Varieties of Recursivity in Transnational Governance
| Published date | 01 September 2017 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12467 |
| Author | Sigrid Quack,Olga Malets |
| Date | 01 September 2017 |
Varieties of Recursivity in Transnational
Governance
Olga Malets
University of Freiburg
Sigrid Quack
University of Duisburg-Essen
Abstract
This special section analyzes the variety of recursivity in transnational regulatory governance. We conceptualize recursivity as a
complex cycle through which addressees’response to transnational rules continuously feeds back into the rulemaking process
and triggers rule revision. In the introduction to the special section, we emphasize that recursivity varies across governance
organizations and governance fields and develop an analytical framework to capture this variation. We also propose a typol-
ogy of recursive governance organizations. Finally, we preview five case studies included in the special section and summarize
their key findings and conclusions, with particular attention to the implications for accountability and legitimacy.
Policy implications
•In order to enhance their accountability and legitimacy, transnational governance organizations should establish formal or
informal structures and procedures for collecting and processing regulatory addressees’feedback on the implementation
and impact of transnational rules and standards.
•Whether they design formal feedback arrangements or rely on informal feedback from regulatory addressees and other
actors, transnational regulatory organizations should monitor and periodically review who uses them, and how, to avoid
privileging certain groups over others.
•In order to promote their own responsiveness and accountability, transnational regulatory organizations should develop
formal rules or informal mechanisms to reflect on how feedback from addressees is taken into consideration (or not) and
how it influences the revision of rules.
This special section contributes to debates in the transna-
tional governance literature on the relationship between
regulators and regulatory addressees. Building on a growing
literature, we emphasize the importance of understanding
feedback effects in transnational governance and focus
specifically on how the usage and implementation of rules
by their addressees feeds back into rulemaking. In order to
capture theoretically the relationship between regulators,
regulatory addressees and other groups of actors affected
by voluntary rules or involved in monitoring the making
and implementation of those rules, we use and expand the
concept of recursivity. This concept emphasizes the cyclical
and recursive nature of rulemaking and reciprocal linkages
between the making of transnational rules and their use
and implementation in different contexts.
Since the 1980s, the number and variety of transnational
governance arrangements have exploded (Djelic and Sahlin-
Andersson, 2006). Transnational standard-setters, certification
schemes and corporate social responsibility initiatives, to
name just a few, have become important regulators in many
global policy fields, including environment protection, labor
and human rights, finance, trade, and security. A
characteristic feature of this ‘remarkable period of institu-
tional innovation in transnational governance’(Hale and
Held, 2010, p. 1) is that non-governmental actors, both from
business and civil society, play a much more important role
as regulators on a transnational scale than was the case in
multilateral state governance. Such transnational governance
arrangements typically regulate through voluntary standards,
codes of conducts and other forms of so-called ‘soft law’
that promote changes in behavior of addressees who are
under no legal obligation to use and implement them
(Black, 2008; Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson, 2006). Neverthe-
less, their impact is often far-reaching because such rules
may become collectively binding in a given policy field
through isomorphic pressures and/or ex post recognition by
international organizations and states (Green, 2014; Quack,
2007; Tamm Hallstr€
om, 2004).
1
The fact that voluntary rules become collectively binding
raises a question of legitimacy, broadly defined as the
acceptance of rules by their addressees and other actors as
relevant, appropriate and beneficial. Many scholars argue
that transnational governance organizations develop various
strategies to promote the legitimacy of their rules in this
Global Policy (2017) 8:3 doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.12467 ©2017 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Global Policy Volume 8 . Issue 3 . September 2017 333
Special Section Article
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