Virtue Epistemology and the ‘Epistemic Fitness’ of Democracy
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1478-9302.2011.00243.x |
| Author | Colin Farrelly |
| Published date | 01 January 2012 |
| Date | 01 January 2012 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Virtue Epistemology and the ‘Epistemic Fitness’
of Democracypsr_2437..22
Colin Farrelly
Queen’s University
In this article I explore three distinct advantages of linking virtue epistemology to an epistemic defence of
democracy.Fir st, because intellectual agents and communities are the primary focus of epistemic evaluation, virtue
epistemology offers political theorists the opportunity to develop an epistemic defence of democracy that takes
‘realism’ seriously (e.g. the cognitive limitations and biases of humans). Second, because virtue epistemology
conceives of epistemology as a normative discipline, it builds normative criteria into the exercise of assessing the
‘epistemic fitness’ of a political arrangement (e.g.democracy vs. epistocracy).Third, by assessing the epistemic powers
of democracy from a virtue-epistemological perspective, a more robust (Deweyan) conception of democracy needs
to be employed and assessed than the minimalist conception employed by the Condorcet Jury Theorem.
Keywords: democracy; Dewey; Estlund; realism; virtue epistemology
In Democratic Authority David Estlund argues that his goal is to show that ‘a concern for
the quality of political decisions, properly constrained by other principles, supports
democratic arrangements’ (Estlund, 2008, p. 1). Let us call this the central goal (CG) of
Estlund’s book. His strategy for establishing CG is to argue: (a) that democracy has modest
epistemic value (i.e. it is better than a coin flip); and (b) that democratic outcomes are
legitimate and authoritar ian in a purely procedural way,by advancing a proceduralist view
called ‘epistemic proceduralism’. For Estlund, the key question to answer is not ‘How is
democracy the best epistemic device available?’, but rather ‘How can democracy have
some epistemic value in a way that could account for the degree of authority we think
it should have?’ (Estlund, 2008, p. 7).
Estlund’s contribution to democratic theory is an innovative and promising one.There
is much in Democratic Authority that I agree with, and much I disagree with. In this article
I will highlight some of those agreements and disagreements (but only in passing; they are
not what drives the arguments I develop) by developing a rival strategy for establishing
Estlund’s CG. Contra Estlund, I believe the key question to answer is ‘How is democracy
the best epistemic device available?’,and the strategy I propose for answering this question
is a virtue-epistemological one. Adopting a vir tue-epistemological approach to the issue of
the ‘epistemic fitness’ of democracy has, I hope to show, many distinct advantages.
In this article I explore three distinct advantages of linking virtue epistemology to an
epistemic defence of democracy. First,because intellectual agents and communities are the
primary focus of epistemic evaluation, virtue epistemology offers political theorists the
opportunity to develop an epistemic defence of democracy that takes ‘realism’ seriously
(e.g. the cognitive limitations and biases of humans). Second,because vir tue epistemology
conceives of epistemology as a normative discipline, it builds normative criteria into the
exercise of assessing the ‘epistemic fitness’ of a political arrangement (e.g. democracy vs.
POLITICAL STUDIES REVIEW: 2012 VOL 10, 7–22
doi: 10.1111/j.1478-9302.2011.00243.x
© 2012 TheAuthor. Political Studies Review © 2012 Political Studies Association
epistocracy). Third, by assessing the epistemic powers of democracy from a virtue-
epistemological perspective, a more robust (Deweyan) conception of democracy needs to be
employed and assessed than the minimalist conception employed by the Condorcet Jury
Theorem.
Virtue epistemologists define knowledge as ‘success from ability’ (Greco, 2010, p. 3) or
‘a state of cognitive contact with reality arising out of acts of intellectual virtue’ (Zag-
zebski, 1996, p. 270). And the knowledge at stake in politics is typically practical knowledge;
that is, knowledge concerning what ought to be done about the economy, about health
care, about the environment, about security, etc. The concept of phronesis (practical
wisdom) is thus central to a virtue-epistemological assessment of the ‘fitness of democ-
racy’. Does democracy, on balance, enhance or hinder a society’s practical wisdom? As
will become evident in the sections that follow, much depends on what we mean by
‘democracy’. The Condorcet Jury Theorem invokes, I argue, a deficient conception of
democracy which employs an artificial account of the decisions democracies typically face
and the mistaken assumption that voting is the primary political activity.
By equating knowledge with ‘success from virtue’, virtue epistemology puts the
evaluative focus of democracy on democracy’s ability (or inability) to provide citizens
with the opportunity to live flourishing lives. In the next section I outline some of the
empirical evidence concerning the cognitive limitations and failings of humans. I then
turn to the task of making the case for the conjecture that democracy, understood as a
mode of associated living, is the best epistemic device available to help humans flourish.
‘Virtue is usually acquired through habituation’ (Zagzebski, 1996, 126). The culture
democracy cultivates – open-mindedness, humility, science, curiosity, etc. – helps reinforce
the habits and dispositions needed to realise phronesis. Such virtues are hindered, rather
than realised, by dogmatism, delusions of infallible ‘knowledge elites’ and a resistance to
changing one’s mind.
Taking Our Cognitive Capacities Seriously
In Virtues of the Mind Linda Zagzebski (1996, p. 114) offers the following extensive list of
intellectual virtues:
(1) the ability to recognise the salient facts; sensitivity to details;
(2) open-mindedness in collecting and appraising evidence;
(3) fairness in evaluating the arguments of others;
(4) intellectual humility;
(5) intellectual perseverance, diligence, care and thoroughness;
(6) adaptability of intellect;
(7) the detective’s virtues: thinking of coherent explanations of the facts;
(8) being able to recognise reliable authority;
(9) insight into persons, problems, theories;
(10) the teaching virtues: the social virtues of being communicative, including intellec-
tual candour and knowing your audience and how they respond.
Knowledge is ‘a state of cognitive contact with reality arising out of acts of intellectual
virtue’ (Zagzebski, 1996, p. 270). Intellectual vices compromise the attainment of knowl-
8COLIN FARRELLY
© 2012 TheAuthor. Political Studies Review © 2012 Political Studies Association
Political Studies Review: 2012, 10(1)
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