Wadsworth v Marshall and Another

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
Judgment Date01 January 1832
Date01 January 1832
CourtExchequer

English Reports Citation: 149 E.R. 279

IN THE COURTS OF EXCHEQUER AND EXCHEQUER CHAMBER

Wadsworth
and
Marshall and Another

S. C. 1 L. J. Ex. 25. Distinguished, Harris v. Quine, 1869, L. R. 4 Q. B. 656. Referred to, Underwood v. Lewis, [1894] 2 Q. B. 308.

:wadsworth v. marshall and another. Exch. of Pleas. 1832.-An attorney who has undertaken a cause, is not bound to proceed without adequate advances from time to time by his client, for expenses out of pocket; and, therefore, the Court will not compel an attorney, even after notice of trial, to carry the cause into Court, unless the client supply him with sufficient funds to pay the expenses out of pocket thereby incurred. [S. C. 1 L. J. Ex. 25. Distinguished, Hivrris v. Quine, 1869, L. E. 4 Q. B. 656. Eeferred to, Underwood v. Lewis, [1894] 2 Q. B. 308.] This was an action by the assignee of a bankrupt against the sheriff of Middlesex, for goods taken in execution. After notice of trial for the Sittings after Easter Term, and a countermand- 280 DOE V. DURNFORD 2 C. & J. 666. The plaintiff obtained a rule, calling upon his attorney to shew cause why he should not proceed with the action. The attorney, in his affidavit in opposition to the rule, stated that, after he had given notice of trial, he had read in a newspaper the report of a trial at the Old Bailey, which induced a suspicion that the action was not a creditable one : and he waa led to suppose, from inquiries he had made, that the plaintiff was in insolvent circumstances ; that he had received a notice from the defendants of their intention to dispute the bankruptcy, which would render further evidence necessary on the part of the plaintiff, and increase the expense of going to trial; and that he had, in consequence, required a further advance of money for that purpose, which he had riot received; by reason whereof he had countermanded the notice of trial. Knowles shewed cause, submitting that the old rule, as laid down in Tidd's Pract., 9th edit., that, when an attorney once appears, or undertakes to be attorney for another, he shall not be permitted to withdraw, although his client neglect to bring him money, no longer prevailed; and he cited the decision of Lord Tenterden, C. J,, in [666] Rowson v. Earle (1 M. & M. 538), that an attorney is justified in refusing to proeeed with & cause, unless funds are supplied. The plaintiff, in person, relied upon the old rule, and objected that the case cited was merely a Nisi Prius decision...

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4 cases
  • Arnold v The Mayor, Aldermen, and Burgesses of the Borough of Poole
    • United Kingdom
    • Court of Common Pleas
    • 22 November 1842
    ...the defendants from the demand; although the suit is going on, the bill has been called for by the defendants. In Wadsworth v. Marshall (2 C. & J. 665) it was held that an attorney who has undertaken a cause is not bound to proceed without adequate [893] advances from time to time by his cl......
  • Williams, Gent., one, Company against Jones, Gent., one other, &
    • United Kingdom
    • Court of the Queen's Bench
    • 12 November 1841
    ...therefore, be for the plaintiff. Williams, Coleridge, and Wightman Js. concurred. Judgment for plaintiff. (a) See Wadsworth v. Marshall, 2 C. & J. 665 ; Fansandau v. Browne, 2 Bing. 402. S. C. 2 Moore & Scott, 543. (b) 2 Q. 2, c. 23, sects. 1, 3. ...
  • The Queen against Fouch and Watling
    • United Kingdom
    • Court of the Queen's Bench
    • 17 November 1841
  • Nicholls v Wilson
    • United Kingdom
    • Exchequer
    • 26 January 1843
    ...during which he conducted it. That was decided in F'an^andau v. Browne (9 Bing. 403; 2 M. & Scott, 543). In Wadswoi'th v. Marshall (2 Cr. & J. 665), it was held that [107] if an attorney has reasonable and probable cause for commencing an action, and desists from prosecuting it because he a......

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