West German Political Parties and the European Community: Structures without Function?
| Published date | 01 December 1983 |
| Date | 01 December 1983 |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9248.1983.tb01354.x |
| Author | Simon Bulmer |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Political
Studies
(1983),
XXXI,
566-583
West German Political Parties and
the
European Community:
Structures Without Function?”
SIMON
BULMER
University
of
Manchester, Institute
of
Science and Technology
The German party debate concerning European Community policy-making is
a
low
key affair which contrasts greatly with the situation in Britain. This paper examines
the form of the debate in the Federal Republic and argues that the nature
of
the
European institutions, of the German party system and, particularly,
of
internal
party policy-making account for this situation. Three short case histories are used to
show the operation of the ‘German model’ of party policy-making. The conclusion
is that the parties seem to lack any clear function in their activities in connection
with the European Community.
‘The parties participate in forming the political. will of the people.
’
(Basic Law,
Article
21).
For observers of the continuing political debate on British membership of
the European Community (EC), a significant ‘culture shock’
is
encountered
when turning to the situation in the Federal Republic of Germany. This is
especially the case where political parties are concerned. Their scant attention
to the EC is at odds with the weighty political tasks entrusted in them by the
constitution, the Basic Law. The low priority they give to EC matters is
consistent, however, with the electorate’s apparent apathy towards Community
membership.
This article focuses upon the German political parties’ policy function
towards the European Community. It seeks to show that the parties have a
peripheral role in the making of German European policy due to a number of
structural and behavioural factors in both the party system and in the parties
themselves. These serve as constraints on party conflict or debate and can be
seen to operate on four different, but inter-related, levels of action.
The first of these tiers is
the
EC
level.
At this level, what is at issue
is
the
ability of German parties, as represented in the European Parliament, to
influence Community policy decisions directly at that level. The three
remaining tiers all concern the shaping of German European policy at the
domestic level, by influence on the Federal Government. The second tier may
be termed
the domestic electoral level.
Here, the focus is on the parties’ ability
*
The author is grateful for financial assistance from the European Commission and to William
Paterson (Warwick University) and Andrew Scott (Heriot-Watt) for helpful comments. (This
paper was completed prior to the March
1983
elections in West Germany.)
0032-3217/83/04/0566-18/$03.00
0
1983
Political
Studies
SIMON
BULMER
567
to stimulate a broadly-based and
active
debate about policy alternatives
regarding the EC. In other words, attitudes towards the Community are made
the subject of electoral competition.
The domestic institutional level,
by
contrast, is characterized by
reactive
debate, as the parties respond to EC
policy initiatives and seek to secure amendments to them. The last tier may be
termed
the ‘party-in-goverment’ level.
It can best be explained as govern-
mental policy which, although initiated from within the government rather
than from a party manifesto, is consistent with party policy.
The contention of this article is that the German party debate of EC affairs
is centred upon
the domestic institutional level.
The nature of the institutions
within which the debate takes place conditions the form which inter- and intra-
party discussion takes. In Britain, by contrast, party conflict is based upon
the
domestic electoral level.
This reflects the adversarial nature of the party debate
on European policy in Britain. Initially some comparisons between British and
German party behaviour on EC policy will be made to show how the conflict
between British parties and the ‘permissive consensus’ between German ones
are ideal-typical of the respective party systems. The argument will, however,
focus upon the various policy-making environments of the German parties
with a view to establishing the consensual nature of their behaviour. Three
short case histories will provide supporting evidence.
Why does the absence
of
any significant inter-party debate on European
policy represent a problem? First, one of the roles of a political party is to
mobilize the electorate and ensure popular participation in the process of
government. In the absence of this, policy-making becomes elitist and loses
accountability. Secondly, if the policy-making elites should become dis-
illusioned with the European Community, there would be no broad reservoir
of support to counteract such a development. The increasing stagnation in
integration suggests that this might not be a hypothetical matter in the future.
Britain and the Federal Republic as Ideal Types
Some interesting contrasts emerge when the salience of the European
Community to German and British political parties is compared. In the
Federal Republic the party system is characterized by a middle ground of
consensus, sometimes known as ‘the politics of centrality’. The anti-models
of the Nazi experience and
of
East Germany have limited the potential for a
wide-ranging ideological debate of economic policy. It has only been since the
1980
election that any really substantive, rather than rhetorical, debate
of
economic policy options has taken place.2 In Britain, by contrast, issues (and
principles) of economic and social policy have been the fulcrum of election
campaigns over the last two decades or more. The national styles of party
debate concerning the European Community have been consistent with the
1
G. Smith, ‘West Germany and the Politics of Centrality’,
Government and Opposition,
11
*
Of particular note were Economics Minister Graf Lambsdorff‘s proposals for higher state
investment to be financed by reducing unemployment benefits and cutting maternity payments
and
so
on.
These proposals brought
to
a head the clashes between the FDP and SPD coalition
partners and resulted in the FDP ministers resigning. See ‘Relief marks end of Schmidt coalition’,
The
Times,
18
September
1982.
(1976),
387-407.
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