Waltz's Theory of Theory
| Published date | 01 June 2009 |
| Date | 01 June 2009 |
| Author | Ole Wæver |
| DOI | 10.1177/0047117809104635 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
WALTZ’S THEORY OF THEORY 201
Waltz’s Theory of Theory
Ole Wæver
Abstract
Waltz’s 1979 book, Theory of International Politics, is the most infl uential in the history of
the discipline. It worked its effects to a large extent through raising the bar for what counted
as theoretical work, in effect reshaping not only realism but rivals like liberalism and
refl ectivism. Yet, ironically, there has been little attention paid to Waltz’s very explicit
and original arguments about the nature of theory. This article explores and explicates
Waltz’s theory of theory. Central attention is paid to his defi nition of theory as ‘a picture,
mentally formed’ and to the radical anti-empiricism and anti-positivism of his position.
Followers and critics alike have treated Waltzian neorealism as if it was at bottom a formal
proposition about cause–effect relations. The extreme case of Waltz being so victorious
in the discipline, and yet being so consistently misinterpreted on the question of theory,
shows the power of a dominant philosophy of science in US IR, and thus the challenge
facing any ambitious theorising. The article suggests a possible movement of fronts away
from the ‘fourth debate’ between rationalism and refl ectivism towards one of theory
against empiricism. To help this new agenda, the article introduces a key literature from
the philosophy of science about the structure of theory, and particularly about the way even
natural science uses theory very differently from the way IR’s mainstream thinks it does –
and much more like the way Waltz wants his theory to be used.
Keywords: international relations theory, models, neorealism, philosophy of science,
positivism, semantic view, theories of theory, theory, Kenneth N. Waltz
I emphasized that much in the present seems to contradict the predictions I make.
But then, I did not write as a positivist or an empiricist. (Kenneth N. Waltz)1
In wondering how to develop a theory of international politics, I spent a lot of time
reading the philosophy of science. I started to read on the subject because I noticed
great variation in the way the word ‘theory’ is used. (Kenneth N. Waltz)2
Most discussions of Waltz’s work open with reference to Man, the State, and War3
or Theory of International Politics.4 In contrast, I would like to start with some
of Waltz’s later writings.5 Kenneth Waltz’s answers to critics increasingly come
in terms of ‘what is theory?’ The poor critic is rarely lectured anymore on having
misunderstood factual features of world politics, nor on having got specifi cs of
Waltz’s theory wrong, but on missing the nature and purpose of theory as such.
The fi rst post-Theory of International Politics phase of ‘reply to critics’ – notably the
reply in Neorealism and its Critics6 – was phrased mostly at the level of the book,
defending the specifi c decisions in it, such as reasons for being state-centric and not
© The Author(s), 2009. Reprints and permissions:
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[DOI: 10.1177/0047117809104635]
202 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 23(2)
including this or that in the structure. A second kind of defence focused on people
misunderstanding or misrepresenting neorealism. But in later replies and interviews,
emphasis moves towards what theory is.
Waltz says ultra-clearly in Theory of International Politics (TIP) and in later
articles and interviews, that the major move enabling TIP was to think deeply
about the ‘what is theory?’ question. ‘Neorealism’s response [to the confusions in
classical realism] is that, while diffi culties abound, some that seem most daunting
lie in misapprehensions about theory.’7 And: ‘In wondering how to develop a theory
of international politics, I spent a lot of time reading the philosophy of science. I
started to read on the subject because I noticed great variation in the way the word
“theory” is used.’8 Yet the debates on TIP in the 1980s and into the 1990s never
focused on the ‘what is theory’ issue, or on the implications of Waltz’s particular –
and peculiar – stance on it. Debates unfolded fi rst at the level of ‘reality’ – does
‘international relations’ out there look in general more like one kind of theory or
the other (a continuation of the 1970s-style inter-paradigm debate9); and, second,
in terms of social theory: how did Waltz conceptualise structure, agency, system,
process and so forth. But not ‘theory’.
Current debates on neorealism are even more puzzling. Most debate about Waltz
is now among realists, and a common theme is that Waltz’s theory is too sparse and
underspecifi ed and hence in need of elaboration. Therefore, arguments rage over
either pinning down in more detail the mechanics of the core theory (offensive versus
defensive realism) or adding unit-level variables to make it a theory of foreign policy
(neoclassical realism). Yet even these writers somehow manage never really to spell
out what the theory is. Most importantly, these debates are conducted as if the theory
is a formal proposition, an assertion which is in principle true or false (anybody who
has read chapter 1 of TIP knows they should not call it a ‘law’, so it is treated as a
kind of ‘higher law’). But nobody seems to be really clear what the proposition is.
No wonder, because that is not the format of the theory.
In this situation, I will draw attention to the importance of the structure of theory
(not theory of structure this time, but structure of theory). In particular, I want to
emphasise Waltz’s defi nition of theory as ‘a picture, mentally formed’.
The main part of this paper (section II) spells out what Waltz’s kind of theory
is, partly through simply going back to his own account, partly by introducing a
philosophical literature on the ‘Structure of Scientifi c Theory’10 discussing the
‘syntactic’ versus the ‘semantic’ view, ‘non-statement views of theory’ and the role of
models in theory.
Once this has been elucidated, additional insights appear of a more ‘history of
science’ and ‘sociology of science’ nature (section III). Placing TIP in the history of the
discipline, explaining its effects, suggests that the battlelines within IR might be about
to shift away from the ‘fourth debate’ (rationalism v. refl ectivism or the neoneos v.
the pomos with constructivism as the middle ground).11 Recapturing the radical
anti-empiricism of Waltz’s seminal work could be the starting point for recasting
the main battleline between empiricism and theory,12 even with a case to be made –
with Waltz as exhibit A – for the political necessity of theory.
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