V International Relations / Relations Internationales
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00208345211065591 |
| Published date | 01 December 2021 |
| Date | 01 December 2021 |
810
V
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES
(a) International law, organization and administration/Droit international, organisation et administration in ternationales
71.7828 BERMANN, Sylvie — Que peuvent faire les Nations Unis au
XXIe siècle? (What can the United Nations do in the 21st
century?). Politique étrangère, 2021(1) : 93-102.
After the events of the spring of the 1990s, the UN experienced a period
of "decline": withdrawal of the Western powers from peacekeeping opera-
tions, undermining of the organization by the USA, return to vetoes in the
Security Council, etc. Its reform now appears to be both necessary to
adapt to a changing world, and unlikely, at least in the make-up of the
Security Council. It remains the only forum for global dialog on issues such
as the environment or human rights. [R]
71.7829 BEXELL, Magdalena ; JÖNSSON, Kristina ; STAPPERT, Nora
— Whose legitimacy beliefs count? Targeted audiences in
global governance legitimation processes. Journal of Inter-
national Relations and Development 24(2), June 2021 : 483-
508.
This article proposes a conceptual framework that highlights the selection
of audiences by global governance institutions as a key element of their
self-legitimation. Specifically, we argue that our approach addresses three
continuing challenges in empirical research on self-legitimation. First, it
emphasises how different actors within the institution may pursue multiple,
and potentially conflicting, strategies with regard to the legitimation audi-
ences they address. Second, our framework calls attention to what we call
intermediary legitimation audiences, that is, audiences targeted with the
expectation that they will in turn convince other audiences of the institu-
tion’s legitimacy. Finally, instead of taking for granted that external critique
steers who is targeted by self-legitimation, our approach highlights that an
institution’s internal assessment of such critique is decisive. [R, abr.]
71.7830 BRGLEZ, Milan ; UDOVIČ, Boštjan ; MAČEK, Amalija —
Covid-19 and the European Parliament (policies): a year of
perilous ad-hoc solutions. Journal of Comparative Politics
14(2), July 2021 : 81-97.
The COVID-19 pandemic not only upturned people’s way of life, but also
exposed the lack of preparedness of states and supranational political in-
stitutions for such crises. The article assesses the policies of the European
Parliament introduced over the last year to guarantee its functioning. What
transpires is that, a year after the outbreak of COVID-19, EU institutions
still act on an ad hoc basis, responding only to present challenges and not
fostering resilience to unexpected crises in the long run. [R]
71.7831 DANG, Trung A. ; STONE, Randall W. — Multinational banks
and IMF conditionality. International Studies Quarterly 65(2),
June 2021 : 375-386.
We find firm-level evidence that US banks receive preferential treatment
in countries under IMF conditionality. We rely on investment location deci-
sions to infer firms’ expectations about future profits and find that US firms
are approximately 53 percent more likely to acquire financial firms in coun-
tries under financial conditionality. IMF programs without financial condi-
tionality and FDI in other sectors serve as placebo tests. Financial condi-
tionality has weak effects on investment decisions by non-US firms, which
implies a political-economy interpretation. Firm-level data indicate that the
distinctive behavior of US firms is not due to advantages of scale or to a
US-firm fixed effect, but to US influence in the IMF. Firms from other major
IMF shareholders benefit as well, but the effects are much weaker. The
effects are concentrated in the politically relevant firms that have local af-
filiates, which is consistent with the interpretation that firms lobby for pref-
erential treatment. [R]
71.7832 DERUELLE, Thibaud ; ENGELI, Isabelle — The COVID-19
crisis and the rise of the European Centre for Disease Pre-
vention and Control (ECDC). West European Politics 44(5-
6), 2021 : 1376-1400.
European institutionalisation of public health policy has never been more
topical than in the COVID-19 era. One European agency has come to the
fore: the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC).
Historically, the ECDC’s mandate has expanded only gradually and the
management of transboundary health crises has remained ultimately in
the hands of Member States. The unprecedented severity of COVID-19
has led the European Commission to propose an extension of the ECDC’s
mandate. This study assesses the expansion of the formal and informal
mandates of the ECDC over 15 years to contextualise the catalytic impact
of COVID-19. While institutional change occurs in the aftermath of a trans-
boundary health crisis, it builds on a long-term process of gradual institu-
tionalisation that is accelerated by the crisis acting as a catalyst but not
fully determined by it. [R, abr.] [See Abstr. 71.7890]
71.7833 GUÉHENNO, Jean-Marie — Qu'attendre de l'ONU
aujourd'hui? (What can we expect of the UN now?). Poli-
tique étrangère, 2021(1) : 79-92.
The U N arguably has neither the legitimacy not the means to enforce
peace in a world that no longer resembles that of 1945. And the reform of
its main institutions is unachievable. However, it can be part of the future,
continuing to help solve many tangible problems. Through its specialized
agencies, the UN will consequently be able to adapt to a world whose chal-
lenges and actors have experienced profound changes since the 1945
Charter. [R]
71.7834 JONGEN, Hortense — Peer review and compliance with in-
ternational anti-corruption norms: insights from the OECD
Working Group on Bribery. Review of International Studies
47(3), July 2021 : 331-352.
How can we make sure that states do not only sign international anti-cor-
ruption conventions, but also comply with them once the ink has dried?
Peer review among states offers one answer to this question. This article
develops a theoretical framework to study the different processes and
mechanisms through which peer reviews can contribute to state compli-
ance. It focuses on three processes: transparency, pressure, and learning.
The article subsequently applies this framework to the OECD Working
Group on Bribery (WGB) in order to identify how far participants in this peer
review perceive the WGB as capable of organising these processes, and
to what extent they consider these processes relevant for promoting state
compliance. Data come from an online survey (74 observations) and 17
in-depth interviews. [R, abr.]
71.7835 KUCIK, Jeffrey ; PERITZ, Lauren — How do third parties af-
fect compliance in the trade regime? Journal of Politics
83(3), July 2021 : 1184-1189.
A core insight of the literature on dispute settlement at the World Trade
Organization (WTO) is that third party countries help enforce the organiza-
tion’s multilateral objectives, including the fundamental principle of nondis-
crimination. Little is known, however, about when countries comply with
WTO rulings and whether these bystander states play a role. We introduce
new data on compliance, measured as whether losing countries make tan-
gible domestic reforms to bring policy in line with WTO rulings. We show
that compliance is sign ificantly less likely in disputes with more third par-
ties. Using a variety of estimation techniques, including controlling for non-
random selection into legal rulings, we demonstrate a robust correlation
between third party participation and noncompliance. [R, abr.]
71.7836 LEE Su-Hyun ; WOO Byungwon — IMF = I’M Fired! IMF pro-
gram participation, political systems, and workers’ rights.
Political Studies 69(3), Aug. 2021 : 514-537.
How do IMF programs and conditions affect labor rights? Recognizing the
diversity of IMF conditionality, we argue that the more stringent IMF labor
market conditionality is, the worse labor rights become. However, this neg-
ative effect can be mitigated if there exist domestic political institutions that
have incentives and abilities to provide protections over workers: one such
case is a closed-list proportional representation system; another case is a
leftist government that relies on political supports of workers. Our empirical
analysis demonstrates that the more labor conditionality a program in-
cludes, the worse labor rights the country sustains. In addition, we report
that the negative effect is partially mitigated when domestic political cir-
cumstances are favorable to the political representation of workers under
a proportional representation system or under a leftist government. [R]
71.7837 LIESE, Andrea, et al. — The heart of bureaucratic power:
explaining international bureaucracies’ expert authority.
Review of International Studies 47(3), July 2021 : 353-376.
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