Why AUKUS and not CAUKUS? It's a Potluck, not a Party
| Published date | 01 September 2023 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00207020231195109 |
| Author | Stephanie Carvin,Thomas Juneau |
| Date | 01 September 2023 |
| Subject Matter | Scholarly Essays |
Why AUKUS and not
CAUKUS? It’s a Potluck, not a
Party
Stephanie Carvin
Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University,
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
Thomas Juneau
Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of
Ottawa, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
Abstract
In September 2021, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia announced a new
security arrangement, dubbed AUKUS, focused on helping Australia acquire nuclear sub-
marines. This caused anxiety in Canada, especially as it emerged that Canadian officials had
been caught unaware. In this paper, we argue that AUKUS 1.0 (now increasingly referred to
as the first pillar) is not a problem forCanada, despit et hise arlyconcern: Canada may need
to renew its aging submarine fleet, but it is unlikely to acquire nuclear submarines in the
foreseeable future. That said, thereare broader reasons for Canada to be worried: its exclu-
sion from AUKUS is illustrativeof its neglect of foreign, defence, and national security policy
more generally. Moreover, as the pact evolves into AUKUS 2.0 (or the second pillar) and
broadens its remit to cooperation on emerging defence technologies, Canada’sabsence
from its proliferating working groups risks imposing serious costs.
Keywords
AUKUS, Canadian foreign policy, Canadian defence policy, five eyes, submarines
Corresponding authors:
Stephanie Carvin, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, 1125 Colonel By
Dr, Ottawa, Ontario, K1S 5B6, Canada.
Email: stephanie.carvin@carleton.ca
Thomas Juneau, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, 120 University
Private, Social Sciences Building, Room 6005, Ottawa, Ontario, K1N 6N5, Canada.
Email: Thomas.Juneau@uottawa.ca
Scholarly Essay
International Journal
2023, Vol. 78(3) 359–374
© The Author(s) 2023
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/00207020231195109
journals.sagepub.com/home/ijx
In September 2021, the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia announced a
new security arrangement to enhance Indo-Pacific security. The arrangement, which
was quickly dubbed AUKUS, focused on helping Australia acquire nuclear subma-
rines. The surprise announcement caused significant consternation and frustration in
France, which immediately lost its contract to sell submarines to Australia.
1
It also
caused anxiety and hand-wringing in Canada, especially when it emerged that
Canadian officials were unaware of the agreement or negotiations leading up to it.
2
In this paper we argue that AUKUS as it was originally conceived (“AUKUS 1.0,”
as referred to by one of our interviewees, and now increasingly called the “first pillar”)
is not a problem for Canada, despite these early concerns. Canada may need to renew
its aging submarines, but is unlikely to acquire nuclear submarines in the foreseeable
future. That said, there are broader reasons for Canada to be worried: its exclusion from
AUKUS is illustrative of its neglect of foreign, defence, and national security policy
and of its exclusion from or marginalization in other fora. Moreover, as the pact
evolves into what we call “AUKUS 2.0”(or the “second pillar”) and broadens its
remit to cooperation on emerging defence technologies, Canada’s absence from
AUKUS’s proliferating working groups may have serious costs.
Methodology
This paper is based on two sets of interviews that we conducted in 2018–2019 and
2022–2023 as part of a larger ongoing project on the Canadian intelligence and
national security community. In the first set, we spoke to about seventy interviewees
(including ten non-Canadians) who over the course of their career had produced
and/or consumed intelligence products. We conducted the second set of ten interviews
(including five with non-Canadians) specifically to address AUKUS and its impact on
Canada’s foreign and defence policy as well as its intelligence-sharing relationships.
We selected interviewees based on our contacts, snowball sampling, and cold-call
emails. The rank of these individuals ranged from desk officer and analyst through
to deputy minister (DM; equivalent to deputy secretary in the American context) or
head of agency level. Some were still in service at the time of the interview, while
others were retired. Interviews were semi-structured and about sixty to ninety
minutes long. We promised strict anonymity to each interviewee; when we use a
direct quote, we use the label “an interviewee,”without reference to nationality or
function.
1. David Brewster, “Le contexte stratégique et la décision de l’Australie de se doter de sous-marins
nucléaires,”Revue Défense Nationale 7, no. 852 (2022): 53–60.
2. Robert Fife and Steven Chase, “Canada caught off guard by new security pact between US, Australia,
and Britain,”The Globe and Mail, 17 September 2021, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/
article-canadian-government-surprised-by-new-indo-pacific-security-pact/ (accessed 17 September
2021).
360 International Journal 78(3)
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