Wales in the World: Intergovernmental Relations and Sub-State Diplomacy
| Published date | 01 May 2012 |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-856X.2011.00502.x |
| Author | Richard Wyn Jones,Elin Royles |
| Date | 01 May 2012 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
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doi: 10.1111/j.1467-856X.2011.00502.x
B J P I R : 2 0 1 2 V O L 1 4 , 2 5 0 – 2 6 9
Wales in the World: Intergovernmental
Relations and Sub-state Diplomacy
Richard Wyn Jones and Elin Royles
This article explores intergovernmental relations between the devolved Welsh Assembly Govern-
ment and the central UK government through the prism of two case studies focusing on examples
of Welsh sub-state diplomacy, the first being international activity aimed at promoting trade and
investment and the second the ‘Wales for Africa’ programme. The article focuses in particular on
the implications for Wales–UK relations of partial party incongruence brought about by the
formation of the Labour–Plaid Cymru coalition government in Cardiff in the summer of 2007. The
authors also examine the early indications of the impact of full party incongruence following the
formation of the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government in London in June 2010.
Keywords: intergovernmental relations; Wales; party incongruence; sub-state
diplomacy
Introduction
This article focuses on intergovernmental relations (IGR) between the UK gov-
ernment and the devolved Welsh Assembly Government (WAG).1 While IGR are
an important facet of governance across the devolved UK, they are particularly
important in the Welsh case due to the particular characteristics of that country’s
constitutional dispensation (Rawlings 2003, 389). As a result, Wales offers a par-
ticularly appropriate prism through which to consider some of the issues that
arise in the context of IGR including the focus of the current special issue,
namely the impact of party incongruence on the nature and outcomes of IGR.
From 2007 to 2011, WAG took the form of a coalition of the Labour party and
Plaid Cymru, giving rise to a period of partial incongruence between the devolved
and central state levels. The formation of the Conservative–Liberal Democrat
coalition government at the UK level in June 2010 began a period of full
incongruence.
In addition to discussing incongruence this article differs in two other ways from
existing discussion of IGR in the Welsh devolved context. While the extant litera-
ture is quite extensive, it has tended to focus on how general trends in IGR affect
Wales, including the plight of the UK’s formal structures for managing IGR and the
(previously) central role of the Labour party in managing IGR (see, for instance,
Laffin et al. 2000; Rawlings 2000 and 2003; Patchett 2002; Trench 2007a and
2007c). Less attention has been paid, however, to how relations between the
Assembly Government and Whitehall departments work in practice. This article
begins to fill that gap by focusing on two specific examples of IGR between WAG
© 2012 The Authors. British Journal of Politics and International Relations © 2012
Political Studies Association
WA L E S I N T H E W O R L D
251
and Whitehall. While policy-oriented studies of IGR are certainly no panacea (for
an important corrective see Bolleyer 2009, 15), they offer a valuable perspective,
one that is as yet underdeveloped in the Welsh case.
But what is perhaps most novel about what follows is that our case studies examine
IGR in the context of the Assembly Government’s sub-state diplomacy (or paradi-
plomacy). One case focuses on international trade and investment activity and the
other on the ‘Wales for Africa’ programme. Sub-state diplomacy refers to the
international relations-related activities of sub-state governments, be those rela-
tions formal or informal, permanent or ad hoc, bilateral or multilateral. It represents
a particularly instructive context in which to examine IGR. The pre-eminent role of
the sovereign state in international relations is, of course, underpinned by inter-
national law and, in this case, by the devolution dispensations themselves. More-
over, this leading role is, and the prerogatives and privileges that are entailed by it
are, often jealously guarded, especially in the context of regional actors within the
borders of the state who chafe at the restrictions inherent in the designation
‘stateless nation’. Sub-state diplomacy increases the potential for tension in central–
sub-state relations and can therefore highlight the limits of IGR; or more precisely,
the potentially limiting and disciplining role of sovereignty on relations between
states and regional actors.
It should be noted that this article concentrates on WAG’s sub-state diplomacy
outwith the European Union context. In doing so, it also represents a further
departure from the current academic discussion on sub-state diplomacy in Europe,
which tends to focus on regional–EU-level relationships or on the triangular inter-
relationships between region, state and the European Union. By examining the
Welsh Assembly Government’s international relations activity beyond Europe, we
deliberately focus on activity that takes place in a less institutionalised and habitu-
alised context, thus allowing more focus on the ‘play’ of IGR between Cardiff and
London.
A final point regarding the case studies is that they offer an opportunity to inves-
tigate the implications of partial incongruence between 2007 and 2010. From the
summer of 2007 to May 2011, economic development was part of the ministerial
portfolio of Plaid Cymru leader and deputy first minister, Ieuan Wyn Jones, while
international development was the preserve of the Labour first minister, Rhodri
Morgan and subsequently (after December 2009) Carwyn Jones.
The two central questions at the heart of this article may be summarised as follows:
(1)
What do our cases tell us about the broader dynamics of intergovernmental
relations between WAG and the UK government?
(2)
What in the Welsh case appear to have been the implications of partial party
incongruence for the dynamics of and organisational arrangements for IGR?
To answer these questions, our discussion is organised into five sections. We begin
with a brief, conceptual overview of the dynamics of sub-state diplomacy and a look
at the limited literature on sub-state diplomacy in the Welsh context. Second, we
locate our discussion in the academic literature on IGR and provide a general
overview of IGR between Cardiff and London, particularly prior to partial party
incongruence. Third, we outline the findings of our two case studies, both in the
© 2012 The Authors. British Journal of Politics and International Relations © 2012 Political Studies Association
BJPIR, 2012, 14(2)
252
R I C H A R D W Y N J O N E S , E L I N R O Y L E S
context of party congruence and partial incongruence. The fieldwork forming the
basis for these case studies comprised the analysis of primary and secondary mate-
rials as well as 32 semi-structured, elite-level interviews conducted between March
2008 and October 2010, predominantly with WAG officials, but also including
relevant officials from Whitehall departments, public sector bodies and the third
sector in Wales. In a fourth section, we consider the effects of partial party incon-
gruence, while also bringing our story up to date with a brief look at the first
indications of the impact of full party incongruence after June 2010. The conclud-
ing section draws out some of the broader implications of the preceding discussion
for our understanding of IGR.
Sub-state Diplomacy: Cui Bono?
Why are sub-state actors increasingly willing (Cornago 2010) to expend scarce
resources on paradiplomatic activities? Especially so given that international rela-
tions are almost universally regarded as the prerogative of the sovereign state, and
that states already have requisite infrastructures in place such as diplomatic services
and extensive international links through which those relations may be developed
and maintained.
As illustrated by our case studies, as the distinction between domestic and foreign
policy appears increasingly outmoded, sub-state diplomacy is often justified as
assisting in the effective delivery of sub-state government functions (Duran et al.
2010). So, for example, sub-state diplomatic activities are often aimed at promoting
economic development (Hocking 1999, 23; Keating 1999, 4). Sub-state interna-
tional links are also regularly justified in terms of ‘policy learning’ or ‘spreading best
practice’, even if this is, at best, very difficult to confirm empirically (Cornago 2010,
28). Apart from such material benefits—real or apparent—sub-state diplomacy is
also a form of political agency (Cornago 2010, 27). An important motivation for
sub-state diplomacy is the symbolic capital that is generated for those politicians
and officials involved. Evidence for the latter point is provided by a somewhat
unexpected source, namely the memoirs of Wyn Roberts, a prominent Welsh
politician of the 1980s and early 1990s. Roberts reveals his pride and pleasure at
being feted by other regional leaders, delighting in the ‘VIP treatment’ received.
This is all the more significant as Roberts was a minister in successive Conservative
governments, sharing his party’s hostility towards devolution. ‘Perhaps it was just
as well’, he muses, ‘that she [Margaret Thatcher] did not know too much about
what we regionalists were up to’ (Roberts 2006, 218).
The symbolic capital that may be generated by international activity seems to play
a key role in the calculations of those sub-state governments that represent ‘state-
less nations’. André Lecours and Luis Moreno (2003) emphasise the role of nation-
alism in encouraging sub-state diplomatic activities in such...
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