Violence, Self-Worth, Solidarity and Stigma: How a Dissident, Far-Right Group Solves the Collective Action Problem
| DOI | 10.1177/0032321716651654 |
| Author | John Meadowcroft,Elizabeth A Morrow |
| Published date | 01 June 2017 |
| Date | 01 June 2017 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
651654PSX0010.1177/0032321716651654Political StudiesMeadowcroft and Morrow
research-article2016
Article
Political Studies
2017, Vol. 65(2) 373 –390
Violence, Self-Worth, Solidarity
© The Author(s) 2016
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Far-Right Group Solves the
Collective Action Problem
John Meadowcroft1 and Elizabeth A
Morrow2
Abstract
How do dissident, far-right groups overcome the collective action problem inherent to political
organisation in order to recruit sufficient activists willing to bear the costs of participation and
not free-ride on the participation of others? An original ethnographic study of the UK anti-Islamic
street protest organisation, the English Defence League, shows that it solved the collective action
problem by supplying selective incentives to members in the form of the club goods of access to
violence, increased self-worth and group solidarity. These benefits were offset against the costs of
stigma, time, money and unwanted police attention that also accompanied English Defence League
membership. The personal benefits the English Defence League provided to its members enabled
it to supply what Mancur Olson has termed the first unit of collective action, but limited its ability
to supply the additional units required to build a broader, more mainstream movement.
Keywords
collective action, extremism, far right, Islamophobia
Accepted: 22 April 2016
How do dissident, far-right groups overcome the collective action problem inherent to
political organisation to recruit sufficient activists willing to bear the costs of participa-
tion and not free-ride on the participation of others? Organisation to achieve political
ends, whether the electoral strategy of a democratic political party or the revolutionary
overthrow of a despotic regime, faces an inherent collective action problem because the
benefits of political action accrue to participants and non-participants, whereas the costs
1Department of Political Economy, King’s College London, London, UK
2Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
Corresponding author:
John Meadowcroft, Department of Political Economy, King’s College London, Strand, London WC2R 2LS,
UK.
Email: john.meadowcroft@kcl.ac.uk
374
Political Studies 65 (2)
are borne by participants alone. Consequently, it will be in each individual’s self-interest
to free-ride on the political activism of others rather than directly participate in costly
political action (Lichbach, 1994, 1995; Olson, 1965; Tullock, 1971).
A number of scholars have analysed how dissident and extremist organisations seek to
overcome this collective action problem – although this approach has not hitherto been
applied to far-right extremism. Dissident organisations are said to solve the collective
action problem by providing selective incentives that are exclusive to members (Lichbach,
1994, 1995; Wintrobe, 2006). These exclusive benefits are supplied as club goods – that
is, goods that are neither purely public nor purely private, but may be supplied exclu-
sively to many people (Buchanan, 1965) – and can include welfare, education, social
entertainment and access to friendship networks. If the exclusive benefits supplied out-
weigh the costs of participation for a sufficient number of people, then the group should
prosper (Berman and Laitin, 2008; Iannaccone, 1992; Wintrobe, 2006).
While to external observers the ideology of a dissident group may appear to be the
driver of participation, it is argued that ideology does not motivate participation, but
instead binds together those who become participants and facilitates the supply of
exclusive benefits. Hence, the process of group membership will involve socialisation
into the ideology of the group, and it is via this process that members obtain selective
benefits like group solidarity (Berman and Laitin, 2008; Lichbach, 1995; Wintrobe,
2006).
This article analyses how one such organisation, the English Defence League (EDL),
a street protest group established in 2009 ostensibly to oppose the spread of Islamist ideas
and practices in the United Kingdom, overcame the collective action problem to build a
relatively effective political organisation. Original ethnographic data are used to show
that the EDL exclusively supplied the club goods of access to violent conflict, increased
self-worth and group solidarity to members. These benefits of EDL membership were
offset against the costs of membership, notably stigma, time, money and unwelcome
police attention. Ideology played an important unifying role within the group, and facili-
tated the supply of increased self-worth and group solidarity, but was not the driving force
behind membership. We also show that the way that the EDL solved the collective action
problem limited the long-term success of the organisation.
This study utilises ethnographic fieldwork conducted within the EDL between
February 2013 and February 2014 that was part of a broader study of the group (Morrow,
2015). EDL demonstrations were attended in English cities including Manchester,
London, Newcastle, Birmingham and Slough, as well as private ‘meet-and-greet’ ses-
sions for new and prospective members and social gatherings at pubs. Membership of a
closed EDL division’s Facebook group was also obtained. In total, approximately 50 hours
were spent directly interacting with EDL members in the form of participant observation
and unstructured, informal interviews. A full account of the research methodology is set
out in the Supplementary Information online.
This article is structured as follows: first, we introduce the EDL, discuss its origins and
the demographic profile of its supporters, and locate it in the history of UK right-wing
extremism; second, we summarise existing explanations of right-wing extremism and
support for the EDL; third, we present our analysis of the exclusive benefits that the EDL
supplies to members in the form of the club goods of access to violence, self-worth and
group solidarity; fourth, we set out the costs of EDL membership; fifth, we discuss the
interplay of costs and benefits that produce the dynamics of EDL activism; sixth, we
present our argument that the way that the EDL supplied the first unit of collective action
Meadowcroft and Morrow
375
hindered its ability to supply further units, thereby limiting the ability of the organisation
to grow beyond its initial membership base; and we conclude in a final section.
The EDL
The EDL began in Luton, an English town of 200,000 people located 30 miles north of
London, following a provocative demonstration by the now-banned Islamist group
al-Muhajiroun. The EDL emerged ‘out of the fringes of the English domestic football
hooligan scene’ – the milieu in which followers of rival professional football teams organ-
ise violence around matches (Busher, 2013, 2015; Copsey, 2010; Garland and Treadwell,
2010; Treadwell and Garland, 2011: 1).
The EDL describes itself as anti-racist, open to gays and lesbians, and with Jewish and
Sikh members. However, previous studies have suggested that its membership is pre-
dominantly white, male and working class (Bartlett and Littler, 2011; Busher, 2015: 17;
Copsey, 2010; Goodwin et al., 2016; Treadwell and Garland, 2011). These studies corre-
spond with our own findings. At EDL demonstrations and social events, almost all mem-
bers were white and men outnumbered women by approximately 3 to 1. The majority of
participants appeared to be in their teens or twenties. EDL members were predominately
either unemployed or employed in low status occupations such as a lorry driver, bouncer,
carer, warehouse worker, factory worker and night shift supervisor. Although notable
exceptions exist – a sprinkling of Sikh members were observed, and a highly literate
reader of Marx appears in Joel Busher’s (2015: 40) study – our research found that EDL
members are primarily young, working-class, white men.
According to its Facebook page and mission statement, the EDL (n.d.) seeks to ‘peace-
fully protest against militant Islam’ and utilise the United Kingdom’s courts and legisla-
ture to achieve its aims of protecting and promoting human rights, democracy and the
traditions of England. However, experience on the ground contradicts these claims. Since
2009, the EDL has staged over 50 demonstrations that have attracted between 500 and
5000 participants. These demonstrations have often involved significant public disorder,
characterised by clashes with counter-demonstrators and the police and missile throwing
(Goodwin et al., 2016; Treadwell, 2013, 2014; Treadwell and Garland, 2011). EDL dem-
onstrations are marked by prolonged chanting, not dissimilar to a football match, directed
at Muslims. At a demonstration in the centre of Birmingham in 2013, for example, enthu-
siastic and loud chanting was witnessed throughout the EDL’s march through the city.
The chants included ‘I’m England till I die’, ‘Whose streets? Our streets’, ‘No surrender
to the Taliban’, ‘Shove your fucking Allah up your arse’, ‘Allah, Allah, who the fuck is
Allah?’ and ‘If you wear a burqa you’re a cunt’.
The evidence suggests that the EDL is an Islamophobic, right-wing extremist group.
Islamophobia has been defined as ‘indiscriminate negative attitudes or emotions...
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