Why Asian states cooperate in regional arrangements: Asian regionalism in comparative perspective
| Author | Diana Panke,Jürgen Rüland |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00471178211028970 |
| Published date | 01 September 2022 |
| Date | 01 September 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178211028970
International Relations
2022, Vol. 36(3) 428 –453
© The Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/00471178211028970
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Why Asian states cooperate
in regional arrangements:
Asian regionalism in
comparative perspective
Diana Panke and Jürgen Rüland
University of Freiburg
Abstract
Regional cooperation in Asia takes place in formal Regional Organizations (ROs) as well as in
less formal Regional Fora (RF). In addition, unlike in other parts of the world, Asian regionalism
mainly developed in one instead of two waves. Especially after the end of the Cold War, Asian
countries created numerous ROs and RF. Over time, Asian states became members of several
ROs and RF at the same time, thereby contributing to Asian regime complexity. Given that
multiple memberships in regional cooperation agreements can place high demands on diplomatic
and financial resources of member states, the fact that Asian states became members in between
one and 17 ROs and RF is puzzling. This article investigates why Asian countries join regional
cooperation agreements. Based on a theory-guided empirical analysis that combines quantitative
and qualitative methods, it argues that hedging and economic interests are the main driving forces
behind Asian regionalism and that these motivations are often interlinked.
Keywords
Asia, comparative analysis, regional cooperation, regional fora, regional organizations,
state membership
Introduction
After a first wave of regionalism in the 1950s and 1960s, which mainly originated in
Europe and to a lesser extent in Latin America,1 the 1990s saw the emergence of a second
wave of regionalism.2 Since then regional cooperation agreements proliferated exponen-
tially. Many of these new regional groupings emerged in the Global South, virtually
leaving no world region without regionalism.3,4 Yet already a casual glance at these
Corresponding author:
Diana Panke, University of Freiburg, Belfortstr. 20, Freiburg 79085, Germany.
Email: diana.panke@politik.uni-freiburg.de
1028970IRE0010.1177/00471178211028970International RelationsPanke and Rüland
research-article2021
Article
Panke and Rüland 429
newly formed regional organizations (ROs) and regional fora (RF) shows that their
membership, functions, and mandates strongly overlap. In other words, many states are
members of several regional bodies, which perform the same or largely similar func-
tions. While the trend to multi-membership in regional bodies is worldwide,5 Asia is a
region in which this trend is also pronounced.
Existing research on Asian regionalism has focused on the history, institutional
design, norms, and effectiveness of regional cooperation,6 but the phenomenon of over-
lapping regionalism has only recently attracted scholarly attention.7 The few existing
studies on Asia often rely on single case studies, cover seldom more than one sub-region,8
and are based on qualitative methodology. None of these studies treated Asia as a whole
and adopted an encompassing long durée comparative perspective.
This article seeks to address this lacuna. Inspired by Lieberman’s ‘nested analysis’,9 we
combine quantitative and qualitative methods, examine overlapping regionalism for the
whole of Asia from 1945 to 2015 and adopt a unit-level approach by focusing on member
states’ interests. We follow the UN definition of Asia, which covers 50 countries located in
the Near and Middle East, Central Asia, South, Southeast and East Asia including Australia,
New Zealand, and Oceania. This paper is the most comprehensive study of Asian regional-
ism to date, encompassing the time period between 1945 and 2015 and covering all Asian
ROs and RFs and combines a quantitative analysis with in-depth case studies.
The paper examines why Asian states join ROs and RFs and why they differ in this
respect as state membership varies between zero and 17 organizations. Membership in
regional cooperation arenas is important as these are the locations in which the distri-
bution of material goods is negotiated and regional rules and norms are discussed and
passed in summit declarations as soft or hard law. Yet the more ROs and RF a state has
joined, the more governance resources it needs in order to participate in these schemes.
In order words, multiple membership can be problematic for the operation and effec-
tiveness of regional governance arrangements when the respective states lack the
capacities to engage actively in all of them. Linked to multiple memberships despite
resource constraints, Asian regionalism is often regarded as being institutionally mini-
malist in nature.10
Accordingly, the key question we pose in this article is the following: Why do some
countries join more regional cooperation schemes than others? We approach this puzzle
by firstly presenting an empirical overview concerning the evolution of regionalism in
Asia including the concomitant membership patterns. Thereafter, we derive six hypoth-
eses, which are influenced by the three major strands of international relations theory:
realism, liberalism, and constructivism. We examine the plausibility of these hypotheses
in the subsequent sections of the article; first by employing statistical regressions, fol-
lowed by a qualitative analysis. The case studies use fine-grained indicators and contex-
tual insights in order to shed additional light on the hypotheses that the quantitative part
identified as important and thus to enhance ‘overall confidence in the central findings of
the study’.11 The main findings are that the motives for joining ROs and RF do not sys-
tematically differ from each other, that hedging and economic interests are the driving
forces behind Asian regionalism and that these motivations are often connected. Also,
the case studies show that economic incentives are often linked to internal legitimacy and
external recognition.
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