V: International Relations; Relations Internationales
| Published date | 01 December 2018 |
| Date | 01 December 2018 |
| DOI | 10.1177/002083451806800605 |
| Subject Matter | Abstracts |
780
V
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES
(a) International law, organization and administration/Droit international, organisation et adm inistration internationales
68.7496 ARRAS, Sarah ; BRAUN, Caelesta — Stakeholders
wanted! Why and how European Union agencies involve
non-state stakeholders. Journal of European Public Policy
25(9), 2018 : 1257-1275.
This article examines why and how EU agencies involve non-state
stakeholders — such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
business associations or trade unions — via three access instruments:
public consultations; stakeholder bodies; and representation in manage-
ment boards. We assess how the use of these instruments varies across
agencies, and how they are linked to different motivations driving the
demand for stakeholder participation. We present two alternative sets of
hypotheses, first focusing on agencies’ need for information, organiza-
tional capacity and reputation, and second, considering stakeholder
involvement as an instrument of legislative control. We draw on a new
dataset of stakeholder involvement practices of the full population of EU
agencies, compiled via document analysis and interviews. Our findings
indicate that stakeholder involvement is a double-edged sword. [R, abr.]
68.7497 BARRETT, Gavin — European economic governance:
deficient in democratic legitimacy? Journal of European
Integration 40(3), Apr. 2018 : 249-264.
This article seeks to offer an overview of the structures of democratic
legitimisation in EU economic governance, and to consider their ade-
quacy, examining in particular the question of the extent of parliamentary
participation in such governance. Although much progress has been
made in establishing throughput legitimacy and creating processes
furthering the interests of accountability, transparency and efficacy, it will
be seen that considerable deficiencies continue to exist, at both Euro-
pean and member state level. [R] [See Abstr. 68.7512]
68.7498 BÁTORA, Jozef ; RIEKER, Pernille — EU-supported re-
forms in the EU neighbourhood as organized anarchies:
the case of post-Maidan Ukraine. Journal of European In-
tegration 40(4), June 2018 : 461-478.
How do the EU and its member states organize their support for reforms
in the countries of the EU Neighborhood? Building on organization theory
research on reforms as sets of loosely coupled "garbage can" processes,
we conceptualize the ENP-induced reform processes as an organized
framework c onnecting the reform capacities of not only the EU institu-
tions but also EU member-state governments. We apply this approach to
Ukraine in the post-Maidan period. We focus on the interplay between
EU-level reform capacities and the capacities of two member states
highly active in Ukraine, namely Germany and Sweden. [R, abr.]
68.7499 BERGMANN, Julian — Turning an idea into reality: creat-
ing the European Institute of Peace. Cooperation and Con-
flict 53(3), Sept. 2018 : 375-391.
This article explains the creation of the European Institute of Peace (EIP)
in May 2014. Combining constructivist insights on policy ideas with a
framing approach, it proposes a conceptual framework to analyse the
dynamics of interaction between state and non-state actors (NSAs) with
regard to formulating new policies and creating new institutions. Focus-
ing on the role of frame entrepreneurs, framing strategies and frame
resonance, it argues that the creation of the EIP was a result of framing
undertaken by an advocacy coalition in which Sweden and Finland,
together with specialized NGOs and individual MEPs, played the role of
frame entrepreneurs. This advocacy coalition managed to convince a
number of European states there was a certain gap in the EU’s media-
tion capacities and that a new institution independent of the EU was
needed to address it. [R, abr.]
68.7500 BOOGAERTS, Andreas — A symbiotic relationship?
Examining the convergence of views between practitio-
ners and scholars on sanctions effectiveness. European
Foreign Affairs Review 23(2), 2018 : 223-241.
In recent years, sanctions — or restrictive measures within the framework
of the Common Foreign and Security Policy — have become one of the
EU’s instruments of choice for dealing with external crises. Given EU
foreign policymakers so often resort to sanctions, they should be aware of
the limits, pitfalls, and benefits associated with this instrument. After all, a
well-designed and well-managed sanctions policy requires a profound
knowledge of the contextual conditions under which sanctions work — or
fail to work. This policy-focused article, therefore, compares dominant views
held by EU policy practitioners with the sanctions effectiveness literature.
Building on thirty-six expert interviews conducted with members of the EU
sanctions community, it examines whether there is a basis for evidence-
based policy-making inside the EU’s sanctions machinery. [R, abr.]
68.7501 BROOME, André ; HOMOLAR, Alexandra ; KRANKE, Mat-
thias — Bad science: international organizations and the
indirect power of global benchmarking. European Journal
of International Relations 24(3), Sept. 2018 : 514-539.
This article illustrates how international organization benchmarking is a
significant source of indirect power in world politics by examining two
prominent cases in which international organizations seek to shape the
world through comparative metrics: (1) the World Bank-International
Finance Corporation Ease of Doing Business ranking; and (2) the OECD
FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index. We argue that the legitimacy
attached to these benchmarks because of the expertise of the interna-
tional organizations that produce them is highly problematic for two
reasons. First, both benchmarks oversimplify the evaluation of relative
national performance, misrepresenting contested political values drawn
from a specific transnational paradigm as empirical facts. Second, they
entrench an arbitrary division in the international arena between ‘ideal’
and ‘pathological’ types of national performance, which (re)produces
social hierarchies among states. [R, abr.]
68.7502 BURAS, Piotr ; VEGH, Zsuzsanna — Stop, Brüssel!: Polen
und Ungarn in der Europäischen Union (Stop, Brussels!:
Poland and Hungary in the European Union). Osteuropa
68(3-5), 2018 : 99-114.
The government of Poland and Hungary are in conflict with the European
Commission, which regards democracy and the rule of law as being at
risk in both states. Hungary and Poland reject such criticism and invoke
their national sovereignty. The government's view themselves as being
democratically legitimized. Budapest and Warsaw are of the opinion that
European integration has gone too far, and propose a strengthening of
the nation states within the EU. At the same tim e, Poland and Hungary
are pursuing different foreign and European policy interests and are
opting for divergent strategies. [R] [See Abstr. 68.7709]
68.7503 BURMESTER, Nicolas ; JANKOWSKI, Michael — One voice
or different choice? Vote defection of European Union
member states in the United Nations General Assembly.
British Journal of Politics and International Relations 20(3),
Aug. 2018 : 652-673.
Existing research suggests that EU member states are increasingly able
to act in concert in the UN General Assembly. Based on several hundred
co-ordination meetings per year, the EU ‘speaks with one voice’ on most
of the resolutions voted upon in the UN General Assembly. However,
little is known about instances where the EU member states do not vote
coherently. Three questions remain unanswered. First, what factors
determine deviating voting behaviour of EU member states? Second,
who are the most frequent defectors from the EU’s majority position?
Third, which voting blocs within the EU can be identified? The article
answers these questions in a quantitative design by controlling for do-
mestic factors, issues of resolutions and the position of the US. [R, abr.]
68.7504 CARSTENSEN, Martin B. ; SCHMIDT, Vivien A. — Power
and changing modes of governance in the euro crisis.
Governance 31(4), Oct. 2018 : 609-624.
The euro crisis has reignited the classic debate between intergovernmen-
talists, who tend to stress the coercive power of dominant member states
in the European Council, and supranationalists, who maintain that
through the use of institutional power, the Commission, and the Euro-
pean Central Bank turned out the “winners” of the crisis. This article
argues that euro-crisis governance is best understood not just in terms of
one form of power but instead as evolving through different constellations
of coercive, institutional, and ideational power that favored different EU
Relations internationales
781
actors over the course of the crisis, from the initial fast-burning phase
(2010-2012), where the coercive and ideational power of Northern
European member states in the European Council was strongest, to the
slow burning phase (2012-2016), when greater influence was afforded
supranational actors through the use of ideational and institutional
power. [R, abr.]
68.7505 CLOSA, Carlos ; PALESTINI, Stefano — Tutelage and
regime survival in regional organizations' dem ocracy
protection: the case of MERCOSUR and UNASUR. World
Politics 70(3), July 2018 : 443-476.
Why do states adopt binding and enforceable democracy clauses at the
regional level, thereby permitting neighboring states to monitor and
potentially sanction their breaches of democracy? To answer this ques-
tion, the authors test a set of hypotheses in two South American inter-
governmental regional organizations, MERCOSUR and UNASUR.
Following the epistemological and methodological requirements of
process-tracing analysis, the authors conducted thirty-six interviews with
top-level policymakers and decision makers who were responsible for
the design and enforcement of the Protocol of Ushuaia (MERCOSUR),
the Protocol of Montevideo (MERCOSUR), and the Protocol of George-
town (UNASUR). The authors argue that actors formalize these provi-
sions in response to threats to regime survival. Unlike international
organizations for the protection of human rights, democracy clauses are
intergovernmental instruments whose enforcement relies on states’
capabilities. [R, abr.]
68.7506 COMAN, Ramona — How have EU ‘fire-fighters’ sought to
douse the flames of the Eurozone’s fast- and slow-
burning crises? The 2013 structural funds reform. British
Journal of Politics and International Relations 20(3), Aug.
2018 : 540-554.
This article examines the debates surrounding the Regulation 1303/2013
on structural funds, arguing that the rules adopted in the midst of the
Eurozone crisis to strengthen the governance of the euro area had spill-
over effects on cohesion policy. It shows how, in the fast-burning phase
of the crisis (2010-2013), some actors pushed forward the idea of sus-
pending structural funds in case of non-compliance with the rules of the
Stability and Growth Pact, making funding conditional on Member States’
compliance with the rules of the new economic governance, and how,
after the entry into force of this Regulation, in the slow-burning phase of
the crisis (from 2013 onwards), a greater number of actors has been
calling for a more flexible interpretation of the rules. [R, abr.]
68.7507 DIESEN, Glenn ; KEANE, Conor — The offensive posture
of NATO's missile defence system. Communist and Post-
Communist Studies 51(2), June 2018 : 91-100.
A compelling case can be made to develop a NATO missile defense
system in response to the advancement of missile technology and the
danger of nuclear weapons. However, this development also undermines
Russia's retaliatory capacity, and consequently heightens the offensive
potential of nuclear weapons. This article explores the offense/defense
posture of NATO's missile defense plans in terms of both capabilities and
strategy. It is argued that NATO is incrementally increasing the strength
and reach of its missile defense components, while rejecting any interna-
tional treaty to regulate and limit their future expansion. This corresponds
with a strategy of achieving invulnerability through counterforce and
utilizing NATO as an ‘insurance policy’ against Russia, to be activated
when conflicts arise. [R, abr.] [First article of a special issue on "NATO,
Russia, and regional security in Europe and Eurasia", edited and intro-
duced, pp. 89-90, by Andrei P. TSYGANKOV. See also Abstr. 68.7566,
7599, 7614, 7649, 7660, 7662]
68.7508 ELBASANI, Arolda ; ŠABIC, Senada Šelo — Rule of law,
corruption and democratic accountability in the course
of EU enlargement. Journal of European Public Policy 25(9),
2018 : 1317-1335.
Why has the EU’s promotion of rule of law (RoL) triggered different and
largely surface-thin reforms across countries subject to a similar frame of
enlargement in the Western Balkans (WB)? We hypothesize that the
domestic (non-)enforcement of EU-promoted rules depends on the
mobilization of politically autonomous constituencies of change — orga-
nized advocacy groups and autonomous state institutions — which
enable democratic accountability. The empirical investigation focuses on
the prosecution of political corruption as empirical foci to assessing the
travails of EU-promoted rules in the domestic context. Specifically, we
trace the role of (1) EU’s RoL promotion strategy, (2) political resistance
and (3) domestic accountability in explaining different records of prose-
cution of political corruption in Albania and Croatia. [R]
68.7509 FASONE, Cristina — Towards a strengthened coordina-
tion between the EU and national b udgets. A comple-
mentary role and a joint control for parliaments? Journal
of European Integration 40(3), Apr. 2018 : 265-279.
The European Parliament (EP) and national parliament (NPs) occupy two
opposite but complementary positions as budgetary authorities in the EU
and, indeed, democratic legitimacy of EU and national budgetary proce-
dures can hardly be conceived without taking into account NPs and the
EP together. Framed within the discourse on throughput legitimacy, the
article analyses if and to what extent the EP and NPs are involved in the
decisions on EU revenues and expenditures as well as in the European
Semester and what initiatives has the EP supported to enhance its
participation and that of NPs in those domains. [R, abr.] [See Abstr.
68.7512]
68.7510 FLIKKE, Geir — Conflicting opportunities or patronal
politics? Restrictive NGO legislation in Russia 2012-2015.
Europe-Asia Studies 70(4), June 2018 : 564-590.
After the 2011-2012 electoral protest cycles, the opportunity structures
for a broad range of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have been
narrowed. This essay argues that increased control over NGOs mirrors a
deeper conflict of governance models, which is endogenous to the
Russian political system, between bureaucratic modernisation and
patronal politics. The modernisation sought by the Kremlin under Med-
vedev’s term brought a greater demand for organisations capable of
fulfilling the dual purpose of public communication and state advisory
functions. This required clear legal definitions, areas of competence and
rules of conduct. However, patronal politics dictate tha t NGOs should
bow to the state, and be governed by diffuse principles of loyalty. [R]
[See Abstr. 68.7846]
68.7511 FROMAGE, Diane — The European Parliament in the
post-crisis era: an institution empowered on paper only?
Journal of European Integration 40(3), Apr. 2018 : 281-294.
Following the adoption of Eurocrisis Law, the European Parliament (EP)
has been strongly empowered in the Economic and Monetary Union. It
may intervene mostly in three ways: by the means of control mechanisms
around Euro summits, during Economic Dialogues and in the framework
of the European Parliamentary Week and the Interparliamentary confer-
ence on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance. An analysis
of the practice reveals however that thus far this empowerment has
remained largely theoretical; The EP could still better exploit the potential
of its newly attributed capacities. The reform proposals currently under
discussion were found to bear some potential if adequately used, despite
being (still) of a soft nature like the ones currently existing. [R] [See
Abstr. 68.7512]
68.7512 FROMAGE, Diane ; VAN DEN BRINK, Ton — Democratic
legitimation of EU economic governance: challenges and
opportunities for European legislatures. Journal of Euro-
pean Integration 40(3), Apr. 2018 : 235-248.
This introduction sets the context of the analysis conducted in this special
issue. In particular, it examines the issue of the democratic legitim acy of
the European Union (EU) Economic Governance, the role of national
parliaments and of the European Parliament in the European integration
process. It also addresses the question of throughput legitimacy within
the EU that guides all contributions. This serves as basis to study the
urgency of the democratic challenge in the EU economic governance, as
well as its specificity. After the contributions to this special issue are
briefly presented, this introduction examines what they bring to the
overall debate on democratic legitimacy in this policy domain, among
others in terms of the difficulties that have arisen across Member States.
[R, abr.] [First article of a thematic issue n "National parliaments, the
European Parliament and the democratic legitimation of the European
Union economic governance", edited by the authors. See also Abstr.
68.7497, 7509, 7511, 7513, 7523, 7526, 7541, 7548]
68.7513 FROMAGE, Diane ; IBRIDO, Renato — The "Banking
Dialogue" as a model to improve parliamentary involve-
ment in the Monetary Dialogue? Journal of European Inte-
gration 40(3), Apr. 2018 : 295-308.
The newly established European Banking Union has introduced a unique
accountability framework of the European Central Bank vis-à-vis the
European Parliament (EP), but also vis-à-vis national parliaments, in the
form of Banking Dialogue. The ECB was thus far held to account for its
monetary policy actions by the EP in the framework of the long-existing
Monetary Dialogue. However, some shortcomings have become appar-
ent in this procedure, especially with the economic crisis. Beyond this,
the recent attribution of new competences to the ECB calls for a reflec-
tion as to the accountability mechanisms in place to control its actions.
Based on an empirical and normative analysis of both types of dialogues,
we contend that the Banking Dialogue could serve as a model to reform
the Monetary Dialogue to enhance the legitimacy of the ECB’s actions
and of the EU as a whole. [R] [See Abstr. 68.7512]
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