Wallgrave v Tebbs
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judgment Date | 14 December 1855 |
| Date | 14 December 1855 |
| Court | High Court of Chancery |
English Reports Citation: 69 E.R. 800
HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY
S. C. L. J. Ch. 241; 2 Jur. (N. S.) 83. Followed, Jones v. Badley, 1867-68, L. R. 3 Eq. 635; L. R. 3 Ch. 362. See Rowbotham v. Dunnett, 1878, 8 Ch. D. 437; In re Boyes, 1884, 26 Ch. D. 536; In re Maddock [1902], 2 Ch. 227.
Charity. Mortmain. 9 Geo. 2 c. 36. Secret Trust. 7 Will 4 and 1 Vict. c. 26
WALLGRAVE V, TEBBS 2K.&J.312, It is a question whether a company, having formerly shewn, to the satisfaction of the Legislature, that it would then be for the public benefit to make a particular line of railway, shall be prevented from shewing, to the satisfaction of the Legislature, that it would now be more for the public benefit to make a diverted line. I ought to notice an able argument of Mr. Eoundell Palmers in Heatlicate v. The North Staffordshire Railway Company (2 M'N. & G-. 107) that there is no such distinction as that a [312] party may be restrained from opposing, but not from promoting, an Act of Parliament; for, if so, he imust first let the bill pass and then promote an Act for its repeal. That consequence does not appear to me to be such a reducdo ad absurdum as the argument represents it, because the party may promote the Act upon public grounds, and that circumstance would entitle him, in this Court, to a very different consideration. Having come to these conclusions, I do not think it necessary to express an opinion on the question whether the contract be void in itself on grounds of public policy. That question does not, to my mind, affect the question of costs, and I leave it to be determined, when occasion may require its determination. I have come to a clear conclusion that the true construction of the agreement is that for which the Plaintiffs contend; and having come to that conclusion, although I refuse the motion, I cannot possibly refuse it with costs. [313] wallgrave v. tebbs. Dec. 14, 1855. [S. C. 25 L. J. Gh. 241; 2 Jur. (N. S.) 83. Followed, Jones v. Badley, 1867-68, L. R. 3 Eq. 635; L. E. 3 Ch. 362. See Rawlotham v. Dunnett, 1878, 8 Ch. D. 437; In re Boyest 1884, 26 Ch. D. 536; In re Haddock [1902], 2 Ch. 227.] Charity. Mortmain. 9 Geo. 2 c. 36. Secret Trust. 7 Will. 4 and 1 Viet. c. 26. Bequest of personalty and devise of lands to Defendants as joint-tenants. Bill to have the bequest and devise declared void, as having been made upon trust for and to the intent that Defendants should carry out certain charitable purposes. Defendants, by their answer, admitted that, since the testator's death, they had been informed and they believed that, on the occasion of making his will, the testator determined on disposing of a part of his property to persons known to be interested in charitable and religious objects, and knowing one of them personally, and the other by character, he made to them the devise and bequest in the bill mentioned, not by way of or accompanied by any trust, but merely with that degree of confidence which a knowledge of character enables a donor to have as to the probable application or use of a gift; and that, at the testator's request, a letter had been written as a sketch for him to sign, but which was never in fact signed by the testator, expressing his confidence that Defendants would make use of the property in such a way as seemed best fitted to promote the glory of God and the welfare of their fellow sinners, and also expressing that it was the testator's intention to have appropriated the property to charitable purposes. The Defendants denied that they had ever had any communication with the testator about, his will, or any of his intentions or wishes with respect to the disposition of his property; denied that they had ever accepted or recognised or acted on the letter or its contents; and said they had always believed, and insisted, that they were entitled to hold the property free from any trust whatsoever, and to dispose of it in any way they thought proper; but admitted that they considered it would be proper for them, in a case in which benefits were left them by will under the circumstances stated, to use those benefits in a manner which would be consistent with the character and profession, in consideration of which they believed they were selected by the testator to receive such benefits. Held, that the stat. 7 Will. 4 and 1 Viet. c. 26, preventing the Court from looking at the letter in which the testator's intentions were expressed, and it not being shewn that, during the testator's life, there was any bargain or understanding between the testator and the Defendants, or any communication which could be construed into a trust, that they would apply the 2K. &J. 314. WALLGRAVE V. TEBBS 801 property in such a manner as to carry the testator's intentions into effect, the devise was valid; and the bill was dismissed with costs. William Coles, by his will in 1850, after giving certain pecuniary and charitable legacies, gave to the Defendants, Tebbs and Martin, their executors, administrators and assigns, as joint-tenants, 12,000, free from legacy duty, to be paid within a month after his decease. And he directed that the said legacies for charitable purposes, and the said legacy to Tebbs and Martin, and the legacy duty payable in respect thereof, should be charged exclusively upon his property in the funds, in priority to his debts and funeral and testamentary expenses. Then, after devising three houses in Chelsea to his executors, and their heirs, upon certain trusts, he devised all other his freehold lands and hereditaments in Chelsea and a field at Earl's Court in Kensington " unto and to the use of Tebbs and Martin, their heirs and assigns, for ever, as joint-tenants." The will contained a residuary devise and bequest upon certain trusts [314] for the benefit of the infant children of a nephew and niece of the testator. After the testator's death a bill was filed on behalf of the infants, to which Tebbs,, Martin, the testator's nephew and heir at law, and the executors, one of whom was a Mr. Graham, were Defendants, stating that the legacy of 12,000, and the hereditaments in the will mentioned to be devised to Tebbs and Martin, were not given and devised to them for their own benefit, but upon trust for and to the intent tbat they should carry out certain charitable purposes, and praying that it might be declared that the said bequest and devise to Tebbs and Martin were void, and that the Plaintiffs were beneficially entitled thereto. The Defendants, Tebbs and Martin, by their answer, stated that neither of them ever had any communication with the testator about his will, or any of his intentions or wishes with respect to the disposition of his property. They then...
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