Varieties of international pluralism
| Published date | 01 June 2023 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/17550882221115456 |
| Author | Ronnie Hjorth |
| Date | 01 June 2023 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/17550882221115456
Journal of International Political Theory
2023, Vol. 19(2) 183 –199
© The Author(s) 2022
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DOI: 10.1177/17550882221115456
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Varieties of international
pluralism
Ronnie Hjorth
Swedish Defence University, Sweden
Abstract
This paper shows that while there seems to be more or less a general acceptance for
plurality as a condition of world politics and at least a vague commitment to a pluralist
ideal, the challenge remains to formulate a fruitful account of international pluralism.
While dominating approaches to international theory present international pluralism
as essentially a by-product and instrumental, this paper suggest an alternative way to
conceive of international pluralism when defending the ancient concept variety as a
better guide to approach both the understanding of plurality as the human condition
and the notion of international pluralism. The paper concludes that it is preferable to
accept a variety of pluralist conceptions rather than go on searching for a theoretical
conception standing above the controversy; accepting pluralism in a sense involves
rejecting just one version of pluralism.
Keywords
English school, Hannah Arendt, international pluralism, international theory, Michael
Oakeshott
Introduction
Political theorists have from time to time returned to the problematic tension between
unity and difference. For example, this kind of tension is involved when dealing with the
balancing of order and liberty, the collective and the individual or when combining inter-
national order and state autonomy. The solution to the problem seems to be to achieve
some kind of unity and at the same time preserve a degree of autonomy and agency while
avoiding fragmentation and disorder. Hence, the notion of international pluralism is cen-
tral to most conceptions of international relations. However, international pluralism is
challenging. It is a both a question of presenting an adequate description of the world as
Corresponding author:
Ronnie Hjorth, Swedish Defence University, Drottning Kristinas väg 37 Box 27805, Stockholm 115 93,
Sweden.
Email: Ronnie.Hjorth@fhs.se
1115456IPT0010.1177/17550882221115456Journal of International Political TheoryHjorth
research-article2022
Article
184 Journal of International Political Theory 19(2)
pluralistic rather than as anything else as well as conceiving of something like a pluralist
ideal for international relations. This paper looks at how versions of international plural-
ism account for relations among states involving both contentions of social facts and
normative accounts of pluralism and a pluralist ideal.
Two distinctions are central. First, the distinction between plurality as a condition and
pluralism as a way to manage that condition. Plurality of states, argues Kooijmans (1964:
8) is the logical consequence of difference within any species, and states are different at
least due to their spatial occupation. Empirically inclined scholars often take plurality of
states to be a social fact (Mayall, 1990; Nye, 2005). However, social facts are typically
contingent and perceived of differently. Especially realism conveys a pessimistic outlook
on world politics (Lebow, 2003; Stevens and Michelsen, 2019). This also affects the
attitude to international pluralism as less of a solution than a problematic condition likely
to prevail despite attempts to reform. Second, the distinction between treating pluralism
as a way to encounter the condition of plurality while promoting other values – hence
treating pluralism as an instrumental value – or, alternatively, viewing pluralism as
something worth defending and promoting for its own sake, hence treating pluralism as
an intrinsic value. The latter points towards the notion of a pluralist ideal.
However conceived, pluralism requires some degree to toleration when building
unity, within a state or among a group of states. Hence, pluralism addresses concepts
such as inclusion, toleration and recognition. Responding to the variety of pluralist con-
ceptions, Walzer (1997: xii) views versions of pluralism as ‘regimes of toleration’ recog-
nising the complex relation between toleration and difference that is involved. He
concludes: ‘Toleration makes difference possible; difference makes toleration neces-
sary’. This begs the question to what extent different pluralist regimes of toleration
reflect a pluralist political ideal or are merely regimes of necessity. Focussing on various
accounts of international pluralism, this paper sets out to deal with the following
questions:
(1) How do different theories of international pluralism account for plurality in inter-
national relations?
(2) What accounts of pluralism are fruitful to assume when theorising international
relations?
(3) In what sense is international pluralism an ideal worth defending in international
relations?
The paper shows that while there seems to be more or less general acceptance for plural-
ity as a condition of world politics, and often, at least a vague commitment to a pluralist
ideal, the challenge remains to formulate a fruitful account of international pluralism.
Initially, the paper reviews the two approaches to international pluralism characteristic of
the English School, state pluralism and solidarism. The English School makes interna-
tional pluralism a central concern and at the same time combines different versions of
international pluralism reflecting what Wight (1991) labels the realist, rationalist and
revolutionist traditions of international thought. Hence, the English School is a good
starting point for dealing with international pluralism. In this paper, I claim that state
pluralism and solidarism treat international pluralism largely as a by-product and as
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