Who should pay for humanitarian intervention?
| Author | Fredrik D Hjorthen |
| DOI | 10.1177/1474885117697468 |
| Published date | 01 July 2020 |
| Date | 01 July 2020 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
European Journal of Political Theory
2020, Vol. 19(3) 334–353
!The Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/1474885117697468
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Article
Who should pay for
humanitarian intervention?
Fredrik D Hjorthen
University of Gothenburg, Sweden
Abstract
While some suggestions have been made as to how the duty to undertake humanitarian
intervention should be assigned to specific states, the question of how to assign the duty
to carry the economic and material costs remains underexplored. In this paper, I argue
that the most plausible answer to this question is found in a pluralist approach. First,
we should look to the Contribution to Problem Principle, according to which the costs
are shared based on the historical responsibility of states for the occurrence of atro-
cities. For the many cases where this principle does not apply or needs to be supple-
mented, I suggest a novel alternative in the Entitlement-adjusted Ability Principle,
according to which costs should be distributed based on states’ levels of resources
that have been tainted by historical rights violations.
Keywords
Humanitarian intervention, responsibility to protect, duty to intervene, international
justice, historical responsibility, disgorgement
Introduction
In recent years, the focus in the theoretical debate on humanitarian intervention
has turned towards what we may call the ‘duty specification question’, that is, how
the duty to intervene should be assigned to particular agents.
1
It is useful to think
of the duty to intervene as comprising two components: the duty to deploy one’s
own forces; and the duty to bear the economic and material costs of the interven-
tion (Fabre, 2012: 191).
2
While several suggestions have been made as to how the
former duty should be assigned (e.g. Fabre, 2012; Pattison, 2010), little attention
has been devoted to the latter duty.
3
Distributing the economic burden of humanitarian intervention fairly is import-
ant for two main reasons: First, fairness is important in itself. Other things being
equal we should prefer distributing burdens in a fair way. Second, fair burden
Corresponding author:
Fredrik D Hjorthen, Goteborgs universitet Samhallsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Box 711, Goteborg 405 30,
Sweden.
Email: fredrik.dybfest.hjorthen@gu.se
sharing has instrumental importance in that it can help alleviate the problem
of undersupply of intervention. While justified criticism has often been aimed
at flaws in interventions that did take place, an arguably more serious problem
has been interventions that did not take place, appropriately captured by Simon
Chesterman’s term ‘inhumanitarian non-intervention’ (2003: 54).
4
Sharing the eco-
nomic burden of intervention fairly among states typically means sharing the costs
among more states than just the military intervener(s). Other things being equal
this entails lower costs for the states that undertake the actual intervention. There is
reason to believe that this increases the will to undertake intervention.
5
In this paper, I will argue that the economic burden of humanitarian interven-
tion should be shared among states using a pluralist approach involving two main
steps.
6
First, costs should be distributed among states based on the degree to which
they have contributed to the problem the intervention is meant to solve. This is the
message of the Contribution to Problem Principle (CPP). Yet, there will likely be
many cases where this principle does not apply. Therefore, a second step is neces-
sary, and, given that CPP is widely endorsed and well understood as a principle for
remedial responsibility, the main thrust of the analysis will deal with developing
this step. I will argue that what I call the Entitlement-adjusted Ability Principle
(EAP) should be our preferred secondary principle. This principle says that the
economic cost should be shared by states in inverse proportion to their claim not to
contribute, where the strength of states’ claims not to contribute should be deter-
mined by the size of their holdings to which they have no legitimate claim.
Throughout the paper I will refer to states as bearers of the duty to pay. This is a
simplifying assumption and follows a trend in the literature, but it needs to be
explained in order to avoid misunderstanding. While the duty to pay for humani-
tarian intervention ultimately attaches to individuals, states are individuals’
main ‘instrument for justice’ (cf. Buchanan, 1999: 82–87) when it comes to
global obligations of this type. Hence, the assumption acknowledges the important
instrumental role of states while retaining an individualist perspective with respect
to the ultimate site of rights and responsibilities.
The paper proceeds as follows: First, I briefly discuss whether there is a need for
separate principles for assigning the duty to undertake humanitarian intervention
and the duty to pay for it. Having given an affirmative answer to this question,
I move on to consider the merits of the CPP as a primary principle. I then examine
the Ability to Pay Principle (APP) and the Beneficiary Pays Principle (BPP) as
alternative secondary principles. Finding these lacking in important respects,
I then present and develop the EAP, and argue that it provides a morally attractive
account of how the economic costs of humanitarian intervention ought to be
distributed. The following section examines some objections to the principle, and
a final section concludes.
Do we need a separate principle for who should pay?
Some might ask why we should not simply adopt the same principle for both who
should pay for intervention and who should carry out the intervention. Here I will
Hjorthen 335
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