Waiting for the real dragon
| Date | 01 June 2017 |
| Published date | 01 June 2017 |
| DOI | 10.1177/2057891116680303 |
| Subject Matter | Research articles |
Research article
Waiting for the real dragon:
How globalization, patriotism
and trust shape tolerance
in Southeast Asia
Christian Collet
International Christian University, Tokyo, Japan
Abstract
Southeast Asia is the world’s most diverse and rapidly modernizing region, yet one where moder-
nization theory is challenged (e.g. Bell et al., 1995) and where allegiance to authoritarian regimes
appearstrenchant (Chang etal., 2013; Dalton and Shin,2014). Using the AsiaBarometer, I considerthe
influence of modernization and allegiance on potential democratization by analyzing an established
indicator of assertive change: tolerance of homosexuality (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005: Ch. 5, forth-
coming).The findings reveal differencesbetween SoutheastAsians and the West and betweencitizens
in the Sinic and Indic subregions. Exposure to foreign cultures produces a significant increase in tol-
erance among Sinicized citizens,but has no meaningful effect on thosein Indic states. Patriotism and
trust in civil society also boost tolerance among Sinicized citizens, but reduce the probability of tol-
eranceamong citizens in Indic states.The strong linkagebetween sexual toleranceand gender equality
driven by social factors and secularism in the West does not manifest in Southeast Asia. While the
findings suggestpotential for change in the Sinicized region, theyunderscore the different effects that
globalization andallegiance may have on citizens living under Southeast Asia’s varietyof regimes.
When the prison doors are opened, the real dragon will fly out. (Ho Chi Minh, Prison Diary, 1962)
...Man is a complex animal who is tractable in some respects and intractable in others. Both the
successes and the failures of our communist cases suggest that there is a pattern to this tractability-
intractability behavior, that liberty once experienced is not quickly forgotten, and that equity and
equality of some kind resonate in the human spirit. (Almond, 1983: 137–138)
Why Viet Nam?
During May of 2012, the Vietnamese Ministry of Justice (MOJ) circulated an official letter asking
for feedback on the country’s Marriage and Family Law. Article 10, a ban on same sex marriage
Corresponding author:
Christian Collet, International Christian University, 3-10-2 Osawa, Mitaka, Tokyo 181-8585, Japan.
Email: collect@icu.ac.jp
Asian Journal of Comparative Politics
2017, Vol. 2(2) 213–239
ªThe Author(s) 2017
Reprints and permission:
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DOI: 10.1177/2057891116680303
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enacted a dozen years earlier in response to outcry over a wedding between two men in Ho Chi
Minh City, had come under scrutiny. Recognizing the complexity of the issue, Ministry officials
nonetheless arrived at the conclusion that ‘‘in terms of ensuring personal freedom, marriage
between people of the same sex should be recognized.’’ Two years of civil public debate ensued.
Various ministry heads spoke in favor of the policy on the grounds of fundamental equality, love
and human rights. Local authorities, in turn, affirmed ‘‘traditionalvalues.’’ Civil society NGOs, led
by young activists in concert with the MOJ and the United Nations Development Programme,
organized Facebook campaigns and ‘‘fun’’ and ‘‘gentle’’ public events that sought to contrast
LGBT issues with the ‘‘political’’ protests taking place over the East China Sea. The experiences
of Western Europe, the US, China and India were brought to bear on both sides (Oosterhof et al.,
2014; Tu ˆ
o
?i Tre
?Online, 2013).
When the National Assembly eventually approved revision of Article 10 (striking the ban but
stopping short of fully recognizing same sex marriages), a wave of favorable Western coverage
followed. The media hailed Viet Nam for ‘‘leadingthe way’’ but expressed shock that such a move
occurred in ‘‘Southeast Asia’s most repressive state.’’ Who—or what—could explain the sudden
change? Was this a sign of people power? A crack in the regime? And why, as debates over sexual
tolerance and marriage equality reverberated across the region, and around the world, was the
Socialist Republic of Viet Nam—and not, say, the democratic Republic of the Philippines—the
first in Southeast Asia to move toward liberalization (e.g. Mann, 2014; Maresca, 2013)?
Although these are timely questions for regional affairs, they beg others about the broader
relationship between political cultures and structures—and how modernization may be affecting
this relationship. Almond and Verba argue in The Civic Culture that when the constellation of
cognitive, affective and evaluative orientations of citizens toward the political system are in
positive alignment, the result is an allegiant culture—one that is congruent with its institutions
and provides the foundation for the growth of a healthy, moderated, ‘‘participatory civic culture’’
(Almond and Verba, 1963: 21–23, 31–32). All political cultures are mixed, stress Almond and
Verba, but for them the ideal democratic society blends participants and subjects—engaged, but
ultimately dutiful, citizens, with those who have a faint sense of the political system and simply
remain obedient to it. Allegiance, th us, is viewed as a critical attitude und erpinning political
stability. But for Almond and Verba, allegiance was seen as the product of uniformly favorable
attachments toward the ‘‘objects’’ of domestic politics. This effectively cast aside the negative
attachments of citizens as anti-system ‘‘alienation’’ when, in fact, their dissent and calls for change
could be seen as equally dutiful expressions requisite for liberal democracy.
Reflecting upon a wider variety of data and democratic transitions, scholars have rethought this
premise. ‘‘Instead of an allegiant and loyal public,’’ write Dalton and Welzel (2014: 2), ‘‘estab-
lished democracies now have a public of critical citizens.’’ As they explain, the contentious politics
of the 1960s and 1970s lamented by scholars like Huntington (1974) as destabilizing to democracy
should instead be viewed as necessary for its continued evolution. While allegiant subjects offer
societal stability, it is critical citizens that organize, voice discontent and demand accountability
from their institutions—an outgrowth of modernization-driven changes in values, across genera-
tions, toward greater autonomy and self-expression (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Welzel, 2013). It
is precisely because governments come under public pressure that they are compelled to respond,
disclose and liberalize. Critical citizens, the argument goes, are essential for better governance
(Norris, 1999).
On the face of it, VietNam—and Southeast Asia generally—would seem a good test forthis thesis.
Publics in theregion are found to be among the world’sleast critical and most patriotic (Chang et al.,
214 Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 2(2)
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