Violence re-directed: due care and the moral challenge of casualty displacement warfare
| Published date | 01 June 2023 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00471178221105598 |
| Author | Neil C Renic,Sebastian Kaempf |
| Date | 01 June 2023 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178221105598
International Relations
2023, Vol. 37(2) 228 –250
© The Author(s) 2022
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DOI: 10.1177/00471178221105598
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Violence re-directed: due
care and the moral challenge
of casualty displacement
warfare
Neil C Renic
University of Hamburg
Sebastian Kaempf
The University of Queensland
Abstract
In this article, we argue in favour of a conceptual expansion of the Just War idea of ‘due care’,
to include the foreseeable, but indirect harm generated by Western force protection. This
harm includes the phenomenon of ‘casualty displacement warfare’ – circumstances in which
the prioritisation and relative success of Western force protection incentivises some Western
adversaries to redirect more of their own violence away from Western soldiers and onto
civilians. Primary moral responsibility for such violence should be allocated to those who violate
the principle of non-combatant immunity, whatever their motivations. Critically though, we argue
that Western militaries do bear some indirect culpability for the conflict conditions that structure
such violence. These same militaries, we argue, are morally duty bound to do what they feasibly
can to reduce the risks of casualty displacement, even if this necessitates a relaxation of their own
commitment to force protection.
Keywords
casualty-displacement, due care, ethics, just war, post-heroic warfare, sacrifice
Introduction
One of the most distinctive features of Western warfare today is the priority given to
‘force protection’ – those measures imposed by Western belligerents to reduce, and in
some cases even eliminate, the likelihood that fighting men and women will be captured,
Corresponding author:
Sebastian Kaempf, The University of Queensland, POLSIS, St Lucia, QLD 4072, Australia.
Email: s.kaempf@uq.edu.au
1105598IRE0010.1177/00471178221105598International RelationsRenic and Kaempf
research-article2022
Article
Renic and Kaempf 229
injured or killed in the course of military operations. This emphasis is an important cor-
rective to earlier forms of ‘total’ conflict, characterised as it frequently was by appalling
and avoidable levels of combatant sacrifice. This elevation of force protection, however,
has not been achieved without cost. Too often, critics argue, force protection strategies
shift the burden of physical risk from Western combatants to civilians in the form of
‘collateral damage’ – the harm inflicted against non-military objects as an ‘incidental’
consequence of an otherwise legitimate attack.1 Compounding this problem, these
same critics allege, is International Humanitarian Law (IHL), which fails to establish
sufficiently meaningful safeguards for non-combatants from unintentional, but foresee-
able violence.
How to properly balance the moral trade-off between force and civilian protection in
war has been the subject of intense debate among Just War scholars. Michael Walzer is
among those who claim this balance is off – too much collateral damage is too often
accepted by policymakers and military leaders as a fair price for force protection. A cor-
rective is needed, he argues, in the form of ‘due care’:
The principle is this: when it is our action that puts innocent people at risk, even if the action is
justified, we are bound to do what we can to reduce those risks, even if this involves risks to our
own soldiers.2
The idea of due care provides much needed scrutiny of the harms unintentionally,
but often foreseeably and avoidably, inflicted upon vulnerable non-combatants as a by-
product of the Western devotion to force protection. It further clarifies the insufficiency
of existing law to constrain this transfer of risk. The principle can and should do more,
however.
We argue in favour of a conceptual expansion of due care to include the foreseeable,
but indirect harm generated by Western force protection. This includes the phenomenon
of ‘casualty displacement warfare’ – circumstances in which the prioritisation and rela-
tive success of Western force protection incentivises some Western adversaries to redi-
rect more of their own violence away from Western soldiers and onto civilians. Under
such circumstances, primary moral responsibility must obviously – and always – be allo-
cated to those who target civilians, whatever their motivations. Critically though, Western
militaries do bear some culpability for the conflict conditions that structure such vio-
lence. These same militaries, we argue, are morally duty bound to do what they feasibly
can to reduce the risks of casualty displacement, even if this necessitates a relaxation of
their commitment to force protection.
A fundamental goal of both the Just War Tradition and IHL is to separate military
forces and peaceful inhabitants into two distinct groups, and insulate the latter from
intentional and direct violence. The principle of due care supplements this by imposing
a positive duty on warring parties to take active steps to minimise unintentional but fore-
seeable collateral damage. We agree with proponents of due care who argue that the
existing rules over-privilege intentionality, to the exclusion of sufficient reflection on the
question of foreseeability. If we are to create better outcomes for civilians in war, how-
ever, more is needed. Our proposed expansion of due care to encompass the indirect
moral responsibility of the West for casualty displacement is an effort to close this gap.
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