Violent Conflict Resolution and the Loser's Reaction
| DOI | 10.1177/002234336500200403 |
| Date | 01 December 1965 |
| Published date | 01 December 1965 |
| Author | Sivert Langholm |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
VIOLENT
CONFLICT
RESOLUTION
AND
THE
LOSER’S
REACTION*
A
Case
Study
from
1547.
By
SIVERT
LANGHOLM
I.
The
problems
and
terminology
At
various
times
and
places
different
forms
of
dueling
or
single
combat
have
been
adopted
as
a
method
of
resolving
conflicts.
From
European
history
we
know,
for
example,
of
the
medieval
trial
by
combat,
of
the
official
extrajudicial
combat
from
the
late
Middle
Ages
and
the
beginning
of
modern
times,
and
of
the
modern
private
duel
which
rose
into
prom-
inence
from
around
1500.1
Possibly
with
the
exception
of
the
pri-
vate
duel
in
its
first
period,2
these
combats
were
regulated
by
strict
and
well-defined
rules.
Indeed
they
provide
textbook
ex-
amples
of
rule-bound
methods
for
deciding
disputes,
what
in
the
following
we
will
call
conflict
resolution
mechanisms.
They
are,
furthermore,
examples
of
conflict
resolu-
tion
mechanisms
which
with
the
aid
of
(controlled)
violence
appear
to
have
produced
a
large
frequency
of
definitive
conflict
reso-
lutions.
These
and
other
circumstances
suggest
that
an
investigation
of
the
struc-
ture
and
function
of
these
combats,
and
of
the
conceptions
surrounding
them,
may
give
rise
to
results
of
interest
to
conflict
theory
in
general.
This
article
is
based
upon
some
of
the
preliminary
work
for
such
an
investigation.
Its
object
is
to
present
hypotheses
and
to
formulate
problems,
not
to
establish
final
solutions
and
conclusions.
It
is
expressly
emphasized
that
the
validity
of
the
sug-
gested
relationships
in
most
cases
can
only
be
established
through
further
studies.
So
far
I
have
used
the
expression
’con-
flict
resolution’,
not
’conflict
solution’.
There
is
a
reason
for
this.
In
conflict
theory
it
is
necessary
to
distinguish
be-
tween
conflict
resolution
and
agreement
to
the
conflict
resolution
on
the
one
hand,
and
conflict
solution
and
acceptance
on
the
other.
The
first
two
expressions,
as
I
use
them,
refer
to
the
outward
behavior
of
the
parties,
the
two
latter
expressions
to
their
internal
mental
reactions.
Roughly,
a
conflict
can
be
brought
to
a
close
in
two
ways:
first,
one
or
both
parties
can
be
made
to
yield
with
the
aid
of
coercion
in
the
form
either
of
social
pres-
sure,
threats
of
force,
actual
use
of
force,
or
total
annihilation;
secondly,
there
can
be
a
way
out
of
the
conflict
which
both
parties
accept,
in
the
sense
that
they
inter-
nalize
it
or
allow
it
to be
integrated
into
their
own
value
systems
in
such
a
manner
that
they
find
the
way
out
good,
favorable,
satisfactory,
or
correct,
reasonable,
fair
(they
recognize
their
faults,
view
the
out-
come
as
deserved),
or
the
best
possible,
the
only
attainable,
or
because
they
find
that
continuation
of
the
conflict
is
not
worthwhile,
or
because
they
accept
the
conflict
resolution
mechanism
itself.
(We
must
distinguish
between
several
degrees
or
types
of
acceptance,
and
the
relation-
ship
between
coercion
and
acceptance
will
in
many
cases
probably
be
anything
but
clear.
As
a
social
institution
a
conflict
resolution
mechanism
will
be
surrounded
by
social
conventions
which
are
not
un-
connected
with
social
pressure
and
thereby
coercion.
Often
one
will
acquiesce
in
the
resolution
just
because
the
rules
of
the
game
say
it
shall
be
so.
In
fact
rules
of
the
game
provide
the
limiting
case
for
applying
the
distinction
between
acceptance
and
other
325
forms
of
agreement,
surrounded
as
rules
of
the
game
are
by
social
sanctions,
but
perhaps
precisely
because
of
this
inter-
nalized
by
the
individual.)3
I
will
use
’con-
flict
resolution’
to
refer
to
every
attained
cessation
of
active
conflict,
irrespective
of
the
underlying
motives,
and
’agreement’
to
refer
to
any
behavior
which
consists
in
omitting
to
renew
active
conflict.
’Conflict
solution’
will
be
used
to
refer
to
the
ac-
cepted
conflict
resolution,
in
the
sense
of
acceptance
indicated
above.
We
have
use
for
both
these
sets
of
con-
cepts.
In
the
study
of
human
beings
in
conflict
situations
we
can
usually,
at
best,
draw
sure
conclusions
only
about
their
outward
behavior.
Thus
we
need
expres-
sions
to
describe
outward
behavior
neu-
trally,
without
any
implications
about
the
underlying
motives.
On
the
other
hand,
we
also
need
concepts
for
the
inner
reac-
tions.
Conflict
solution,
the
resolution
of
conflict
accepted
by
both
parties,
is
in
itself
automatically
a
definitive
resolution.
Ac-
ceptance
on
both
sides
is
a
sufficient,
though
not
of
course
a
necessary,
condition
for
breaking
off
conflict
in
the
long
run.
VVe
can
do
no
more
than
demonstrate
agreement,
but
we
must
be
constantly
re-
searching
into
the
conditions
of
acceptance.4
4
The
term
’conflict
resolution
mecha-
nism’
also
needs
some
comment.
The
ex-
pression
is
used
here
to
refer
to
rule-gov-
erned
methods
for
resolving
conflicts.
My
analysis
of
dueling
as
a
conflict
resolution
mechanism
is
largely
based
upon
ideas
proposed
by
Johan
Galtung.
Galtung
has
advanced
the
hypothesis
that
the
most
essential
aspects
of
the
structure
and
functioning
of
conflict
resolution
mecha-
nisms
(single
combats,
ordeals,
games,
and
other
chance
mechanisms,
law
cases,
elec-
tions,
and
so
forth)
are
brought
to
light
by
analyzing
them
using
the
scientific
ex-
periment
as
a
model.
Provisionally
I
will
expect
the
single
combat
mechanism
to
be
constructed
thus:
in
the
first
place
we
have
certain
factors
which
will
legitimately
provide
the
outcome
corresponding
to
the
experiment’s
independent
variables.
Other
causally
relevant,
but
according
to
the
rules
illegitimate,
factors
corresponding
to
the
experiment’s
relevant
conditions
must
be
controlled
so
as
to
prevent
them
from
exercising
any
influence
upon
the
out-
come.
The
outcome
corresponds
to
the
dependent
variable
and
provides
the
cri-
terion
for
the
resolution;
one
proceeds
from
the
outcome
to
the
resolution
via
a
fixed
interpretation
of
the
outcome
5
Moreover,
as
every
conflict
can
be
said
to
arise
from
a
situation
in
which
there
are
incompatible
value
claims
(such
that
two
or
more
persons
claim
the
same
value,
or
one
or
more
claim
different,
but
mutually
incompatible
values),
the
conflict
resolu-
tion
must
contain
a
determination
about
the
future
value
distribution
between
the
parties
(in
the
form
either
of
a
redistribu-
tion
or
of
a
status
quo) .
Such
a
decision
on
the
future
distribution
of
values
is
thus
one
of
the
things
which
must
emerge
from
fixed
interpretations
of
different
types
of
out-
come.
In
the
following
the
structure
of
duels
will
be
analyzed
in
the
way
outlined
above,
using
the
scientific
experiment
as
a
model
(except
that
I
will
speak
of
legitimate
and
illegitimate
factors
and
criteria
instead
of
variables
and
conditions).
We
will
pay
particular
attention
to
its
value-distrib-
uting
function,
i.e.
to
the
question
of
how
the
disputed
value
becomes
distributed
between
the
parties
in
and
by
the
resolu-
tion
by
duel.
Our
principal
object
will
be
to
investigate
possible
connections
with
agreement
or
non-agreement
and
espe-
cially
to
trace
features
which
may
be
thought
to
play a
role
in
the
question
of
acceptance.
2.
Choice
of case :
Combat
between
La
Chastaigneraie
and
Jarnac
Our
further
presentation
of
the
structure
and
function
of
single
combat
is
based
upon
the
description
and
analysis
of
a
particular
example
of
such
a
combat.
A
concentrated
analysis
of
this
kind
on
a
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