When do rebels sign agreements with the United Nations? An investigation into the politics of international humanitarian engagement

Published date01 September 2023
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1177/13540661231180369
AuthorHyeran Jo,Joowon Yi
Date01 September 2023
E
JR
I
https://doi.org/10.1177/13540661231180369
European Journal of
International Relations
2023, Vol. 29(3) 602 –627
© The Author(s) 2023
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DOI: 10.1177/13540661231180369
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When do rebels sign
agreements with the United
Nations? An investigation into
the politics of international
humanitarian engagement
Hyeran Jo and Joowon Yi
Texas A&M University, USA
Abstract
International actors engage rebel groups in conflict zones for better humanitarian
outcomes. What are the political conditions under which such external engagement
occurs in internal conflict zones? We argue that “insecure governments” and politically
“modulated rebels” are the key factors that explain the international humanitarian
engagement with rebels in civil conflicts. With the history of instability marred by
coups and frequently changing hands of governments, insecure governments resort to
international help and allow international actors to interact with their internal enemies.
In contrast, with strong political control and military capacity, secure governments
play a gatekeeper role, dealing with internal enemies autonomously. On the rebel side,
politically “modulated rebels” are the prime candidates for international humanitarian
engagement. Such modulation is likely to occur after civilian-connecting experiences
over time by holding territory or after peace talks. We test these arguments using
the case of the United Nations (UN) action plans between 2000 and 2015, in which
some rebel groups committed to reducing the practice of child soldiering. We find that
the combination of “insecure governments” and “modulated rebels” can systematically
account for the UN action plans occurrence. Our analysis has implications for the role
of external actors in internal conflict zones around the world.
Keywords
Humanitarian engagement, rebel groups, civil conflicts, United Nations action plans,
child soldiering
Corresponding author:
Hyeran Jo, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77845, USA.
Email: hyeranjo@polisci.tamu.edu
1180369EJT0010.1177/13540661231180369European Journal of International RelationsJo and Yi
research-article2023
Article
Jo and Yi 603
Introduction
In 2009, the Moro Islamic Liberation Movement (MILF) in the Philippines signed an
action plan on the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict with the United
Nations (UN) (MILF/BIAF, 2009). The Action Plan document laid out the specific
“actions” to reduce the number of child soldiers in the rebel ranks with time-bound
“plans,” such as the internal implementation for age verification, release, and reintegra-
tion of children into the society, as well as changes in internal code of conduct.1 The 2009
UN-MILF Action Plan was the outcome after more than 2 years of engagement, and
6 years after the MILF was listed on the shame list (Nadarajah, 2019: 9). In 2017, the
MILF subsequently released 1,859 children from the group (UN/SC, 2017).
Since 2000, the United Nations Office of the Special Representative for Children and
Armed Conflict (UN/CAAC) has exerted efforts to engage nonstate armed groups to
reduce the number of child soldiers, with the help of the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF)
and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).2 Between 2000 and 2015,
about a dozen rebel groups in the world signed the UN action plans to stop the practice
of child soldiering, while other approximately 100 groups did not.3 The first case of the
Ivory Coast bore fruit in 2005, and then the effort was extended to other parts of the
world. Sometimes negotiations succeed (e.g. negotiations with some groups in the
Central African Republic), at other times they fail (e.g. dialogue with several groups in
Myanmar).4
Charged broadly with the task of protecting children during armed conflicts around
the globe, the UN/CAAC Office starts with the list of violators (so-called “shame list”)
that use and recruit child soldiers around the world. Approximately 40 rebel groups and
10 states are on the shame list annually. Once the list is identified, the UN delegation or
staff tries to contact states as well as nonstate actors. In some cases, rebel groups take the
initiative to contact international actors.5 The negotiation takes place when the conflict
parties are willing to commit to the action plans. As such, the plans themselves are essen-
tially consent-based and often confidential.6 The actions are subject to so-called
Monitoring and Reporting Mechanisms that allow international monitors to access rebel-
held areas. The psychological and social, and community-based programs are also dis-
cussed on the way of negotiations as part of a humanitarian engagement.
The outcome of the UN action plans is part of the broader phenomenon of interna-
tional engagement in conflict zones to improve humanitarian outcomes. Since the post-
Cold War period, international efforts in internal conflicts have grown with the means of
peacekeeping, mediation, or sanctions (Howard and Stark, 2017; Krasner and Weinstein,
2014). The presence of external actors in conflict zones is a salient feature of global poli-
tics today (Breslawski and Cunningham, 2019; Hoeffler, 2014; Matanock, 2020). This
trend might change due to the backlash and retrenchment in international actions (Börzel
and Zürn, 2021), but the contemporary relevance of international engagement still
remains, largely due to the potential contribution to the reduction of violence.
Among the set of international actions in conflict zones, we study the phenomenon of
international humanitarian engagement with rebel groups in conflict zones. The phenom-
enon is characterized by direct interaction of international actors with nonstate armed
actors to achieve humanitarian goals of reducing human suffering in conflict zones while

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