Whose Business is it Anyway? Employees and the Consumer Protection Act 1987
| Date | 01 March 1993 |
| Author | Peter Cartwright |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1993.tb00959.x |
| Published date | 01 March 1993 |
March
19931
Employees
and
the Consumer Protection Act
1987
which was, again, vested in
M’s
sole name. Thus:
The next question, arising under the
Lloyds
Bank
plc
v
Rosset
formula, is whether there is
any
property in regard to which
an
intention to share a beneficial ownership should be imputed
to the parties in the absence
of
any
express discussion leading to
an
agreement
or
understanding
to that effect.I5
This reference to imputed intention is odd as the concept of imputed intention has
not found acceptance.16 It may be that Waite
J
had inferred intention in mind.
Earlier in his judgment, Waite
J
indicated his willingness, in the absence of express
discussions, to engage in ‘inferential analysis involving a scrutiny of all events
potentially capable of throwing light on the question of whether, in the absence
of express discussion, a presumed intention can be spelt out of the parties’ past
course of dealing.’” However, in
Rosset,
Lord Bridge stated that direct payment
of purchase monies is the only form of conduct which would lead to an inference
of
common intention, observing that ‘it is at least extremely doubtful whether
anything less will do.’!*
Few would contend that the mistress in this quasi-matrimonial case deserved to
walk away empty-handed. It was evident that her efforts played no small part in
the couple’s business success. Hard cases, however, still make bad law. In
Rosset,
an attempt was made to establish certainty in this difficult area. Unfortunately, the
present case may have further compounded the problems encountered by a lawyer
attempting to advise in cases of this nature.
Whose Business
is
it Anyway? Employees and the
Consumer Protection Act
1987
Peter Cartwright*
The decision of the Divisional Court in
Warwickshire County Council
v
Johnson
I
is likely to cause considerable confusion among those responsible for the administra-
tion of the Consumer Protection Act 1987. The case involved the question of whether
or not employees of
a
company can be prosecuted under
ss
20(
1)2
and
40(
1)3 of
15 [1992] 2
All ER
109, 119.
16
Pettit
v
Pettit
[I9701
AC
777,
at 804H-805A, 810A,
810F.
816;
Gissing
v
Gissing
[1971]
AC
886,
at
896C,
WE-F, WE-F;
McFarlane
v
McFarlane
[I9721
NI
59,
at
71.
17 [1992] 2
All ER
109, 112.
18
[1990]
1
All ER
1111,
1119.
\
*Lecturer in Law, University of Wales, Aberystwyth.
I
would like to thank my colleagues Michael Hirst and Andrew Campbell for their helpful comments on
an earlier draft of this work, and Richard Bragg of Manchester University for discussing some points with
me. Responsibility for the final piece is, of course, mine.
1
(1992) 156
JP
577.
2
s
20( 1)
states:
Subject to the following provisions a person shall be guilty of an offence if, in the course of any
business of his, he gives (by any means whatever) to any consumers an indication which is misleading
as to the price at which any
goods,
services, accommodation
or
facilities are available (whether
generally or from particular persons).
Where the commission by any person
of
an offence to which section
39
above applies is due to
227
3
s
40(1)
states:
@
The
Modem
Law
Review
Limited
1993
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