What kills international organisations? When and why international organisations terminate
| Published date | 01 March 2021 |
| Date | 01 March 2021 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1354066120932976 |
Article
What kills international
organisations? When
and why international
organisations terminate
Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni
Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge, UK
Abstract
This article addresses the puzzle of why, and under what conditions, international
organisations cease to exist. International Relations literature offers rich explanations
for the creation, design and effectiveness of international institutions and their organi-
sational embodiments, international organizations (IOs), but surprisingly little effort has
gone into studying the dynamics of IO termination. Yet if we want to understand the
conditions under which international organisations endure, we must also explain why
they frequently fail to do so. The article formulates and tests a theory of ‘IO death’ using
a combination of population-wide statistical analysis and detailed historical case studies.
My analysis is based on an original dataset covering the period 1815–2016. I find that
exogenous shocks are a leading proximate cause of IO terminations since 1815 and that
organisations that are newly created, have small memberships, and/or lack centralised
structures are most likely to succumb. My analysis leads me to suggest a number of
extensions and refinements to existing institutionalist theories.
Keywords
Intergovernmental organisations, international institutions, institutional termination and
change, international relations theory, power and international order
On 14 November 1936, Germany withdrew from the international conventions estab-
lishing the International Commissions of the Danube, the Elbe, and the Oder, and the
Central Commission for Navigation of the Rhine. Although they were never officially
dissolved, the Elbe, Oder and Danube River Commissions never convened again,
Corresponding author:
Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge,
CB12HN, UK.
Email: mer29@cam.ac.uk
European Journal of
International Relations
2021, Vol. 27(1) 281–310
ªThe Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/1354066120932976
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whereas the Rhine Commission operates to this day, making it the oldest international
organisation (IO) in modern history. On 31 March 1991, members of the Warsaw Pact
voted to terminate the alliance in light of monumental geopolitical changes following the
end of the Cold War. The Pact thus joined the long list of institutionalised multilateral
alliances that have been eventually relegated to history.
1
By contrast, its western
counterpart, NATO, went on to expand its membership and mission, leading interna-
tional relations scholars to hail it as an exemplar of the remarkable durability of inter-
national institutions (McCalla, 1996; Menon and Welsh, 2011; Wallander, 2000).
Why do IOs (sometimes) die? Why some IOs and not others? From the perspective of
existing scholarly literature, IO terminations present a puzzle. An extensive literature in
International Relations asserts that international institutions and organisations are the
products of costly negotiation and contracting processes that are far too deeply ingrained
in wider social and political structures to suddenly nullify (Cotrell, 2016: 21; Strange,
1998). Functionalist theories invoke high negotiating costs and ‘increasing returns’ from
institutionalised cooperation to ground the notion that states will maintain existing
institutions as long as feasible and – at any rate – ‘long after the original conditions for
their creation have disappeared’ (Keohane, 1984: 215; Stein, 1990: 50). Sociological
institutionalists emphasise normative and cognitive biases leading to ‘competency traps’
and institutional status quo bias (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; March and Olsen, 1998:
964). Historical institutionalists cite positive feedback and institutional lock-in effects
(North, 1990: 95; Pierson, 2004), while organisational theorists highlight international
secretariats’ strategic use of bureaucratic resources to resist obsolescence (Barnett and
Finnemore, 2004; Shanks et al., 1996: 593). While they start from different theoretical
assumptions, these perspectives all share in common the assumption that institutional
change is predominantly incremental, and institutional deaths rare (Cappoccio and
Kelemen, 2007; Cotrell, 2016: 21; North, 1990: 89–94). As Shanks and co-authors
(1996: 593) summarise, ‘no-body expects public institutions to die’.
IOs do of course die. Of 561 intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) created between
1815 and 2006, 216 (about two-fifths) have since ceased to exist (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni,
2018). Why, given the high costs of creating international institutions and the lasting
benefits they allegedly produce, do states frequently abandon established IOs? Under
what specific conditions are IOs most likely to terminate? Existing IR scholarship
provides surprisingly limited analytical leverage on these questions. For decades,
scholars have focused on explaining patterns of institutional creation and design, and on
theorising ‘institutional robustness’ – understood broadly as ‘the ability of international
institutions to endure despite exogenous change’ (Hasenclever et al., 1992: 2, my
emphasis).
2
This lopsided focus on explaining institutional endurance (rather than ter-
mination) has led to widespread selection bias, insofar as scholars have systematically
favoured the study of the living over the dead.
3
Thus, many studies of institutional
robustness focus rather one-sidedly on a handful of long-lasting IGOs while ignoring
prominent organisational failures. For example, the substantial literature focused on
explaining NATO’s persistence after the Cold War contains surprisingly few references
– let alone focused comparison – to former institutionalised alliances that dissolved once
exogenous threats subsided (McCalla, 1996; Menon and Welsh, 2011; Wallander 2000.
cf. Lake, 2001). This bias has led scholars to widely overestimate institutional
282
European Journal of International Relations
27(1)
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