What Activates an Identity? The Case of Norden
| Published date | 01 March 2010 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0047117809359039 |
| Author | Hans E. Andersson |
| Date | 01 March 2010 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
46 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 24(1)
What Activates an Identity? The Case of Norden
Hans E. Andersson
Abstract
Despite a general acknowledgement that knowledge about identities is essential for under-
standing international relations, surprisingly little has been written about what actually
activates one of a state’s many identities and not another. More generally, the article sug-
gests that situational relevance and commitment are of importance. More specifi cally, it is
suggested that a policy area’s legitimisation is a factor that may affect the commitment to
a collective identity. The argument is illustrated by the case of ‘Norden’, as the inhabitants
of Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden call their territory. The end of the Cold War and
Sweden and Finland joining Denmark in the European Union (EU) put Nordic identity under
severe stress in the beginning of the 1990s. As shown, this collective identity was intensely
active in the case of the Nordic Passport Union, but less so in the case of environmental
negotiations.
Keywords: collective identity, commitment, identity reach, legitimisation, master identity,
Nordic identity, situational relevance
Introduction
The concept of ‘identity’ became the buzzword of the day in the 1990s. It is thus under-
standable that defi nitions came to vary and certain scholars even came to view the
concept as less useful.1 However, in my reading there is – even in different disciplines –
a fairly universal consensus that identity is one’s conception of who one is, and who
one is not.2 Put another way, identity is one’s differentiation of Self from Other.
Such a distinction is important since ‘It is only … as some-one that we can have an
interest in something; it is only once we know who we are that we can know what
we want.’3 Thus, identities are central to understanding international relations since
they provide a basis for interests and consequently for behaviour; identities simply
have effects.
In 1890 the American philosopher and psychologist William James concluded
that: ‘An individual has as many different social selves as there are distinct groups
about whose opinion he cares.’4 Just like individuals, states also have many identities.
The most basic identity is what Alexander Wendt calls a corporate identity.5 Such
an identity provides a platform for other identities and refers to the essence of what an
actor is. In the case of a state this implies the conception of being an entity consisting
of territory and people and being distinct from other entities characterised by the same
features (other states) as well as entities with other features (e.g. non-governmental
organisations). To uphold a corporate identity – to continue to exist – a state needs
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[DOI: 10.1177/0047117809359039]
WHAT ACTIVATES AN IDENTITY? 47
to satisfy certain interests, and it makes sense to assume that security, autonomy and
economy are such interests.6
Stressing the importance of corporate identities and their certain interests is, of
course, completely in line with much of Realist thinking. Less so is the argument that
states have many more identities. There are, for example, numerous role identities.7
Such identities come about due to states’ conceptions of their role in relation to others,
e.g. small state v. big state, friend v. enemy. Another kind of identity is provided by
states’ domestic characteristics which are acknowledged as having social meaning
in the international arena, e.g. being democratic and/or capitalistic.8 It is here appro-
priate to once more stress a point that often seems confusing. Logically, interests
follow identities. As already stated, it is only when we know who we are – when we
are sure about our identity – that we know what we want, i.e. what our interests are.
Consequently, the different interests a state pursues are a result of the activated iden-
tity. If a state’s corporate identity is activated – as is often the case – it will pursue
interests of security, autonomy and economy. If a state has the identity of being a
capitalistic state, it will pursue interests that are in line with that, e.g. free trade.
Besides corporate and role identities, states may also, as will be illustrated in this
article’s empirical parts, form collective identities. Such an identity is the result of the
conception of belonging to a group, i.e. Self is conceptualised in a collective, rather
than in an idiosyncratic, way.9 Since the concept is prone to misunderstanding, it
should be clarifi ed that collective identities are not about ‘altruism’, i.e. sacrifi cing
one’s own needs for somebody else’s. Rather, the point is that the group’s needs are
seen as one’s own. Also, even when a collective identity is activated, it is rare that
the interests that come with the corporate identity are abandoned and, for example,
survival is put at risk. Furthermore, collective identities are not common between
states. However, besides the Nordic identity discussed below, the cooperation among
the Benelux states and parts of the British Commonwealth, Spanish–Latin American
relations, Greece–Cyprus attachments and Turkey–Azerbaijan’s affi liations also come
to mind as examples that possibly fulfi l the defi nition.
Despite a general acknowledgement that knowledge about identities is essential for
understanding international relations, surprisingly little has been written about what
actually activates one of a state’s many identities and not another. This is an issue
that has to be addressed if we are to move away from the current situation where we
‘produce very particularistic explanations for state action and provide little hope of
contingent generalisations about identity and world politics’.10 The aim of this article
is to provide some suggestions in this regard.
Researchers that stress the importance of concepts such as ideas, norms and iden-
tities take the standpoint that international politics should be understood to a large
degree (or – more radically – completely) as socially constructed. Such a view does
not, of course, imply a denial of material facts such as nuclear weapons. The point is
that it is through our interpretation that these material facts gain importance. To use
a common example: the United Kingdom’s quite large stockpile of nuclear weapons
is less worrying to most of us than the thought of North Korea having one or two
of them.11 Essentially, constructivists stick to the old sociological view that ‘If men
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