Walking the middle path: The characteristics of Indonesia’s rise
| Published date | 01 December 2016 |
| Date | 01 December 2016 |
| Author | Awidya Santikajaya |
| DOI | 10.1177/0020702016686381 |
| Subject Matter | Scholarly Essays |
International Journal
2016, Vol. 71(4) 563–586
!The Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/0020702016686381
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Scholarly Essay
Walking the middle
path: The characteristics
of Indonesia’s rise
Awidya Santikajaya
Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy, The Australian National
University, Canberra, Australia
Abstract
This article provides a framework to help understand Indonesia’s rise. Although the
study of emerging powers has flourished in recent years, much discussion is devoted to
explaining large emerging powers, such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC).
Indonesia’s rise is overlooked because its material capabilities are less than those of
the BRIC countries. In order to characterize the emergence of Indonesia, this article
establishes a set of parameters to distinguish Indonesia from BRIC and middle powers.
The parameters are: (1) attitude toward the international order; (2) performed
role; and (3) nexus between regional and global roles. This article argues that
Indonesia displays three characteristics that distinguish it from BRIC and middle
powers—(1) soft-revisionist; (2) normative bridge building; and (3) accommodative
regional leadership. The third and fourth sections of this article test these characteris-
tics through G20 and climate change case studies. This article concludes that the
characteristics of Indonesia’s emergence are located in a conundrum between those
of BRIC and middle powers. Although it shares some characteristics with BRIC coun-
tries, Indonesia is carefully trying to keep a distance from BRIC and to maintain strategic
autonomy in relations with other international actors.
Keywords
Indonesia, middle powers, BRIC, G20, MIKTA
Background and context: Indonesia, the one left behind in the
study of emerging powers?
Narratives on a ‘‘changing world,’’ ‘‘transformation of global order,’’ and ‘‘global
governance transition’’ have flourished in recent years. From an economic
Corresponding author:
Awidya Santikajava, Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy, Hedley Bull Centre, room 2.39, The Australian
National University, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia.
Email: awidya.santikajaya@anu.edu.au
perspective, developing countries’ economies have indeed expanded substantially.
According to a report by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), the share of non-OECD countries to the global economy
will rise from 49 percent in 2010 to 57 percent in 2030. In contrast, the developed
nations’ share of world gross domestic product (GDP) has generally declined.
The United States’ share as the world’s largest economy, for instance, declined
from 30.87 percent in 2000 to 24.44 percent in 2015, while the Eurozone’s contri-
bution to the world’s GDP decreased from 19.46 percent in 2000 to 15.71 percent
in 2015.
1
In response to the growing importance of certain countries in contemporary
world politics and economics, scholars and policymakers use the terminology of
‘‘emerging powers’’ or ‘‘rising powers.’’ As a manifestation of their increasing
economic weight, these emerging powers have pursued foreign policy activism in
various multilateral negotiations.
2
They are now seen not merely as destinations for
foreign investors, but also as countries that have ambitions to promote changes in
international relations. They often actively question the relevance and legitimacy of
established norms in world politics.
Despite growing attention to nations in this category, the elaboration of the
emerging powers remains contested and ambiguous.
3
The analysis often takes for
granted the membership of the ‘‘emerging power’’ group, without a deeper under-
standing of the complexity and variation among countries within this category.
Thus, a significant body of literature is concerned with such countries as China,
India, Brazil, and Russia. While research dealing with these four countries, collect-
ively referred to as BRIC, is abundant, the rest of the emerging powers are still very
much understudied. BRIC has been central due to the large size of its members, in
terms of population, geography, and material resources. ‘‘BRIC’’ is even used
interchangeably with ‘‘emerging powers’’ as a whole. Lin Yueqin listed four
BRIC countries as representatives of emerging powers.
4
Joshua Toh regarded
these four countries as the leading actors shaping the world order in the twenty-
first century.
5
Indonesia is one of the emerging powers that is relatively understudied. When
narratives about emerging or rising powers became popular, Indonesia was indeed
1. Data obtained and processed from the World Bank. Total GDP used here is Current GDP in US$.
World Bank, ‘‘World Data Bank,’’ http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx (accessed 24
July 2016).
2. Tom Sauer, ‘‘The emerging powers and the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime,’’
Security Policy Brief,Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations, no. 27 (2011): 1, http://
aei.pitt.edu/33466/1/SPB27-Sauer.pdf (accessed 1 March 2014).
3. Amitav Acharya, ‘‘Why Indonesia matters,’’ Strategic Review, October–December 2014, http://
www.sr-indonesia.com/in_the_journal/view/why-indonesia-matters?pg¼all (accessed 2 February
2015).
4. Lin Yueqin, ‘‘The rise of emerging powers and the BRICs’ chase to catch up,’’ China Economist 5,
no. 2 (2010): 1.
5. Chee Hong Joshua Toh, ‘‘Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC): Reshaping the world order in
the 21st century,’’ Luce.nt (2010): 5–6, https://www.usnwc.edu/Lucent/OpenPdf.aspx?id¼93
(accessed 25 July 2016).
564 International Journal 71(4)
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