267.
76 See S. Jarvin, ‘International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration: Award
Rendered in Case No. 3902 in 1984’ (1984) 2 International Construction Law Rev.
49, 52 (which includes a report of the case).
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However, the translocation of the distinction between the contractual
and public orders from the lex mercatoria to the lex construcionis is highly
problematic from an environmental perspective. Indeed, it undermines the
capacity of the lex constructionis to ‘see’ the deep environmental
problematic of the construction practice. There are two aspects to this
legal ‘blindness’. The first is political; the second is functional. From a
political perspective, there is a problematic gap between the fragmented
legal image that is generated by the lex constructionis, and the actual
socio-environmental intimacy that characterizes the construction
endeavour. Construction activities, which encroach deeply into the social
and ecological localities in which they take place, are highly
contextualized activities; they are ‘webbed’ into their social and ecological
surroundings. This embeddedness is highly incongruent with the image of
an isolated ‘business relation’, which underscores the contractual tradition
of the lex mercatoria. The fragmented discourse of the lex constructionis is
‘blind’, in other words, to the community that is fabricated by the
interference of the construction endeavour in a particular geographical
space and a delimited time horizon.
This ‘blindness’ of the lex constructionis provides a convenient setting for
the externalization of the project’s environmental costs to the extra-
contractual community. In that respect the contractual tradition of the lex
mercatoria goes hand in hand with the economic constraints that surround
the construction market. Economists view the legal contract as a tool for
enhancing the economic value of the business deal for its parties. This
economic vision, as its legal counterpart, provides no basis for the
consideration of those interests, which are not parties to the ‘deal’.
77
The
notion of ‘efficient risk allocation’ further illustrates how this logic of
externalization operates. In order to maximize its economic value the
contract is expected to provide the parties with an efficient risk-allocation
scheme. This should be achieved by allocating particular risks to the party
best able to manage them.
78
Any other allocation would inhibit the
realization of a surplus-maximizing transaction. The economic vision clearly
encourages the parties to allocate environmental risks to the extra-
contractual community, when they can do it without any external
consequences.
79
98
77 Under this economic vision, a perfect, or complete contract is that which ‘fully
realize[s] the potential gains from trade in all states of the worlds’, see I. Ayres and
R. Gertner, ‘Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal
Rules’ (1992) 101 Yale Law J. 729, 730.
78 See L.W. Carter and G. Bond, Financing Private Infrastructure (1996) 67.
79
Indeed, the idea that ‘third parties’ might need protection from such
externalization is used to justify in the national context – the encroachment of
the ‘freedom of contract’ ideal by mandatory rules. A prominent example is
antitrust laws, which restrict the power of private parties to enter into exclusive
dealing agreements.
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But the private/public dichotomy, and the sharp apportionment of roles
that accompanies it within the contractual discourse of the lex constructionis,
is problematic also from a functional perspective. The assumption that the
extra-contractual realm can provide the regulatory services that are expected
from it under the deference model is highly questionable. The complexity of
the construction endeavour requires a cooperative regulatory strategy, which
would bring together the problem-solving capacities of the constructing
agents, the regulatory establishment, and the community that hosts the
project. Thus, for example, successful environmental assessment might
require the involvement of both local knowledge and highly technical
capabilities. Assessing the environmental and social impacts of a project is a
‘fuzzy’ and unbounded task. There is no clear candidate to whom this task
can be delegated on exclusive terms. The sharp distinction between the
internal and external orders inhibits the evolvement of such flexible, trans-
domain collaborations. The fact that the regulative capacities of many
developing countries are highly limited further emphasizes the need for such
collaborations.
80
It is important to note in this context, that the existing
international regulatory framework cannot, in its current form, fill the
regulatory void that characterizes the developing world.
81
4. A different contractual vision?
Any attempt to incorporate environmental concerns into the lex
constructionis would require, then, a change in the current conception of
the construction contract. I believe that viewing the construction contract as
a semi-political mechanism, rather than a strictly private tool, can provide a
useful basis for transforming the current environmental insensitivity of the
lex constructionis. This transformation should seek to break the traditional
99
80 Thus, for example, in many developing countries EIA is not required, and, even
when it is required, tends to be poorly implemented and monitored. See Biswas and
Agarwal, op. cit., n. 65, and the World Bank, op. cit., n. 58, p. 4. The EIA issue is, of
course, only one aspect of this institutional weakness. Similar regulatory problems
exist in the supervision of industrial pollution, see, for example, S. Pargal et al.,
‘Formal and Informal Regulation of Industrial Pollution: Comparative Evidence
from Indonesia and the United States’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper
1797 (1997).
81 First, the activities of transnational corporations are not subject to a general (and
binding) system of international supervision. Second, the issue of EIA itself is
subject to a limited international regulation. Even when there is some sort of
international regulation, it is limited, usually, to projects with substantial
transboundary effects. As it currently stands, international environmental law does
not seek to regulate those construction projects which are contained within the
boundaries of one jurisdiction, even when they involve multinational cooperation: C.
Klein-Chesivoir, ‘Avoiding Environmental Injury: the Case for Widespread Use of
Environmental Impact Assessments in International Development Projects’ (1990)
30 Virginia J. of International Law 517, 527.
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division (between the public and private realms) that characterizes the
regulatory spectrum of the modern welfare state. The cornerstone of this
alternative vision is the idea that any construction activity creates, through its
interference in a singular geographical space, a micro ‘polity’, which
consists of the inhabitants (humans and non-humans!) of this space.
82
This
micro-polity is not just a reflection of common space/time boundaries but,
more importantly, of a common dilemma: how to cope, collectively, with the
potential impacts of a proposed construction project. Indeed, the fact that this
dilemma requires a collective solution is what makes it political.
Under this view the construction contract should constitute an integral
part of the constitutional’ framework through which this collective dilemma
is resolved, The construction contract is conceptualized, then, as one of the
tools through which the project of ‘ecologizing’ our political life could be
realized. ‘Ecologizing’ is interpreted in the spirit of Bruno Latour – not as
the sanctification of nature but as the invention of new political procedures
for managing this construction-induced ‘collective’.
83
The deference model
and the private/public dichotomy that informs it are, of course, inconsistent
with this constitutional vision. This constitutional vision fits nicely with the
idea of EIA, which is perceived by many observers not just as a technocratic
decision-making tool but as a consensus-building mechanism that aspires to
bring within its boundaries all those who might be affected by a construction
activity.
84
The more difficult question, of course, is how to translate this abstract
vision into a set of realizable institutional practices. This question is explored
in the remaining part of this section. In seeking possible implementation
paths I focus on two key points, which seem to me to be the most promising.
The first argues for the incorporation of an environmental management
system (EMS) into the construction contract. The second seeks to modify the
dispute resolution model that dominates the construction world. Consider
first the issue of environmental management. The main advantage of the
EMS concept is that it provides a way to integrate the environmental cause,
in a systematic way, into the decision-making structure of a business
endeavour. As such, it provides a way to bring some of the ‘externalized
100
82 As a ‘micro-constitution’ the construction contract should develop deeper sensitivity
to the details of the social situation in which it is embedded, where ‘social situation’
depicts the totality of societies, living organisms, and physical environment, which
interact in the context of a particular ecological problem.
83 See Latour, op. cit., n. 12, pp. 234–5.
84 See, for example, O. Renn et al. (eds.), Fairness and Competence in Citizen
Participation: Evaluating Models for Environmental Discourse (1995). The World
Bank adopted a similar cooperative vision, which views the process of EIA as a
cooperative effort that involves the borrower, the Bank, the affected populations, and
local NGOs; see the World Bank, ‘Public Involvement in Environmental
Assessment: Requirements, Opportunities and Issues’ in Environmental Assessment
Sourcebook Update No. 5 (1993).
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parties’ into the contractual universe of the lex constructionis. The
environmental management system of the International Organization of
Standardization, the ISO 14001, is the most likely candidate for such
incorporation, since it is currently the most widely used global EMS.
85
The ISO 14001 standard and its most important rival, the European
EcoManagement and Audit Scheme (EMAS)
86
are based on a similar vision,
which is to create a framework that will encourage the certified organization
to improve, continuously, its overall environmental performance.
87
ISO
14001 attempts to achieve this goal through a very simple scheme, which is
based on five general principles: commitment and policy, planning,
implementation, measurement and evaluation, and finally, review and
further implementation. What links these principles together is a general
commitment to a dynamic cyclical process of ‘plan, implement, check and
review’.
88
Linking this cyclical process to the environmental objectives that
were set out in the pre-contractual EIA should provide a mechanism for
implementing and reviewing the conclusions of the EIA.
The integrative and reflexive vision of the ISO 14001 and EMAS seems to
provide a good setting for confronting some of the key problems of the lex
constructionis. As was noted before, these problems emanate from the
discontinuity between the ‘pre’ and ‘post’ phases of the contractual project.
101
85 In 1998 there were 5,637 ISO sites against 2,141 sites for the competing European
scheme (EMAS), see Anonymous, ‘ISO 14001 and EMAS Sites World-Wide’
(1998) 5 J. of the Institute of Environmental Management 3, 6. By the end of 2000
the total number of ISO 14000 certificates has risen to 22,897; see ‘ISO Survey of
ISO 9000 and ISO 14000 certificates – Tenth cycle: up to and including 31
December 2000’, available at .
86 ISO 14001 (1996) Environmental Management Systems Specification with
Guidance for Use is the actual management system. A second standard, the ISO
14004 (1996) Environmental – Management Systems – General Guidelines on
Principles, Systems and Supporting Techniques is a guidance manual. The European
scheme was established in 1993 by Council Regulation (EEC) 1836/93 29 June
1993, OJ L168, 10 July 1993, 1, and became operative in 1995. The 1993 scheme
was revised in 2001 by the Regulation (EC) No. 761/2001 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2001 allowing voluntary participation by
organisations in a Community eco-management and audit scheme, OJ L114, 24
April 2001, 1 (henceforth EMAS II Regulation). The EMAS II Regulation
incorporates ISO 14001 as its environmental management system (see Annex 1 of
the revised regulation). EMAS II imposes, however, several additional obligations
that go further than the requirements of ISO 14001, particularly in the areas of
environmental improvement, external communication, and employee involvement.
For a review of the ISO 14000 series, see the ISO website at , and P.C.
Murray, ‘Inching Toward Environmental Regulatory Reform – ISO 14000: Much
Ado About Nothing or a Reinvention Tool?’ (1999) 37 Am. Business Law J. 35; for a
review of the EMAS II Regulation, see the EMAS website:
comm/environment/emas>.
87 See the ISO 14001 introduction at vi, and Article 3.1, and Article 1(2) of the EMAS
II Regulation.
88 ISO 14001, Annex A.1, at 6; Murray. op. cit., n. 86, pp. 45–8.
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This discontinuity tends to impede the efficient implementation of a pre-
contractual EIA, and, as such contributes to the culture of ‘externalization’
which characterizes the lex constructionis.
89
In order to create a temporal
continuity between the different phases of the construction project, the main
contract should provide both a monitoring mechanism, which would guarantee
that the conclusions of the preliminary EIA are actually implemented (in both
the design and execution of the works), and a mechanism for coping with the
problem of unforeseen contingencies. A possible response to the latter
challenge might be to create a mechanism of second environmental review.
This contractual mechanism should fulfill two goals. First, it should provide
an opportunity for re-evaluating the conclusions of the preliminary
environmental assessment in light of any new information (for example,
unforeseen changes to the original design or unpredicted environmental
effects). Second, it should provide clear procedures for programme revision,
which would enable the parties to incorporate the conclusions of such a
‘second review’ into the working programme.
90
These two tasks fit quite
naturally into the management cycle of the ISO 14001 standard.
Some features of the ISO 14001 standard are, however, inconsistent with
the constitutional vision that was promulgated above. In the first place, the
ISO 14001 is designed to operate mainly within a given organizational
structure – usually a business corporation. In contrast construction activities
involve, usually, a multiplicity of agents (owner, designers, constructors, sub-
contractors, suppliers, and future operators) who operate either simultaneously
or in a sequential fashion. The ISO 14001 system does not provide an
adequate answer to this institutional complexity, and it would have to be
modified accordingly.
91
A second shortcoming of the ISO 14001 standard, is
that it gives the organization a wide discretion, both in devising its
environmental plan and in designing the environmental indicators according
to which it will measure its performance.
92
If the basic ‘regulatory level’ is
102
89 The emphasis on the post-EIA problematique is consistent with the World Bank
understanding of the EIA process, which views the idea of post-EIA auditing as an
integral part the EIA process. See Articles 12, 13, 15 of Operational Directive 4.01
on Environmental Assessment (1991, updated 1996), and Annex C to OD April 2001
(Environmental Mitigation or Environmental Management Plan).
90 Article 13 of the new FIDIC forms, which deals with ‘Variations and Adjustments’,
can provide some guidance to the way in which such a review mechanism could be
designed. However, Article 13 is based on an either/or risk allocation that is, again,
at odds with the cooperative vision that is advocated here. The provisions of the
NEC that deal with programme revision (Articles 31, 32) can also provide useful
guidance for devising such procedures.
91 For example, the notion of continuous improvement would have to be interpreted as
project-specific rather than organization-specific.
92
See Murray, op. cit., n. 86, pp. 49–50. The introduction to ISO 14001 provides that:
‘. . . this international standard does not establish absolute requirements for
environmental performance beyond commitment, in the policy, to compliance with
applicable legislation and regulations and to continual improvement’, ISO 14001,
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low, as might be the case in many developing countries, the commitment to
continual improvement might not mean much.
93
One of the challenges of the
lex constructionis and the construction industry as a whole is, indeed, to fill
this gap. The integrity of the initial EIA has a crucial role in this context.
A final weakness of the ISO 14001 framework, is its undemanding position
with respect to public participation. The ISO 14001 standard does not view the
notion of public consultation as an integral element of the environmental
management system.
94
The involvement of the public is, however, a key
element of the contractual vision, which was promulgated here. Public
participation is important both in the context of post-EIA monitoring, and in
the context of second environmental review. In that respect the revised EMAS
regulation provides a more progressive model, both by introducing demanding
disclosure requirements,
95
and by requiring any certified organization to
103
introduction, at vi. Organizations certified under EMAS II will face higher demands.
This was achieved by introducing the concept of significant environmental aspects.
Article 1(2) of the EMAS II regulation states that ‘The objective of EMAS shall be to
promote continual improvements in the environmental performance of organisations
.. .’. Article 2(b) defines ‘continual improvement of environmental performance’ as
‘the process of enhancing, year by year, the measurable results of the environmental
management system related to an organisation’s management of its significant
environmental aspects, based on its environmental policy, objectives and targets . . .’
(my emphasis). The notion of significance is defined in Annex VI (Article 6.4).
93 Note, also, that under the ISO 14001 scheme, a firm can legitimately respond to
nonconformance by reducing the stringency of its declared goals on the ground that
the initial goals were ‘inappropriate’ (as long as the new goals comply with
regulatory guidelines): J. Switzer and J. Ehrenfeld, ‘Independent Environmental
Auditors: What Does ISO 14001 Registration Really Mean?’ (1999) Environmental
Quality Management 17, 27.
94 Article 4.4.3 of ISO 14001 requires the organization only to ‘consider processes for
external communication on its significant environmental aspects and [to] record its
decision’ (my emphasis). Furthermore, the ISO 14001 standard does not require the
publication of an annual environmental statement (see ISO 14004, Article 4.3.3.1).
This of course raises the question of the public accountability of the scheme. This
approach to the disclosure issue reflects mainly the concern of the United States
business community that such extensive disclosure would act as a platform for
criminal or civil litigation, and not as a platform for constructive dialogue; see
Murray, op. cit., n. 86, pp. 53–4. Responding to these concerns, several US states
have made an attempt to provide firms with certified EMS programmes with either a
statutory immunity from liability or a qualified privilege. For a more detailed
discussion, see Murray, id., pp. 53–62.
95 The organizations that will register under the new scheme will be required to
publish, on a yearly basis, an environmental statement, which should provide details
of the environmental performance of the organization against its environmental
objectives and targets (Art. 3, sub-paragraphs (2)(c) and (c) and (3)(b) of the EMAS
II regulation). The environmental statement shall be verified by ‘environmental
verifier’ (Art. 3(2)(d)). Further details with respect to the objectives, structure
(including data requirements), and modes of publication, of the environmental
statement are given in Annex III. Art. 3.6, which deals with the issue of public
availability, encourages the certified organizations to use various communicating
channels – including electronic publication, libraries, and so on.
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engage in true and open dialogue with its employees and the public at large.
96
The revised EMAS regulation thus makes an attempt to go beyond a purely
‘disclosure’ model, in which the deliberation is perceived only as an ad hoc
exercise, toward a model in which the dialogue between the organization and
the public is perceived as a continuous process. This approach fits nicely with
the construction context, where it is critical that any deliberation would take
place before the project is completed.
It is important to understand that this proposal does not seek to transform
the construction contract into some monstrous, all-embracing instrument.
Thus, I do not believe that the construction contract should provide a detailed
environmental performance schedule, or act as an environmental
management manual. Rather, this proposal seeks to encourage a greater
use of the construction contract as a coordination mechanism. As a
coordinating device the contract can, and should, refer to external sources
such as the World Bank’s EIA guidelines or the ISO 14001 standard, only
modifying them when required.
97
The technical modalities of such
incorporation are not complicated. Indeed, FIDIC model forms already use
this ‘legislative’ method, albeit in relation to quality assurance.
98
I believe
that this idea could find some support within FIDIC, which has been
involved over the last few years in an initiative to introduce the concept of
EMS to the construction industry.
99
A second area, which could be used to advance my ‘constitutional’ vision,
concerns the issue of dispute settlement. As was noted above, most of the
model forms include an arbitration agreement. This means that most of the
104
96 Thus, Article B(3) of Annex 1 of the Revised Regulation, entitled ‘external
communication and relations’, requires that the organization shall be able ‘to
demonstrate an open dialogue with the public and other interested parties including
local communities and customers with regard to the environmental impact of their
activities, products and services in order to identify the public’s and other interested
parties’ concerns’. Article B(4) of the same Annex requires certified organizations to
involve their employees in the operation of the environmental management system,
through, for example, suggestion-book systems, project-based working groups, or
environmental committees.
97 As the EMAS II regulation does with respect to ISO 14001.
98
Article 4.9, which appears in almost identical form in the construction, plant, and
EPC contracts, provides that: ‘The Contractor shall institute a quality assurance
system to demonstrate compliance with the requirements of the Contract. The
system shall be in accordance with the details stated in the Contract. The
Employer shall be entitled to audit any aspect of the system, . . .’ This is the EPC
version. The construction and plant contracts differ only in that they use the term
‘Engineer’ instead of the ‘Employer’. A similar provision could be used to
introduce an ‘environmental management system’ (‘EMS’) into the contract.
99 FIDIC published in 1995, in cooperation with UNEP and the International Chamber
of Commerce, a resource training kit on environmental management, which was
inspired, largely, by the ISO 14001 standard and EMAS. However, FIDIC has
viewed the concept of EMS as a purely managerial notion, and has made, so far, no
attempt to incorporate it into its model forms.
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disputes in the global construction market are adjudicated before private
arbitrators, usually in one of the main international arbitration centres. The
arbitration universe is, however, a closed world; it gives no voice to those
parties who are external to the contractual order. This closure, which means
that non-parties can raise claims against the contractual order only through
the ‘external’ court system, supports and perpetuates the private/public
separation which was criticized earlier. Breaking this separation clearly
requires an alternative dispute settlement structure.
The idea of Dispute Adjudication Board (DAB), which was adopted by
FIDIC’s new model contracts, can provide a useful starting point for
thinking about such an alternative structure.
100
The DAB is constructed
as an internal adjudicator/mediator, which should deal with any dispute
before it is forwarded to an external formal arbitration.
101
The main
advantage of the DAB concept is that by being in place at the outset of
the project, before the emergence of any dispute, it ‘is able to have
personal and contemporaneous familiarity with the development of the
work under the contract’ and to establish regular communication with the
parties.
102
This close contact with the project’s ‘reality’ distinguishes the
DAB from a post-dispute legal adjudicator, who necessarily relies, in
constructing her judgement, on documents and witnesses, rather than on a
direct knowledge of the project. It is this close contact, which makes the
DAB’s opinion with respect to any disagreement more acceptable to the
parties. Of course, to create this distinction between the DAB and a legal
adjudicator, it is essential that the ‘DAB’ be appointed by the parties at
the commencement of the contract, and will familiarize itself with the
project before the occurrence of any dispute.
103
Under the current construction contract the DAB members are
appointed by the parties.
104
This arrangement is unsatisfactory from my
105
100 See Article 20 to FIDIC new model-forms. The DAB shall comprise either one or
three persons.
101 Both parties have the right to submit the dispute to formal arbitration, usually under
the ICC Rules, if they do not accept the DAB’s decision, and fail to reach an
amicable settlement (Article 20.6 of FIDIC’s new forms).
102 G.L. Jaynes, ‘FIDIC’s 1999 Editions of Conditions of Contract For ‘‘Plant and
Design-Build’’ and ‘‘EPC Turnkey Contract’’: Is the ‘‘DAB’’ Still a Star?’ (1999) 17
International Construction Law Rev. 42, 45.
103 The construction contract establishes explicit procedures to enable the DAB to
familiarize itself with the project prior to any dispute. These include regular visits to
the site and allowing the DAB to request different documents (such as a copy of the
contract documents, progress reports, variations instructions, and so on). See
Articles 1–4 to the ‘Procedural Rules’ annex to the ‘General Conditions of Dispute
Adjudication Agreement’ appendix of the construction contract.
104 Article 20.2 provides that ‘If the DAB is to comprise three persons, each party shall
nominate one member for the approval of the other party. The parties shall consult
both these members and shall agree upon the third member, who shall be appointed
to act as chairman’.
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perspective, because it does not provide a voice to the extra-contractual
community. A possible solution would be to appoint a public
representative to the DAB, The power to appoint this member could be
conferred upon an acceptable third party.
105
This member should have the
right to accept complaints from the public and initiate internal discussions
within the DAB. A more difficult question is how to link this transformed
DAB with the arbitration world. To make this proposal more appealing, it
might be more realistic to limit any public-initiated deliberation to the
informal discussions at the DAB, and not to carry them further to the
arbitration phase. While this would formally give the contractual parties
the right to overrule any public-initiated DAB decision, I believe that it
would not stop the DAB from having some impact on the social reality of
the project. It is clear, however, that this idea requires further
experimentation.
106
The alternative contractual vision that was suggested in this section could
find some support in the new contractual paradigms that appeared recently in
the construction market. Both the ICE managerial model, which views the
contract as a stimulator of ‘good management’,
107
and the ‘partnering
ideology’ of the Egan report
108
indicates an increasing willingness within the
industry to adopt novel contractual models. The concept of partnering
provides a useful counter-metaphor to the public/private image; the ICE
model, for its part, includes several interesting ideas on the question of how
to use the construction contract as a management tool. Particularly
interesting is the attempt of the ICE NEC series to create a flexible
framework, which would encourage the parties to seek ‘win-win’ solutions
to unexpected problems.
109
However, while these new paradigms do signal a
willingness to experiment with alternative contractual models, they do not
106
105 Such procedure already exists in the contract for cases where the parties fail to
nominate a member or chairman to the DAB. See Art. 20.3.
106 For a more detailed discussion of the DAB concept, see Jaynes, op. cit., n. 102, p. 45,
and C.R. Seppala, ‘Letter to the Editor (Reply to Jaynes)’ (2000) 17 International
Construction Law Rev. 1.
107 See Hughes and Greenwood, op. cit., n. 21, p. 197 and Barnes, op. cit. n. 51, for a
discussion of the ICE new engineering contract.
108 J. Egan, Rethinking Construction: Report of the Construction Task Force to the
Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott, on the Scope for Improving the Quality and
Efficiency of UK Construction (1998). For a further discussion of the ‘partnering’
paradigm, see B. Colledge, ‘Obligations of Good Faith in Partnering of UK
Construction Contracts’ (2000) 17 International Construction Law Rev. 175–7, and
Stipanowich, op. cit., n. 47, pp. 568–9.
109 See, Barnes, op. cit., n. 51, p. 93. The NEC includes (Article 16) an ‘early warning’
procedure which obliges the contractor and project manager to give an early warning
with respect to any matter that could increase the total cost, delay completion or
impair the project. It then provides that either the contractor or the project manger
can initiate an ‘earning warning meeting’ in which solutions to the unexpected
problem should be sought.
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provide, in themselves, an appropriate constitutional framework, since their
structures still retain a strong private/public perspective.
110
IV. THE ENGINEERING ETHOS AND OTHER CONTRIBUTING
FACTORS
The alternative contractual vision, which was sketched in the previous
sections, could face strong resistance. The ‘externalization’ culture of the lex
mercatoria is driven by strong economic interests, which cannot be
disregarded. The contractual changes, which were proposed above, are
likely to increase the cost of the construction project, and as such are highly
inconsistent with the economic perspective of the contract.
111
What I would
like to do in this concluding section is to point to some social processes,
which, together, could overcome this economic power. The first process is
internal to the construction market. It has to do with the cultural context in
which FIDIC operates what we might call the ‘engineering milieu’. I believe
that this unique institutional ethos – a product of special values, technical
competencies, and accumulated experience – could be conducive to an
attempt to change the environmental contours of the lex constructionis. This
unique ethos distinguishes FIDIC from business organizations, in which the
edict of profit-maximizing has a much more dominant role.
The engineering ethos is primarily a product of the unique training path of
civil engineers. Civil engineers are trained to provide solutions to very
pragmatic problems: how to construct bridges, high roads, chemical plants,
and so on. Traditionally, it was not their job to guarantee the profitability of
the project on which they were employed. Rather, as one commentator put it,
‘their prime responsibility is to ensure the safety and functionality of their
projects. Economics are important but slightly lower than safety in the
typical engineer’s hierarchy of values’.
112
The pragmatic orientation of civil
107
110 The new partnering initiatives, both in the United States and the United Kingdom,
still perceive their audience as the construction community, that is, the owner,
contractor, subcontractors, and design professionals. The inhabitants who populate
the project surroundings are still not conceived of as part of this emerging
‘partnership’, see Egan, op. cit., n. 108, paras. 36–37, and C.L. Noble, ‘Friend of the
Project – A New Paradigm for Construction Law Services in a ‘‘Partnered’’
Construction Industry’ (1998) 15 International Construction Law Rev. 79.
111 The introduction of an environmental management system and the establishment of
a Dispute Adjudication Board (DAB) would increase the cost of the contract. See,
for example, Murray, op. cit., n. 86, p. 43, fn. 48 (for the cost of ISO 14001
certification) and Seppala, op. cit., n. 106 (discussing the cost implications of the
DAB). These costs should be shared by the contractual community as a whole.
Placing all the costs on one party (for example, the contractor) would not only be
inconsistent with the political vision promulgated above, but would probably be
untenable from a financial perspective.
112 D.S.O. Russell, ‘Insights From the Three Gorges Study’ (1994) 21 Cnd. J. of Civil
Engineers 541, 545.
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engineers means that environmental concerns can be incorporated quite
naturally into the set of technical objectives and constraints that constitute a
particular ‘engineering problem’. From an environmental perspective, the
weaker commitment of the engineering community to the edict of profit
making constitutes a convenient setting for an agenda of ecological
transformation. The cultural framework in which FIDIC operates offers,
then, a receptive terrain for green ideas;
113
it distinguishes FIDIC from
economic-oriented organizations such as the WTO.
114
Indeed, over the last
decade FIDIC has made a substantial effort to develop greater awareness of
environmental issues among its members.
115
The recent environmental awakening within FIDIC has not found its way
yet to its normative products. It would be wrong, however, to dismiss
108
113 A similar process occurred in the chemical industry. In the wake of the Bhopal
tragedy in 1984, the chemical industry established a voluntary programme, the
Responsible Care Programme, which sought to improve environmental standards in
the chemical industry worldwide. See F.L. Reinhardt, ‘Bringing the Environment
Down to Earth’ (1999) 77 Harvard Business Rev. 149, 152–3.
114 While one of FIDIC’s principal tasks is, indeed, to stand ‘as the rightful
spokesperson for the business interests of the industry in the global forum’ (FIDIC,
Engineering Our Future (1998) i, my emphasis) the business perspective is not the
main ethos by which the organization orients itself. Thus, in the same 1998 report we
can also find the idea that FIDIC’s mission should be ‘To promote the business
interests of members in relation to the provision of technology-based intellectual
services for the built and natural environment, and while doing so, accept and
uphold our responsibilities to society and the environment’ (id., p. 25, my emphasis).
Of course, to what extent these broader commitments are realized in practice is a
matter for empirical analysis.
115 This effort was reflected by a series of pro-environmental documents and statements.
In 1990 FIDIC published a policy statement titled ‘Consulting Engineers and the
Environment’, which promulgates the environmental commitments of a consulting
engineer (it calls, for example, on each engineer, to ‘evaluate the positive and
negative environmental impacts of each project . . . [and] suggest alternatives to [his]
clients if environmental risks emerge’ (Art. 8)). Another recent report, FIDIC, id. – a
strategic action plan that should guide FIDIC into the twenty-first century – states
that one of the objectives of the organization would be to promote the commitment
of FIDIC’s members to environmental sustainability. Institutionally, this effort is
coordinated by a special task force for sustainable development. In 1999 the
sustainable development task force issued another strategy paper, ‘Sustainable
Development in the Consulting Industry’ (1999). The paper is particularly
interesting in our context because it is guided by a participatory outlook. It
encourages FIDIC members to contribute to the involvement of key stakeholders in
the construction process, to be willing to engage in a dialogue with the general
public in large and complex projects, and to contribute to the development of new
institutional structures in which this participatory outlook can be advanced (id., p. 8).
While the paper does not make any references to FIDIC contractual products, its
general message seems to be consistent with the contractual vision proposed in this
article. All of the documents referred to above are on FIDIC’s website:
.
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FIDIC’s green initiatives as mere cheap talk.
116
I believe that as a locus of
technical expertise and professional pride, FIDIC has a real potential (much
more than business oriented organizations such as the WTO) to act as a
bridge between the environmental and business communities. Several recent
social developments make this scenario more reasonable. These
developments could provide the necessary counterforce to the economic
motivations which lie behind the externalization praxis. They include an
increased environmental awareness within the realm of international
finance,
117
the increasing international presence of environmental NGOs
and the news media,
118
and the growing impact of transnational
environmental litigation.
119
These different phenomena present a common
threat to the discourse of externalization, in that they encourage the
participants in construction activities (through different means) to consider
more seriously the ecological consequences of their activities.
A final point. It is important to emphasize that the proposals made in this
article do not seek to achieve some kind of ‘perfect internalization’. While
adopting new procedures for project management and dispute settlement
should extend the discursive horizon of the lex constructionis, they could
also create new blind spots. Although I believe that in a transformed form
FIDIC’s contracts could be more attentive to environmental considerations,
some undesired effects are unavoidable. In particular, the reliance on
standard eco-management systems such as the ISO 14001 could subscribe
the contractual parties to a certain way of constructing and understanding
environmental problems. The technical outlook which characterizes the ISO
14001 standard means that environmental dilemmas would be constructed,
primarily, as technical problems of management and engineering. This
technocratic bias could be further exacerbated by the cultural background –
109
116 ‘Cheap talk’: a costless signal or communication. It should be noted in this regard
that FIDIC’s environ mental awaken ing is suppo rted also by economic
considerations. The report Engineering Our Future argues that the increasing
demand for new environmentally related services, such asenviromnental assessment
and environmental management, offer new business opportunities to the engineering
profession (FIDIC, id., p. 22).
117 See the discussion in P. Thompson, ‘Bank Lending and the Environment: Policies
and Opportunities’ (1998) 16 International J. of Bank Marketing 243; S. Williams,
‘U.K. Ethical Investment: A Coming of Age’ (1999) 8 J. of Investing 58; and K.A.
Strasser and D. Rodosevich, ‘Seeing the Forest for the Trees in CERCLA Liability’
(1993) 10 Yale J. on Regulation 493.
118 See the discussion in G. Jordan. ‘Indirect Causes and Effects in Policy Change: the
Brent Spar Case’ (1998) 76 Public Administration 713, and P. Wapner, ‘Politics
Beyond the State: Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics’ (1995) 47
World Politics 311.
119 See the discussion in F.K. Juenger, ‘Environmental Damage’ in Transnational Tort
Litigation: Jurisdictional Principles, eds. C. McLachlan and P. Nygh (1996) 199,
and A. Rosencranz and R. Campbell, ‘Foreign Environmental and Human Rights
Suits Against U.S. Corporations in U.S. Courts (1999) 18 Stanford Environmental
Law J. 145.
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the engineering milieu – in which this concept would be invoked. This
interpretative ‘bias’ could lead to the marginalization of other points of view,
which offer different understandings of the relationships between humans
and nature.
There is no clear answer to this problem. For me, the most plausible
response lies in expanding the reflexivity of the contractual package.
Flexible participatory procedures should play a prominent role in this effort.
These procedures should enable the public to participate, in a meaningful
way, in the assessment (and management) of construction projects.
120
Only a
genuine commitment to involve the public in the assessment and
management of the construction endeavour could guarantee the necessary
‘plurality of thoughts’ which is needed to overcome/supplement the
technocratic orientation of the eco-management concept and the engineering
milieu.
110
120 There is an increasing recognition within international bodies of the importance and
value of public participation, see the World-Bank, op. cit., n. 84 and UNCITRAL,
op, cit., n. 34, p. 202. See, further, Dorf and Sabel, op. cit., n. 75.
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