Voice and Access
| Published date | 01 June 2004 |
| Date | 01 June 2004 |
| Author | Jan Beyers |
| DOI | 10.1177/1465116504042442 |
| Subject Matter | Journal Article |
Voice and Access
Political Practices of European Interest
Associations
Jan Beyers
Leiden University, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT
This article examines to what extent European interest
associations combine public political strategies with
traditional forms of inside lobbying or the seeking of access
to public officials. I compare two theoretical perspectives: a
resource-based explanation focusing on the nature of the
mobilized interest and an institutional account emphasizing
the explanatory power of varying institutional conditions.
My data show that institutional variables have a significant
effect on whether and how public and inside strategies are
combined. Although the institutional supply of access
favours specific interests, the European Union contains
important institutional opportunities for diffuse interests that
aim to expand the scope of political conflict or signal policy
concerns by using public political strategies.
211
European Union Politics
DOI: 10.1177/1465116504042442
Volume 5 (2): 211–240
Copyright© 2004
SAGE Publications
London, Thousand Oaks CA,
New Delhi
KEY WORDS
access networks
institutions
outside lobbying
political mobilization
03 042442 (to/d) 15/4/04 12:26 pm Page 211
Introduction
Are interest associations that use inside strategies less inclined to express their
demands in public? Or do they combine public political practices with
traditional forms of inside lobbying? And do those with access avoid public
strategies? With regard to the European Union (EU), few scholars have
systematically examined these questions: the combination of seeking access
with public political action has inspired a relatively small set of researchers
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1991; Gais and Walker, 1991; Kollman, 1998). The
aim of this article is to investigate whether the interests on whose behalf
political mobilization takes place and/or the institutional context in which
mobilization is embedded explain the choice of political strategies among
interest associations at the European level.
My analysis contrasts two different theoretical understandings about
political mobilization. To begin with, interest associations can be seen as
organizations whose survival depends on their material resources, their
constituency and their structural embeddedness within a political system
(Gais and Walker, 1991: 105–7). These are resource-based explanations empha-
sizing the nature of the organized interest’s ‘material basis’. Interest associ-
ations mobilize resources that are useful in order to sustain support from their
constituencies and to attract government attention. Costly and inefficient
strategies are avoided. For instance, those with routine access to policy-
makers capitalize on this and invest further in access strategies. They are less
likely to invest in grassroots mobilization or in public campaigns. Those
associations on the periphery of the political system, which do not have
access, use public strategies extensively. In this way, they try to provoke a
public debate on the issues they care about. In addition, their peripheral
position is reinforced by a predisposition among policy-makers to pay atten-
tion to the supply of policy-relevant expertise by specific interests rather than
to listen to those making public noise.
In contrast to resource-based explanations, institutionalists emphasize that
institutional variability leads to incentives and constraints that influence the
emergence of particular political practices (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2000).
For instance, interest associations rarely face one monolithic government. In
polities composed of different arenas and layers offering multiple access points
for political demands, such as the European Union, each institutional actor
plays a specific role. Different institutional actors are targeted to varying
degrees by different sorts of interests and their respective influence strategies.
This article demonstrates the incompleteness of resource-based explanations
and confirms the explanatory power of institutional approaches. In general, a
resource-based perspective depicts interest associations as prisoners of their
European Union Politics 5(2)
212
03 042442 (to/d) 15/4/04 12:26 pm Page 212
To continue reading
Request your trial