What drives attitudes towards the reintegration of former fighters? Insights from a conjoint experiment in Nigeria
| Published date | 01 May 2023 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00223433221087070 |
| Date | 01 May 2023 |
| Subject Matter | Regular Articles |
What drives attitudes towards
the reintegration of former fighters?
Insights from a conjoint
experiment in Nigeria
Ame
´lie Godefroidt
Department of Sociology and Political Science, Norwegian University of Science and Technology and Centre for
Research on Peace and Development, University of Leuven
Arnim Langer
Centre for Research on Peace and Development, University of Leuven
Abstract
Reintegrating ex-combatants back into society is one of the most challenging, yet fundamental components to
building sustainable peace. While previous work has extensively evaluated the reintegration trajectories of ex-
combatants, there is still little understanding of how citizens think about reintegration. In this article, we system-
atically analyze which former fighters people prefer to reintegrate into society. Based on theories of threat and justice,
we develop a heuristic framework that explains how information about the motivations and behavior of ex-
combatants shapes public preferences about whom to reintegrate. We test this framework using a conjoint experi-
ment conducted among approximately 2,000 (former) university students in Nigeria. We find that our respondents
are more forgiving towards former fighters who were forced to join the insurgency and expressed remorse afterwards,
while being less willing to reintegrate more militant and less repentant offenders. Similar informational cues shape
respondents’ evaluations of how successful the reintegration process would be and what punishment would be
appropriate. Taken together, the results underscore the importance of perceptions of risk and fairness in driving
attitudes towards reintegration. Finally, subgroup analyses revealed that these heuristics are broadly held across
different demographic and conflict-related fault lines. While caution is warranted when generalizing these results,
insights gained in this specific context are nonetheless an important step towards advancing our understanding of
reintegration processes in conflict-affected countries.
Keywords
attitudes, conjoint experiment, justice, Nigeria, social reintegration, threat
Reintegrating former fighters, particularly when they
have joined so-called terrorist organizations, is a contro-
versial undertaking often causing a public backlash
(Renard & Coolsaet, 2018). For example, on 25 July
2020, the Nigerian army announced that about 600
ex-Boko Haram members would be reintegrated back
into society. This decision caused widespread concern
across Nigeria and many Nigerians expressed fierce
opposition to it (Ogunlade, 2020). Nigeria is not the
only country facing this challenge, however. In recent
times, many fighters disengaged from the Islamic State of
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in the Middle East, the Rev-
olutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), or the
Forces Nouvelles de Co
ˆte d’Ivoire (FNCI) in Ivory
Coast. As a result, various governments and commu-
nities worldwide are currently struggling with what to
Corresponding author:
amelie.godefroidt@ntnu.no
Journal of Peace Research
2023, Vol. 60(3) 410–427
ªThe Author(s) 2022
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DOI: 10.1177/00223433221087070
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do about these ex-fighters (Speckhard, 2020; Steadman,
2020).
1
Notwithstanding manifold challenges, the conflict
resolution and peacebuilding literature has long argued
that successfully reintegrating ex-combatants is funda-
mental to preventing conflict recurrence and building
sustainable peace (Knight & O
¨zerdem, 2004). As a
result, previous work has extensively evaluated the rein-
tegration trajectories of ex-combatants and demonstrated
how post-conflict reintegration is extremely complex,
multidimensional, and context-dependent (Knight &
O
¨zerdem, 2004; Humphreys & Weinstein, 2007;
United Nations, 2014; Gilligan, Mvukiyehe & Samii,
2012; Blattman & Annan, 2016; see also Tellez, 2019a
for a similar argument). Social reintegration, in particu-
lar, poses unique challenges caused by the interactions
and relationships between the ex-combatants and com-
munity members (Kaplan & Nussio, 2018: 133). Inter-
estingly, although public acceptance of ex-combatants is
often recognized in this respect as a sine qua non for
social reintegration to be successful, very little research
has systematically investigated this issue. Moreover, what
we know is predominantly based on descriptive accounts
or perceptions of acceptance reported by the ex-
combatants themselves (e.g. Humphreys & Weinstein,
2007; Pugel, 2007). Consequently, existing scholarship
can tell us little about the determinants of public accep-
tance of different types of former fighters (but see Kao &
Revkin, 2021).
To fill this void, this article examines how informa-
tion about the motivations and behaviors of ex-
combatants – during the entry, engagement, and exit
phase of involvement in an insurgent group – shapes
people’s attitudes towards the reintegration of those ex-
combatants.
2
Building on theories of threat and justice
from across the social science literature, we argue that
these informational cues will determine which ex-
combatants are seen as more dangerous or, conversely,
more deserving to be reintegrated. Such safety considera-
tions and fairness perceptions, in turn, jointly shape
citizens’ willingness (or lack thereof) to reintegrate ex-
combatants. We test this heuristic framework using a
conjoint experimental design, fielded among approxi-
mately 2,000 (former) university students in Nigeria.
Respondents were shown pairs of ex-Boko Haram mem-
bers and were then asked which ex-fighter they would
prefer to reintegrate back into the Nigerian society, how
successful they thought the reintegration process of both
ex-fighters would be and which punishment they would
consider appropriate for both ex-fighters.
We find that citizens were less willing to reintegrate
those former fighters who voluntarily decided to join the
Boko Haram insurgency, while being more forgiving
towards those ex-fighters who proactively ended their
involvement in the insurgency and subsequently contrib-
uted to reconciliation. Similar informational cues shaped
respondents’ assessments about how successful the rein-
tegration process would be, and which punishment
would be appropriate. Altogether, these results suggest
that perceptions of risk and fairness are key to our under-
standing of people’s attitudes towards the reintegration
of former fighters. Although our findings are based on a
specific sample at a specific point in time,
3
this article
nonetheless makes substantial inroads into our theoreti-
cal understanding of social reintegration processes and
offers preliminary insights into how policymakers might
design and ultimately communicate reintegration pro-
grams tailored to the needs of the society-at-large.
Returning to society
Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR)
programs have become the standard peace-building strat-
egy to dismantle militant organizations and bring
ex-combatants back into civilian life (Berdal, 1996). Fol-
lowing disarmament and demobilization, the ultimate
goal is for ex-combatants to establish a peaceful and
sustainable livelihood (i.e. economic reintegration), to
leave behind violent political action and abide by the
laws and norms of society (i.e. political reintegration),
and to become accepted by and, ideally, involved in the
communities where they settle (i.e. social reintegration;
Gilligan, Mvukiyehe & Samii, 2012; United Nations,
2014; Kaplan & Nussio, 2018). So far, DDR programs
have mainly been evaluated with respect to how far they
have resulted in meaningful attitudinal and behavioral
changes among enrolled ex-combatants (e.g. Humphreys
& Weinstein, 2007; Pugel, 2007; Blattman & Annan,
2016). Taken together, this literature suggests that these
1
To reduce repetition, we use the terms ‘ex-combatant’, ‘ex-fighter’,
and ‘former fighter’ interchangeably.
2
In this respect, it is worth noting that this article examines the
micro-determinants of popular buy-in for reintegrat ion in general
and does not focus on those particular communities to which ex-
combatants are effectively returning.
3
In the discussion, we elaborate on the implications of our empirical
approach. Specifically, besides touching upon the internal validity of
our experiment, we discuss implications of the studied type of
insurgency, sample, and t imeframe for the generaliz ability of our
findings.
Godefroidt & Langer 411
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