Warfare and Extortion
| Date | 01 April 1998 |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1108/eb025879 |
| Pages | 170-175 |
| Published date | 01 April 1998 |
| Author | A. Jones |
| Subject Matter | Accounting & finance |
Journal of Financial Crime — Vol. 6 No. 2 — Extortion
EXTORTION
Warfare and Extortion
A. Jones
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, particularly since the dissolution of
the Soviet Union, there has been a noticeable
increase in the quantity and types of arms for sale
in the international market. A variety of organisa-
tions,
other than nation states, throughout the
world provides a ready and willing market for this
commodity. Once in the hands of such groups, the
weapons are put to the only use that they have,
although the reasons for their use vary. Perhaps
the three most easily defined types of such non-
nation state groups are the terrorist, the guerrilla
and the criminal. While the motives of each are
reasonably well defined, the boundary between, in
particular, the terrorist and the criminal groups is
increasingly difficult to determine.
PIRA
There is one example that is relevant to the United
Kingdom. The Provisional Irish Republican Army
(PIRA), which came into existence in the late
1960s, when it splintered from the Official IRA,
has waged a bloody and relentless campaign against
the British people and the Government in West-
minster with the aim of gaining a united Ireland.
The organisation considers itself to be 'freedom
fighters' and is considered by the government in
Westminster to be a 'terrorist' organisation. Over
the period of nearly 30 years that it has been in
existence, the funding for the organisation's activi-
ties have been derived from a number of sources.
Probably the most publicised source of income has
come from NORAID, the fund-raising element
based in the USA, but a large proportion of the
organisation's funds over the period has been
gained as a result of bank robberies, extortion, pro-
tection rackets, gambling and smuggling. There is
also evidence that despite loud protestations to the
contrary, the organisation has controlled the
import and distribution of illegal drugs within the
areas over which it has influence. Interestingly,
there are also indications that the PIRA have met
with loyalist terrorists on the subject of drugs in
order to 'carve out' their respective territories.
Given that only a proportion of the activity that
has been blamed on the PIRA is correctly attrib-
uted and was authorised and planned on an official
level, the activities to generate the funds required
to maintain the terrorist campaign can only be
considered as organised crime. These criminal
activities have also projected the PIRA on to the
international stage, with, to name just a few of the
major incidents, bank robberies in Eire and
Northern Ireland, abductions in Eire and the pur-
chase and attempted purchase and exportation of
arms in the USA.
While the PIRA have always been regarded by
the world as a British problem, they are in reality,
a part of international terrorism. There are historic
links between the PIRA and other terrorist factions
such as the German Red Army Faction, the Jap-
anese Red Brigade and other middle eastern terror-
ist groups, in addition to the links that are known
to exist with the Libyan regime. Additionally, they
have carried out attacks on members of the British
Armed Forces in at least four other countries
(Germany, Gibraltar, Holland and Cyprus).
Despite all of this, it is estimated that the PIRA
has less than 600 active members. How is it
possible for such a small group of relatively well-
known individuals to successfully carry out crimi-
nal and terrorist activities over such a protracted
period, particularly- when taking into account the
presence of in the region of 12,000 British troops
and 11,500 active members of the Royal Ulster
Constabulary to maintain the peace and law and
order in Northern Ireland?
Take the case, as reported in a number of the
daily newspapers, that was tried in the UK courts
in June of this year. One of the men in the dock,
Gerard Hanratty, a member of a PIRA active
service unit, gave as part of his defence, the
reasoning behind the projected attack for which he
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