Voted out: Regime type, elections and contributions to United Nations peacekeeping operations
| Author | Allard Duursma,John Gledhill |
| Published date | 01 December 2019 |
| Date | 01 December 2019 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/1354066119830773 |
https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066119830773
European Journal of
International Relations
2019, Vol. 25(4) 1157 –1185
© The Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/1354066119830773
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JR
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Voted out: Regime type,
elections and contributions to
United Nations peacekeeping
operations
Allard Duursma
ETH Zurich, Switzerland
John Gledhill
University of Oxford, UK
Abstract
Previous research has suggested that leaders of democratic regimes are particularly
willing to contribute troops to United Nations peacekeeping operations because
backing ‘liberal’ peacekeeping allows them to support the diffusion of liberal institutions.
However, evidence used to sustain this argument is based on contribution patterns
during the decade of peacekeeping that followed the Cold War. In this article, we
argue that there has been a reversal in the relative willingness of democratic and non-
democratic governments to provide the United Nations with peacekeepers since then.
Specifically, we propose that the introduction of more ‘robust’ forms of peacekeeping
during the 1990s has rendered democratic governments reluctant to contribute large
numbers of peacekeepers to United Nations operations because elected leaders are
now concerned that voters may object to the deployment of national troops to high-
risk humanitarian missions in which there is no clear national interest. By contrast,
non-democratic leaders partly discount public opinion because they are less reliant
on popular support to retain power. Thus, when non-democrats see that contributing
troops to United Nations peacekeeping will bring them reputational and/or resource
benefits, they are willing to contribute peacekeepers — and on a large scale. We test
our claims quantitatively. We find that since the 1990s, democratic governments have
remained more likely than non-democrats to contribute some troops to United Nations
peacekeeping operations, but non-democratic governments have been more likely to
Corresponding author:
John Gledhill, University of Oxford, 3 Mansfield Rd., Oxford, OX1 3TB, UK.
Email: john.gledhill@qeh.ox.ac.uk
830773EJT0010.1177/1354066119830773European Journal of International RelationsDuursma and Gledhill
research-article2019
Article
1158 European Journal of International Relations 25(4)
make large-scale contributions. We also find that governments have been especially
reluctant to make sizeable contributions to peacekeeping when elections have been on
the horizon.
Keywords
Foreign policy, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, public goods, regime type, United
Nations
Introduction
Are democracies or non-democracies more likely to contribute troops to United Nations
(UN) peacekeeping operations (PKOs)? Previous research has suggested that democratic
governments are particularly willing to contribute to PKOs because backing ‘liberal’
peacekeeping and peacebuilding allows them to support the diffusion of liberal institu-
tions and values (Andersson, 2000; Lebovic, 2004). While there is evidence to support
this claim, that evidence is somewhat ‘dated’ because it is based on observations of con-
tribution patterns over the decade that followed the Cold War. Thus, in this article, we
revisit the relationship between regime type and troop contributions.
We argue that since the 1990s, there has been a reversal in the relative willingness of
democratic and non-democratic governments to commit large numbers of troops to UN
PKOs. Specifically, we propose that the introduction of more ‘robust’ — and thus risky
— forms of peacekeeping during the 1990s has rendered democratic governments particu-
larly reluctant to contribute large numbers of peacekeepers to UN missions. This, we sug-
gest, is because elected leaders, who are reliant on popular support, have become concerned
that voters may object to sending national troops to high-risk humanitarian missions in
which there are no clear national interests at stake. By contrast, since non-democratic lead-
ers are less reliant on public support, they can discount any negative public opinion.
Consequently, when illiberal governments believe that providing peacekeepers might bring
them reputational gains and/or resources that they can use to strengthen their hold on
power, they are willing to contribute troops — and on a large scale.
To assess these claims, we run two sets of quantitative tests. First, using data on troop
contributions from all independent states since 1990, we use a Heckman model to exam-
ine the relationship between regime type and peacekeeping contributions during two
discrete periods: 1990–1999 and 1999–2015. Our results suggest that since the 1990s,
democratic governments have remained more likely than non-democrats to contribute
some troops to UN PKOs. However, we also find that governments at the non-demo-
cratic end of the regime spectrum are now more likely to make large-scale contributions
to UN PKOs. Given this finding, we explore our proposed causal claim, which holds that
democratic leaders have become reluctant to provide large numbers of peacekeepers
because they are concerned that such a move may be unpopular with voters. We assume
that if this is true, then democratic governments (since the 1990s) will have been particu-
larly reluctant to initiate large-scale troop contributions when elections have been on the
horizon. We find that this is the case.
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