Watching the watch‐dog
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1108/13581980710835290 |
| Published date | 20 November 2007 |
| Date | 20 November 2007 |
| Pages | 464-471 |
| Author | Richard Burger,William Dodsworth |
| Subject Matter | Accounting & finance |
FEATURE
Watching the watch-dog
Richard Burger
Mills & Reeve LLP, Cambridge, UK, and
William Dodsworth
Mills & Reeve LLP, London, UK
Abstract
Purpose – This paper seeks to consider the first ever report by the National Audit Office (NAO) on
the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of the Financial Services Authority (FSA).
Design/methodology/approach – This paper reviews the NAO’s report and the FSA’s response.
Findings – The paper finds that the majority of the NAO’s findings and recommendations have been
accepted and incorporated into the FSA’s planning.
Originality/value – This paper will be of interest to regulated firms and regulatory and public law
lawyers.
Keywords Management accountability, Auditing,United Kingdom, Financial services
Paper type Case study
Introduction
The UK, and in particular London, is internationally recognised as a leading provider
of financial services. It is therefore not surprising that the City watch-dog, the Financial
Services Authority (FSA), is one of the world’s first unified financial regulators.
To maintain this reputation, it is essential that the FSA is accountable. Such
accountability comes from within, for example, the practitioner and consumer panels,
as well as externally from decisions made by the Financial Services and Markets
Tribunal. However, the FSA is also accountable to the Her Majesty’s Treasury (the
Treasury).
National audit office review
On 21 June 2006 the Treasury invited[1] the National Audit Office (NAO) to conduct a
review of the FSA’s economy, efficiency and effectiveness. The NAO published its
review on 30 April 2007. The FSA responded in a statement addressing the review’s
findings and recommendations[2].
Scope and terms of reference
The NAO review focused on the following five areas, each with terms of reference:
(1) Performance management. How effective are the FSA’s non-executive directors
(NEDs) in carrying out their responsibility to prepare an annual report on
economy and efficiency? How well is the FSA in matching its resources to the
risks to its statutory objectives?[3] Any suggestions on the design of the
Outcomes Performance Report (OPR)?
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at
www.emeraldinsight.com/1358-1988.htm
JFRC
15,4
464
Journal of Financial Regulation and
Compliance
Vol. 15 No. 4, 2007
pp. 464-471
qEmerald Group Publishing Limited
1358-1988
DOI 10.1108/13581980710835290
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