Where Help Is Needed Most? Explaining Reporting Strategies of the International Trade Union Confederation
| Author | Faradj Koliev |
| Published date | 01 May 2021 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0032321720903244 |
| Date | 01 May 2021 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321720903244
Political Studies
2021, Vol. 69(2) 390 –411
© The Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/0032321720903244
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Where Help Is Needed
Most? Explaining Reporting
Strategies of the International
Trade Union Confederation
Faradj Koliev
Abstract
How do international non-governmental organizations select countries for naming and shaming?
I argue that three focal actors influence non-governmental organizations’ shaming decisions:
inter-governmental organizations, governments, and non-governmental organization members.
Moreover, drawing on existing research, non-governmental organizations might respond
differently to focal actors’ preferences, by either targeting states that have been criticized by
focal actors or, alternatively, targeting those who have escaped their scrutiny. To test these
propositions, the article conducts multiple interviews and gathers original data on shaming within
the International Trade Union Confederation during period 1991–2011. The main findings are
threefold. First, focal actors, except governments, have a significant influence on International
Trade Union Confederation shaming. The members’ preferences regarding which states should
be singled out have the strongest impact. Second, the International Trade Union Confederation
is likely to adopt a bandwagoning strategy by shaming states that have been targeted by focal
actors, rather than focusing on states that have escaped their criticism. Third, as a result of the
bandwagoning approach, the International Trade Union Confederation mainly targets states with
poor labor rights conditions.
Keywords
international non-governmental organizations, labor rights, human rights, International Trade
Union Confederation, naming and shaming
Accepted: 8 January 2020
Introduction
Over the last 40 years, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) have
played a crucial role in international politics. INGOs operate at various levels, providing
information to inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), monitoring compliance with
Department of Political Science, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden
Corresponding author:
Faradj Koliev, Department of Political Science, Stockholm University, 106 91 Stockholm, Sweden.
Email: faradj.koliev@statsvet.su.se
903244PSX0010.1177/0032321720903244Political StudiesKoliev
research-article2020
Article
Koliev 391
international norms, and influencing the domestic and international policies of states. To
do this, they utilize a wide range of advocacy strategies (Murdie, 2014; Stroup and Wong,
2017: 65–88). One of the most critical assets of INGOs is their ability to generate and
disseminate information that can mobilize domestic and international organizations
(Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Murdie and Davis, 2012). To increase their relevance on the
international arena, INGOs now operate through multiple channels. As their formal access
to intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) has increased, INGOs spend considerable
resources on monitoring and reporting on violators of international agreements (Johnson,
2014; Tallberg et al., 2013). For instance, within the United Nations (UN) system, there
are currently thousands of registered INGOs that allocate substantial resources to “nam-
ing and shaming” states that violate international norms within IGOs like the Economic
and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the Human Rights Council (UNHCR).1 By reporting
on states’ violations, INGOs strive to hold perpetrators accountable for their wrongdoings
and facilitate political change in these states. But how do INGOs decide which states to
single out for “naming and shaming”?2 While we have considerable knowledge of how
and when governments within international organizations (IOs) target violators (Koliev,
2019; Terman and Voeten, 2018), we know little about what factors influence INGOs’
decisions to target states for naming and shaming in IOs.
Consider the following examples. Between 2000 and 2008, the International Trade
Union Confederation (ITUC), the leading labor rights INGO (Reinalda, 2019: 237), regu-
larly criticized the government of Myanmar for its use of forced labor in the military. The
ITUC compiled new evidence of forced labor and filed a report against Myanmar within the
International Labour Organization (ILO), condemning the government and putting pressure
on the ILO and its member states to punish Myanmar. In their efforts to eliminate the prac-
tice, the ITUC also compiled a blacklist of multinational companies working in Myanmar
(ILO, 2001). In parallel with the Myanmar case, the ITUC conducted multiple interviews
with workers in Mauritania and invested considerable resources in investigating the practice
of slavery in the country. In 2001, the ITUC publicly alleged Mauritania for violating the
ILO’s conventions on forced labor. In their report to the ILO, the ITUC stated, for instance,
that “a young man and a 13-year-old girl were forced to work for their masters as a shepherd
and camel herder respectively before escaping and being caught with the help of the police,”
and demanded immediate measures against these practices (ILO, 2001). Yet, during the
same period, the Nigerian government’s anti-union measures and use of forced labor did not
receive the ITUC’s attention. This is despite the fact that ITUC members—Nigerian
unions—accused the government of grave violations of major international labor conven-
tions, such as the dissolution of central labor unions.
These examples generate an empirical puzzle regarding how INGOs select states for
public criticism. This question is important in the light of previous research that links
INGO and IGO naming and shaming with human rights improvements (Koliev et al., in
press; DeMeritt, 2012; Murdie and Davis, 2012). It is also imperative to the study of
NGOs and international politics to understand the politics behind INGOs’ targeting
behavior and the extent to which other factors and actors influence their decisions.
Drawing on previous research, this article argues that three focal actors shape INGOs’
shaming decisions: IGOs, governments, and members or donors3 (see, for example,
Carpenter, 2014; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Stroup and Wong, 2017). The preferences of
these focal actors as regards which states to single out play a decisive role for INGOs’
targeting decisions due to reputational and strategic benefits. But reputational and strate-
gic considerations might be a doubled-edge sword (Gent et al., 2015), and, given the
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