Why can’t we be friends? Entitlements and the costs of conflict
| Date | 01 July 2014 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343314524428 |
| Published date | 01 July 2014 |
| Subject Matter | Research Articles |
Why can’t we be friends? Entitlements
and the costs of conflict
Erik O Kimbrough
Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University
Roman M Sheremeta
Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve University &
Economic Science Institute, Chapman University
Abstract
We design an experiment to explore the impact of earned entitlements on the frequency and intensity of conflicts in a
two-stage conflict game where players may attempt to use non-binding side-payments to avoid conflict. In this game,
Proposers make offers and Responders decide simultaneously whether to accept the offers and whether to engage in a
conflict. A simple theoretical analysis suggests that Proposers should never offer side-payments because Responders
should always accept them and then still choose to enter conflict; however, our experiment reveals that some indi-
viduals use this non-binding mechanism to avoid conflict. Moreover, when subjects earn their roles (Proposer or
Responder), conflicts are 44% more likely to be avoided than when roles are assigned randomly. Earned entitlements
impact behavior in three important ways: (1) Proposers who have earned their position persistently make larger
offers; (2) larger offers lead to a lower probability of conflict; but (3) Proposers whose offers do not lead to conflict
resolution respond spitefully with greater conflict expenditure. Hence, with earned rights, the positive welfare effects
of reduced conflict frequency are offset by higher conflict intensity. This result differs from previous experimental
evidence from ultimatum games in which earned entitlements tend to encourage agreement and increase welfare;
thus, our findings highlight the important consequences of endogenizing the costs of conflict. Our analysis suggests
that earned entitlements alter behavior by influencing the beliefs of Proposers about the willingness of Responders to
accept a peaceful resolution. As a result, these Proposers make persistent high offers, and when their beliefs are dis-
appointed by a Responder’s decision to accept a side-payment and still enter conflict, they retaliate.
Keywords
conflict resolution, contests, entitlements, experiments, side-payments
Introduction
When you reap the harvest of your land, do not reap to
the very edges of your field or gather the gleanings of
your harvest. Do not go over your vineyard a second
time or pick up the grapes that have fallen. Leave them
for the poor and the alien. (Leviticus 19: 9–10)
The God of the Old Testament instructed his followers
to leave some of the fruits of their harvest in their fields,
un-harvested. An economist might assume merely that
God understood the Law of Diminishing Returns and
taught his followers accordingly. But to ignore the exhor-
tation to leave something behind for the poor and alien is
to miss a potentially rich historical and economic point.
Why, beyond the diminishing returns to labor, might
one want to leave unpicked fruit on a vine?
The property rights to the goods are clearly delineated
in this story. No indication is given that the people for
whom the gleanings are to be left have any claim to the
Corresponding author:
rms246@case.edu, rshereme@gmail.com
Journal of Peace Research
2014, Vol. 51(4) 487–500
ªThe Author(s) 2014
Reprints and permission:
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343314524428
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