Values, Diversity and the Justification of EU Institutions
| Author | Emanuela Ceva,Gideon Calder |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2009.00792.x |
| Date | 01 December 2009 |
| Published date | 01 December 2009 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
P O L I T I C A L S T U D I E S : 2 0 0 9 VO L 5 7 , 8 2 8 – 8 4 5
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2009.00792.x
Values, Diversity and the Justification of EU
Institutionspost_792828..845
Emanuela Ceva
Gideon Calder
University of Pavia
University of Wales – Newport
Liberal theories of justice typically claim that political institutions should be justifiable to those who live
under them – whatever their values. The more such values diverge, the greater the challenge of
justifiability. Diversity of this kind becomes especially pronounced when the institutions in question are
supranational. Focusing on the case of the European Union, this article aims to address a basic question:
what kinds of values should inform the justification of political institutions facing a plurality of value
systems? One route to an answer is provided by John Rawls, who famously distinguishes between
comprehensive and political values, and defends the exclusion of the former from the foundations of a
political theory of justice. This article questions the tenability of the Rawlsian solution, and draws
attention to an alternative twofold conceptual distinction: that between minimal and non-minimal and
between substantive and procedural values. Minimal values are meant to be as independent as possible of
controversial conceptions of the good and views of the world, regardless of whether these are compre-
hensive or purely political. It will be argued that their endorsement may thus further specify the nature
of what should be shared in order to justify political institutions in conditions of pluralism. In order to
refine further the account of such a basis of justification, two variants of minimalism will be presented
according to whether they invest substantive or procedural values. Substantive values qualify the property
of an outcome; procedural values qualify the property of a procedure. The latter part of the article consists
of a ‘face-off ’ between minimal proceduralism and minimal substantivism, considering reasons in favour
of the adoption of each. The result, we suggest, is a helpful reorientation of the political dimension of the
value debates to which the multiplicity of values amid contemporary European horizons give rise.
Diverse Values and the Justification of EU Institutions:
Setting the Scene
Although questions of diversity and value pluralism have become part of the
‘furniture’ of political philosophy, there is little by way of consensus as to how best
to tackle them in normative terms. Universalists jostle with communitarians,
liberals with radical democrats, individualists with collectivists. Part of what is at
stake here is where to ‘place’ diversity amid wider norms of social justice, and how
much prominence to grant the plurality of particular values vis-à-vis common
standards and universal principles. Our focus in this article is on how this question
might be negotiated within an overarching institutional framework such as
the European Union. Rather than aspiring solely to make a contribution to
EU-related issues of institutional justification, we use this example to make a
broader point regarding the justification of political institutions in contexts
characterised by a plurality of values.
Attempts to set out shared institutions as a means to articulate a European political
project reveal a certain tension between diversity and singularity, highlighting
levels at which diversity is to be cherished, alongside the appeal to some order of
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shared framework in which such differences might sit, be negotiated and, where
necessary, protected. The ‘idea’ of Europe identified in the Berlin Declaration of
March 2007 embodies a series of values, presented as a package but differentiated
in their texture and implications. As is so often the case with such statements, we
find a combination of – and sometimes a blurring of the lines between – the
given and the aspirational. Thus while the hope for ‘peace and understanding’ has
(we are informed) ‘been fulfilled’, and a system of equal, inviolable rights secured,
other values are presented as being in the process of being made manifest. So, for
example: ‘We are striving for peace and freedom, for democracy and the rule of
law, for mutual respect and shared responsibility, for prosperity and security, for
tolerance and participation, for justice and solidarity’ (emphasis added).1
What forms does such ‘striving’ take? From what normative basis – whether
‘given’ in the traditions of Europe, or couched in terms of a regulative ideal of
some yet-to-be-realised European identity – might it proceed? We might say that
these goals come in two kinds, achievable in separate ways. On the one hand,
values such as ‘the rule of law’ and ‘justice’ can be legally secured – for example,
by the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty or an equivalent. On the other hand,
values such as ‘mutual respect’ and ‘solidarity’ depend on the quality of the
relations between individuals and groups: they inhere in civil society and do not
lend themselves to being secured through legislation itself. These two kinds of
values might seem to pull in different directions. Agreement on ‘legally enforce-
able values’ – e.g. everyone agrees on the importance of the rule of law – may
coexist with significant disagreement on the interpretation of values such as
mutual respect and solidarity, with potentially disruptive effects on the realisation
of common institutions.
Liberalism and Justification
This problem is, of course, a focal point for liberal theories of justice, typically
holding that political institutions should be justifiable to those who are required
to live under them (see, among others, Klosko, 2000; Nagel, 1991). Meeting such
a requirement becomes particularly challenging when the agents towards whom
the justification should be addressed endorse different, and possibly conflicting,
values. In such a state of affairs, to the liberal, agents thus disagreeing among
themselves face the need to identify shared values on the basis of which to
structure just institutions under which they might accommodate their controver-
sies. Clearly, the public spheres of the present-day European Union are punctu-
ated by disagreements of this kind. And so it follows that the viability of European
institutions depends crucially on the identification of such shared values. Hence
the question at the heart of this article: what sorts of values should inform the
justification of political institutions facing the plurality of value systems within the
EU?2
It is important to qualify the exact scope of this question. Our primary concern
is not the justification of the project of the European political integration per se, nor
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POLITICAL STUDIES: 2009, 57(4)
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is it to lay the ground for the justification of the authority of a European
superstate (above that of single nation states). This latter is crucial for commen-
tators such as Glyn Morgan, quite explicitly concerned not with the products of
the EU (institutions and policies), but with the very project of a politically
integrated Europe (Morgan, 2005, p. 159). Our focus is on a more limited
question, to do with justifying different ways of articulating EU institutions,
according to the types of value they embody and promote. If the question is, to
borrow Frederick Forsyth’s phrasing, ‘How, and by whom, do you wish to be
governed?’ (Forsyth, 2001, p. 7), we focus primarily not on ‘by whom?’, but on
‘how do you wish to be governed?’.3 So our considerations are not aimed to
persuade ‘Eurosceptics’ of the force and tenability of the EU project, but are rather
aimed to specify how EU institutions should be devised. This certainly does not
exhaust the spectrum of possible inquiries into the multifaceted EU-related
justificatory issue, but still poses a significant and, we think, widely under-
explored question.
To a question of this sort, John Rawls’ work offers one popular type of answer.
Famously, Rawls argues that we should exclude what he calls ‘comprehensive
values’ from the foundations of shared institutions. ‘Comprehensive values’ are
those referring to the controversial conceptions of the good and metaphysical
beliefs held by diverse agents. Rawls’ view is that such values impede the
possibility of grounding the political structure of a society on values that are
properly political. As co-authors we have different ‘takes’ on the possibility and
desirability of Rawls’ project in this respect (some aspects of which emerge in this
article). But we are agreed that it is insufficiently nuanced in its depiction of
‘political’ values, and of the role they might play in the justification of institutions.
We shall propose that in place of Rawls’ divide between political and compre-
hensive values, we might install an alternative twofold conceptual distinction: that
between minimal and non-minimal and between substantive and procedural
values.4
We suggest that, at an abstract level, a comparison between substantive and
procedural versions of minimalism about values better captures the issues inherent
in the EU ‘value debates’ than Rawls’ model. To articulate such a suggestion we
shall start by presenting and assessing Rawls’ response, and offer a minimalist
critique of its approach to values. We shall then, even-handedly, consider both
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