Who dissents? Self-efficacy and opposition action after state-sponsored election violence
| Author | Lauren E Young |
| Published date | 01 January 2020 |
| Date | 01 January 2020 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0022343319886000 |
| Subject Matter | Research Articles |
Who dissents? Self-efficacy and opposition
action after state-sponsored
election violence
Lauren E Young
Department of Political Science, University of California, Davis
Abstract
Reactions to acts of state-sponsored election violence and other forms of repression vary greatly across individuals.
This article develops a theory that the psychological characteristic of self-efficacy moderates opposition supporters’
reactions to state-sponsored election violence. I use data from an original survey and in-depth qualitative interviews
with opposition supporters in Zimbabwe to illustrate and test this theory. Self-efficacy is a strong predictor of
intention to take action in support of the opposition after episodes of state-sponsored election violence and is related
to the emotional reactions that opposition supporters have after violent events. Specifically, people who are higher in
self-efficacy report that they would feel more anger relative to fear after episodes of state-sponsored election violence.
The relationship between self-efficacy and persistence in pro-opposition action after violence is similar in magnitude
to variables that the existing literature argues are the most important predictors of dissent in repressive environments,
including strength of identification with the opposition and gender. These results provide empirical support for the
assumption in many collective action theories that psychological characteristics create variation in dissent in repres-
sive environments. Understanding how individual psychological differences can shape reactions to coercive violence
may help explain why forms of repression like state-sponsored election violence have such unpredictable effects on
subsequent pro-opposition mobilization.
Keywords
election violence, repression, Zimbabwe
Introduction
In March 2008, Zimbabweans went to the polls. Eco-
nomic mismanagement had given many reason to vote
against the incumbent regime despite a large police pres-
ence at the polling stations and a history of intimidation
and violence during elections. In the days after the elec-
tion, the results were not announced and police were
deployed, leading opposition voters to fear that the gov-
ernment was riggingthe results. During this period,voters
sent messages to the BBC (BBC News, 31 March 2008):
‘Police have already been deployed on the streets in
Harare and are telling people not to assemble, to keep
quiet. I have never been this afraid before.’
‘People talked freely – even in the voting queues – of
their discontent at Mugabe rule. They openly said they
would vote for change [ ...]’
‘[ ...] people will burst with anger and probably
demonstrate or become violent.’
The reactions of voters to the same political events are
highly diverse. Fear, indifference, and anger are all com-
mon reactions to threats of state punishment for political
action or speech. What explains this heterogeneity in
voter reactions to state-sponsored election violence?
More generally, when violence is used to influence the
outcome of an election, when does it have its intended
effect of reducing support for the opposition?
Election-related state repression is an important and
understudied form of election violence. Govern ments
are the most common perpetrators of pre- and post-
Corresponding author:
leyou@ucdavis.edu
Journal of Peace Research
2020, Vol. 57(1) 62–76
ªThe Author(s) 2020
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/0022343319886000
journals.sagepub.com/home/jpr
To continue reading
Request your trial