When Preventing Absenteeism Fuels Long‐Sickness Leave: The Case of a Leading Operator for Local Transport Services
| Published date | 01 March 2020 |
| Date | 01 March 2020 |
| Author | Damien Cartron,Philippe Askenazy |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/bjir.12495 |
British Journal of Industrial Relations doi: 10.1111/bjir.12495
58:1 March 2020 0007–1080 pp. 199–223
When Preventing Absenteeism Fuels
Long-Sickness Leave: The Case of a
Leading Operator for Local Transport
Services
Philippe Askenazy and Damien Cartron
Abstract
We examine the strategy to reduce sickness absences of transit drivers in one
of the leading Multinational Operators for Local Transport Services in France.
Absenteeism dramatically rose as a result of this strategy. Using observations
and interviews at the corporate and field levels, and company data, wedisentangle
the mechanisms that led to this failure. In a context of strong constraints
especially from local communities,the strategy based on underlining the costs of
absences pushed local units to change their management practices. They focused
on chasing short absences, promoted presenteeism and intensified pressure on
workers rather than boosting prevention. Eventually, long-duration sickness
leaves massively expanded.
1. Introduction
A vast literature in sociology, psychology, ergonomics, management and
economics focuses on absenteeism atwork. Many occupations, industries and
countries are covered. On the one hand, researchers explore the individual,
organizational or institutional determinants of worker absences as well as
presenteeism (for a review, see, e.g., Mullen et al. 2017). On the other hand,
authors track the strategies that eliminate or mitigate adverse determinants
and promote virtuous practices: in general, specific actions targeting absences
in the workplace yield disappointing results, whereas programs considering
overall working conditions seem to be eective (Odeen et al. 2013).
Philippe Askenazy and Damien Cartron are atthe CNRS-ENS-Centre Maurice Halbwachs.
This study builds on research carried out according to a research convention with a MOLTS.
The convention concedes total liberty to publish the findings in academic outlets, provided that
there be an embargo period, and that the MOLTS not be identifiable.Therefore, some details are
omitted and some basic statistics are orders of magnitude ratherthan exact figures.
C
2019 John Wiley& Sons Ltd.
200 British Journal of Industrial Relations
By contrast, very few papers explore counterproductive strategies, except
on New Public Management methods in public health services.1This article
contributes to this last complementary perspective. It deconstructs a case
of corporate strategy to manage worker absences, which failed to reduce
absenteeism and eventually fuelled long-sickness leaves. This strategy tried to
exploit the economic argument of the financial costs of absences as leverage
for prevention. It was implemented in a Multinational Operator of Local
Transport Service (MOLTS) in France.
Transport services provide a particularly relevant framework for studying
worker absences. Companies face a high level of absenteeism, which is in
France, similar to that observed in the construction sector. Transit drivers
experience changing exposures to cumulative physical and mental strains:
improved equipment, extended driving times, more frequent incivilities, etc.
These changes have ambiguous consequences for workers and, globally,
working conditions and the quality of life remain poor.
Despite the automation of certain metro/tram lines, urban and interurban
passenger transport remains labour-intensive, in particular for bus networks.
Absenteeism still impacts the performance of transport companies.
Extraboard teams — used to fill in for absent operators if no extra drivers
are available — overtime paid to present drivers and missed trips are huge
sources of costs, despite the improvement of planning practices (Diab et al.
2014). In addition to their costs, these schemes cannot compensate for all
the disruptions generated by absences; therefore, firms have aprioristrong
incentives to prevent absenteeism at work.
Our analysis is based on extensive research by a multidisciplinary —
sociology, economics and ergonomics — team over a four-year period.
It combines interviews of managers and operators, field observations and
exploitation of internal datasets. The research has been funded by the
corporate health and safety department, which allowed us to visit a variety
of subsidiaries across France.
The main finding is that the strategy of corporate managers significantly
modified how working conditions and absences have to be accessed at
the workplace level. The argument that absenteeism hampers financial
performance pushed local managers to amplify their focus on reducing short-
term absences; they put pressureon workers claiming behaviour and incentives
for sickness presenteeism.This drove a reconfiguration of the natureof periods
of sickness leave, with a declining share of short-duration absences, but long-
term sickness absences increased so massively that total absenteeism rose.
The paper is organized into five sections.Section 2 details the mutations of
working conditions for bus drivers and the emergence of MOLTS. Section 3
briefly reviews the context and methodology of the study.In Sections 4 and 5,
we explore the actions and behavioursof actors to address absenteeism at the
company-wide and subsidiary levels,respectively. In Section 6, statisticsat the
unit level shed quantitative light on the increase of long-term sickness leave
in the wake of the corporate strategy.Lessons for avoiding counterproductive
consequences are discussed in the conclusion.
C
2019 John Wiley& Sons Ltd.
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