Why an early Belt and Road Initiative East Africa hub? Economic, demographic and security factors
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1108/JCEFTS-09-2021-0049 |
| Published date | 21 March 2022 |
| Date | 21 March 2022 |
| Pages | 125-149 |
| Subject Matter | Economics,International economics |
| Author | Lauren Johnston,Joseph Onjala |
Why an early Belt and Road
Initiative East Africa hub?
Economic, demographic
and security factors
Lauren Johnston
Institute for International Trade, School of Economics and Policy,
The University of Adelaide, Adelaide, Australia, and
Joseph Onjala
Department of Economics and Development Studies, University of Nairobi,
Nairobi, Kenya
Abstract
Purpose –This purpose of this paper is to explore China’s choice to focus early Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI) Africa outrea ch on Eastern Africa. The BRI specifically seeks to achieve ten economic and policy
objectives, as outlined in the two launch speeches of 2013. In terms of realising these, the economic
development and digitisation levels, that progress of the demographic transition, and the important
security context of the sub-region, logica lly make East Africa relatively importan t to BRI in continental
context. Kenya specifically is important in bei ng an African frontier therein, and , also, because it shares a
few important borders with landlocked countries, including Ethiopia, Sudan and Uganda, alongside a
strategic coast and ports. From this lens, as well the fact that in the Ming Dynasty Chinese fleets reached
what is modern-day Kenya, China’s early BRI outreach to Africa having had a historical precedent in
initially focusing on Eastern Africa, might be usefully understood.
Design/methodology/approach –To realise that aim a comprehensivesurvey of related literature and
policy documents,in Chinese, English and Swahili, was undertaken and relevantdata compiled and analysed.
Findings –To the best of the authors’knowledge,first, this paper is the first to argue that the Belt and Road
Initiative in Africa may build on abstract long-run logic in terms of economics, demographic change and
security. This provides a contraryperspective to the pre-existing established “debt trap diplomacy”and no
consistent logic narratives. Second, it is the first to offer a synthesised analysis of the BRI in Africa, East
Africa specifically,looking across economic, demographicand security angles.
Research limitations/implications –The paper is a synthesisof development and regional economics
literature that forges some prospective rationales only. It is not an empirical research paper drawing very
specificanddefinitiveconclusions.
Practical implications –Amid widespread geo-economictensions and uncertainty, around the Belt and
Road Initiativein particular, this paper offers a new economicdevelopment-oriented logic for the choiceof an
importantnode of the China’s Belt and Road Initiative, that of East Africa, Kenya especially. Thismay impact
existingrelated narratives and policy responses.
Social implications –Equivalently to the above this may then have an impact on the ground in East
Africa and beyond.
Originality/value –The first such or evenclose to synthesis.
Keywords China, EastAfrica, Security, Economic geography,Belt and Road Initiative,China-Africa
Paper type Viewpoint
JEL classification –J11, F43, F01, F02
Belt and Road
Initiative East
Africa hub
125
Journalof Chinese Economic and
ForeignTrade Studies
Vol.15 No. 2, 2022
pp. 125-149
© Emerald Publishing Limited
1754-4408
DOI 10.1108/JCEFTS-09-2021-0049
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:
https://www.emerald.com/insight/1754-4408.htm
1. Introduction
The rise of China over nearly half a century has dramatically shifted economic gravity
eastward (Quah, 2011). In parallel to China’s and East Asia’s ascent, Africa’s development,
has, in contrast, lagged. Led by China, investor interest in Africa has since the 1990s
especially, however, increased. China became net externally energy dependent in the early
1990s and, pushed by conflict in the Middle, pursued greenfield energy markets (Seddon,
2006).
Ties between China and oil-exporterAngola evolved rapidly consequentially, such
that Angola spent years atop the world’s fastest growing economy table and a model
of Chinese lending was named the “Angola Model”(Burgos and Ear, 2012). The
Angola model uses resource extraction commitment as collateral for related and
sometimes additional infrastructure investment (Jure
nczyk, 2020). Driven
disproportionately by oil exports from Angola, in year 2009; moreover, China became
the African continent’s largest trade partner and from around when scholarly interest
in China’s Africa interests has risen (Kaplinsky, 2008;Wang and Bio-Tchané, 2008;
Eisenman, 2012).
Into that context, in 2013 China launched an obscurely named outbound-oriented
initiative, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) [1]. The BRI was launched in two speeches by
China’s President Xi Jinping (Xi,2013a, 2013b), given in Kazakhstan and Indonesia. Those
respectively gave rise to thetwo geographic passageways that grant the Initiative its name:
a“Silk Road Economic Belt”(Belt) and a “Twenty-first century Maritime Silk Road”(Road)
(Figure 1). Despite that geographic reference, Chinese officials emphasise the BRI is
universally open(China, PRC, State Council, 2015).
The literature, scholarly and popular, is rich in attempts to interpret President Xi’s BRI
agenda (Huang, 2016;Lin, 2019;Huang, 2019;Johnston, 2018a;Maçães, 2019). Also, in
expositions that highlight that there may be little, if any, underlying strategy and logic to
the BRI (Jones and Zeng, 2019). There are also arguments that the BRI is merely an
incidental external representation of domestic policies and practices (Summers, 2016). Into
that confusion and given that high-level official speeches are considered an important
Figure 1.
“Silk Road Economic
Belt”and “Twenty-
first Century
Maritime SilkRoad”
Map
JCEFTS
15,2
126
To continue reading
Request your trial