Votes, money can buy. The conditional effect of EU Structural Funds on government MPs’ electoral performance
| Author | Zsófia Papp |
| Published date | 01 December 2019 |
| Date | 01 December 2019 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/1465116519862875 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Votes, money can buy.
The conditional effect
of EU Structural Funds
on government MPs’
electoral performance
Zs
ofia Papp
Centre for Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences,
Budapest, Hungary
Abstract
Members of Parliament are often thought to attract funding into their constituencies to
increase their local support, and eventually, secure re-election. Nevertheless, there is
only limited research focusing on the question whether or not government funding indeed
affects the MPs’ electoral performances. I focus on pork barrel politics in a single country,
namely Hungary, and use town-level European Union Structural Funds data between
2007 and 2010 to explain the electoral performance of single-member district MPs at
the 2010 general elections. I find that increasing funding improves government MPs’
electoral performances and that the size of the effect is conditional upon the mayors’
party affiliations. In towns with government mayors, government MPs perform signif-
icantly better than in towns with opposition mayors. The results have consequences in
the fields of the distribution of Structural Funds, the electoral connection between
legislators and voters and the European Union’s contribution to regime legitimation.
Keywords
Elections, Hungary, legislators, pork barrel, Structural Funds
Corresponding author:
Zs
ofia Papp, Centre for Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 4 T
oth Ka
´lma
´n Street, Budapest
1096, Hungary.
Email: papp.zsofia@tk.mta.hu
European Union Politics
2019, Vol. 20(4) 543–561
!The Author(s) 2019
Article reuse guidelines:
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DOI: 10.1177/1465116519862875
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Introduction
The idea of ‘pork barrel politics’ refers to the distribution of government funds to
locally organised projects. It is commonly applied by incumbent legislators to
channel money into their constituencies with significant implications for the
national budget. Thus, eventually, pork barrel politics affect both citizens living
in the district the funds are allocated to, and those from other parts of the country,
whose towns, as a consequence, are not subject to government funding.
Additionally, pork barrel is considered a form of (allocation) responsiveness and
thus is an important building block of the electoral connection.
The source of pork barrel spending varies across and within countries. Whilst
government spending constitutes a considerable share of the funding, governments
increasingly capitalise external sources such as European Union (EU) funds to
either support districts where the government party has fared well in elections or
to increase their vote share in marginal constituencies. In countries where the
distribution of EU Structural Funds (SF) is organised by a central government
agency, it is easier for governments to frame funding as pork barrel and enjoy its
benefits during election times. Hence, in countries where pork barrel politics
increase the government vote, the EU regional policy may have substantial effects
on national politics and plays an important role in regime legitimisation.
Members of Parliament (MPs) are thought to attract funding into their constit-
uencies to increase their local support, and eventually, secure re-election (Cain
et al., 1987; Mayhew, 1974). Nevertheless, there is only limited research focusing
on the question whether or not government funding, and particularly EU SF, indeed
affect government MPs’ electoral performances. Although government MPs do not
formally participate in funding allocations, they are interested in advertising win-
ning projects as their own success. I demonstrate that the electoral support of
government MPs is larger in towns with larger funding. There is, however, more
to the story. Besides the MP, the mayor is another key actor in town-level politics,
one who alters voter perceptions of who ‘brought home the bacon’, and thus whom
voters reward at elections. I theorise that because voters are better able to credit
the funding to parties instead of individual politicians, in towns with mayors affil-
iated with government parties (henceforth ‘government mayors’), the electoral
reward of pork barrel politics for government MPs is larger than in towns with
mayors affiliated with opposition parties (henceforth ‘opposition mayors’).
The article focuses on how the distribution of EU SF affected town-level elec-
tion results in Hungary in 2010. The Hungarian case seems suitable for an inves-
tigation of this issue for several reasons. First, the single-member district (SMD)
tier of the mixed-member electoral system ensures a one-in-one connection
between the MP and the constituency, minimising the problem of ‘shirking’. To
get a more nuanced picture, the article explains town-level electoral performance.
As towns are nested within electoral districts, just as in the case of SMDs, the
connection between the legislator and the town remains immediate. Second,
there was a steep decline in government popularity before the 2010 elections.
544 European Union Politics 20(4)
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