What difference can it make: Why write books on global justice in the first place?
| Date | 01 June 2016 |
| Author | Mathias Risse |
| Published date | 01 June 2016 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1755088215626738 |
Journal of International Political Theory
2016, Vol. 12(2) 96 –117
© The Author(s) 2016
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/1755088215626738
ipt.sagepub.com
What difference can it make:
Why write books on global
justice in the first place?
Mathias Risse
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, USA
Abstract
This article looks at different conceptions of what political philosophy is as a vocation,
with an eye on the question of what is the point of writing books specifically on global
justice. The occasion for reflecting on this question is a particular line of criticism
that has been advanced against my 2012 book On Global Justice. I introduce a Platonic
conception of political philosophy and then turn to two contemporary conceptions:
one due to Habermas and one due to Rawls. The Rawlsian approach strikes me as most
plausible. I develop that approach some more by defending it against different versions
of realism and bring it to bear on the title question.
Keywords
Global justice, Habermas, justice, Rawls
1. An early review of my 2012 book On Global Justice (Risse, 2012) appeared in
Times Higher Education.1 The book might “work,” wrote Conor Gearty, a legal
academic, for readers who think “there is something important out there called
‘justice’ that brainy and well-read people can access by the erudite elaboration of
their already well-honed instincts.” Finally he asked, “what difference can (yet
another) set of self-contained right answers about justice by a bright university
guy make?” A discussion post suspected the reviewer was hostile to normative
theory and took it out on my book. Indeed, it seems most of Gearty’s challenge is
for political philosophy as such. But the ambition to talk about global justice was
also pilloried. That doubt may also occur to fellow political philosophers who
think “global justice” is altogether too grand a topic. So why write books on
global justice? It is a fair question that arises periodically and deserves a reply.
Corresponding author:
Mathias Risse, Harvard Kennedy School, 79 JFK Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.
Email: Mathias_risse@harvard.edu
626738IPT0010.1177/1755088215626738Journal of International Political TheoryRisse
research-article2016
Article
Risse 97
Most of what must be said in response to the title question proceeds by way of devel-
oping what I take to be a sensible conception of political philosophy as a vocation that
should also vindicate the writing of such books. I introduce five views of political phi-
losophy, focusing on what they entail about (distributive) justice and about theorizing at
the global level. These are views that have been developed by philosophers about politi-
cal philosophy. But the answer I offer is directed at philosophers and non-philosophers.
This piece contributes to a special issue on whether political philosophy, specifically
global political philosophy, should “get real.” The view of political philosophy as a voca-
tion I develop offers one way of answering that question affirmatively, at the level of
reflection on what the field is all about. In the course of this discussion, I enlist a number
of important distinctions that help delineate different views on what political philosophy
should be about (with the purpose of explaining why I prefer the view I offer), among
them the realism/moralism distinction and the ideal/non-ideal-theory distinctions. My
view, however, transcends these two particular distinctions. Political philosophy is large
enough a field to generate tasks that, according to these distinctions, differ substantially
in nature. It is a house with many rooms.
Section 2 introduces a Platonic view that sees political philosophers as epistemologi-
cally privileged in ways that enable them to rule. Philosopher-kings microcosmically
embody and macroscopically implement justice. Section 3 introduces a radically differ-
ent view, one developed by Jürgen Habermas. Here, the main task of political philosophy
is to describe procedurally just communication. Justice is not for philosophers to deter-
mine, but emerges from suitable deliberation among citizens. Sections 4 and 5 develop a
view from John Rawls’ later work. Justice is the primary political value because it allows
adherents of different comprehensive doctrines to live together. Creating and maintain-
ing a just society is a tall order, and might elude us. But political philosophy plays a
well-defined role in our efforts to create such a society. The philosopher here is a theory-
providing citizen-discussant who should also propose principles of justice. This view
strikes me as very plausible. Section 6 defends it against realist objections presented by
Raymond Geuss and Section 7 against objections from the camp of moral realists.
Section 8 elaborates on the Rawlsian view. Section 9, finally, assesses what that view
involves for the global case. The conversation of mankind would be impoverished with-
out philosophical reflection on global justice. This much we can safely say without being
naive or too disconnected from real politics.2
2. The analogy of the cave in Book VII of Plato’s Republic is among the best-known
pieces of philosophy. The philosopher struggles free from chains that keep others
in ignorance, eventually sees the truth, and brings it to those still in chains.
Perhaps rather few contemporaries explicitly hold this view on the vocation of
political philosophy. Nonetheless, this standpoint anchors the current debate.
Plato’s works—mostly dialogues featuring Socrates as interlocutor—explore the
consequences of conceiving of reality in a bifurcated way. While the world of appear-
ances is defective, there exists a more perfect and real realm populated by eternal and
changeless “ideas,” “forms,” or as we would say today, “abstract objects.” Among
them we find being, likeness, unity, but also goodness, beauty, or justice. Observable
To continue reading
Request your trial