Voice and silence: Why groups take credit for acts of terror
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343310376439 |
| Date | 01 September 2010 |
| Published date | 01 September 2010 |
| Author | Aaron M Hoffman |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Voice and silence: Why groups take credit
for acts of terror
Aaron M Hoffman
Department of Political Science, Northern Illinois University
Abstract
Terrorism is designed to draw attention to particular issues and causes. Yet, the incidence of credit-taking (announcing one’s
responsibility for acts of terror) varies even though anonymity can undermine the clarity of the intended messages. This article
offers an explanation of the variation in credit-taking that emphasizes how the competitive context in which groups operate
shapes terrorists groups’ need to cultivate support for their activities. Increasing numbers of terrorist organizations make it dif-
ficult for the supporters of terrorism to reward the perpetrators of particular attacks with their backing. Since such support is
critical to the proper functioning of terrorist organizations, groups use claims of responsibility to distinguish themselves from
those that had no hand in the violence. Consequently, variation in the probability of credit-taking fluctuates as a function of
the number of active terrorist groups in a given theater of operations. This argument is contrasted with theories that suggest
credit-taking is influenced by: the ideological mix of terrorist organizations; the willingness of governments to respond to terror-
ism using military force; state sponsorship; the depth of communal grievances; and the use of suicide attacks. The results, based
on an analysis of transnational terrorism events conducted in the Israeli theater of operations between 1968 and 2004, suggest
that competitive context is a consistently strong predictor of credit-taking. By implication, the results point to the utility of
counter-terrorism strategies that interfere with the transmission of information between terrorist organizations and their
supporters.
Keywords
competition, credit taking, Israel, ITERATE, terrorism
Introduction
Terrorism is designed to draw attention to particular issues and
causes. Yet, perpetrators often keep their involvement in acts
of terrorism secret, resulting in confusion among target audi-
ences. The 1995 Oklahoma City bombing is a case in point.
Timothy McVeigh’s decision to hide his participation in the
attack led some authorities to speculate that Islamic militants
were to blame (Johnston, 1995). McVeigh’s silence permitted
observers to overlook his message (which was one of frustra-
tion with federal police actions in Waco, Texas and Ruby
Ridge, Idaho) and to focus instead on other groups and issues.
Given the importance of publicity in terrorist campaigns, why
are claims of responsibility issued for some terrorist attacks,
but not others?
Claims of responsibility are worthy of analysis because they
provide a window into what perpetrators of terrorism want
and the incentives that influence their behavior. For example,
anonymous attacks are often taken to indicate that groups are
disinterested in building grass-roots support for their move-
ments and closed to efforts at political compromise (e.g.
Enders & Sandler, 2006). Claimed attacks, on the other hand,
are seen as signifying that groups are unafraid of retaliatory
strikes (e.g. Hoffman, 1997a,b), which might further imply
weaknesses in certain counter-terrorism efforts. In short,
credit-taking has the potential to tell observers a great deal
about the nature of the threat groups pose and the adequacy
of the responses to their attacks.
Yet, the promise of using credit-taking to understand the
strategy of terrorism is complicated by the difficulty of explain-
ing the actual propensity of claims. Organizations like Hamas
and al Qaeda that might be expected to disdain credit-taking,
either for ideological reasons or the desire to avoid military
counter-strikes, instead often claim responsibility for attacks.
Terrorism may be influenced by more than ideology or the
prospect of military action.
In this article, I advance an alternative explanation for the
conditions under which claims of responsibility are issued for
acts of terrorism: variations in the competitive context in
which groups operate affects the probability of credit-taking
Corresponding author:
amhst20@gmail.com
Journal of Peace Research
47(5) 615–626
ªThe Author(s) 2010
Reprints and permission:
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0022343310376439
jpr.sagepub.com
To continue reading
Request your trial