‘Why is there no NATO in Asia?’ revisited: Prospect theory, balance of threat, and US alliance strategies
| Date | 01 June 2012 |
| Published date | 01 June 2012 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1354066110377124 |
Article
European Journal of
International Relations
18(2) 227–250
© The Author(s) 2010
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DOI: 10.1177/1354066110377124
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Corresponding author:
Kai He, Political Science Department, Utah State University, 0725 Old Main Hill, Logan, UT 84322, USA.
Email: hekai@yahoo.com
‘Why is there no NATO in
Asia?’ revisited: Prospect
theory, balance of threat, and
US alliance strategies
Kai He
Utah State University, USA
Huiyun Feng
Utah State University, USA
Abstract
Why did the US prefer multilateral alliances in Europe, but bilateral alliances in Asia after
World War II? Rationalists and constructivists debate the impact of power, institutions,
and identities in explaining this highly contested question. We introduce a new argument
embedded in prospect theory from political psychology — a prospect–threat alliance
model — to account for the variation in US alliance strategy toward Europe and Asia
after World War II. Through setting the threat level as a reference point for leaders’
prospects of gains or losses, we suggest: (1) high threats frame decision-makers in a
domain of losses, and multilateral alliances become a favorable alliance choice because
states are more likely to take the risk of constraining their freedom of action in return
for more help from multiple allies as well as for avoiding further strategic losses;
(2) low threats position leaders in a domain of gains, and bilateral alliances win out
because states are risk-averse in terms of maintaining their freedom of action in seeking
security through alliances with fewer allies. US alliance policy toward Asia after World
War II is a within-case analysis that tests the validity of the prospect-threat alliance
model.
Keywords
balance of threat, NATO in Asia, prospect theory, SEATO, US alliance strategies
228 European Journal of International Relations 18(2)
Introduction
‘Why is there no NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) in Asia?’ (Acharya, 2005;
Hemmer and Katzenstein, 2002). It is a highly debated question among International
Relations scholars. Rationalists, especially neorealists and neoliberals, suggest power
disparity and institutional efficiency arguments to account for different US alliance
strategies after World War II, that is, bilateralism in Asia but multilateralism in Europe
(Crone, 1993; Ikenberry, 2003; Press-Barnathan, 2000/1; Weber, 1992). Constructivists
contend that the different densities of collective identity between the US and its allies
in Europe versus Asia explain the variation in US alliance strategies (Hemmer and
Katzenstein, 2002). While the US prefers a multilateral alliance, that is, NATO, with its
European partners who share a common identity, bilateral alliances are designed for
dealing with its alien, inferior partners in Asia.1
After examining the merits and weaknesses of the prevailing rationalist and construc-
tivist arguments, we introduce a new argument embedded in political psychology — a
prospect–threat alliance model — to account for the variation in US alliance strategy in
Europe and Asia after World War II. The prospect–threat alliance model combines pros-
pect theory from political psychology and balance of threat theory from political science
to explain under what conditions states are more likely to commit to a multilateral alli-
ance rather than a bilateral one. It suggests that different levels of threat from the inter-
national system shape leaders’ decisions in choosing bilateral versus multilateral alliances
to pursue security. By setting the threat level as a reference point for leaders’ prospects
of gains or losses, the prospect–threat alliance model argues that (1) high threats frame
decision-makers in a domain of losses, and multilateral alliances become a favorable
alliance choice because states are more likely to take the risk of constraining their free-
dom of action in return for more help from multiple allies as well as for avoiding further
losses in the strategic competition with rivals; (2) low threats position leaders in a domain
of gains, and bilateral alliances win out because states are risk-averse in terms of main-
taining their freedom of action in seeking security through alliances with fewer allies.
Alliance formation is a complex and sophisticated foreign policy outcome influenced
by material, ideational, and domestic factors. US postwar decisions regarding alliance
strategies are by no means the one single factor accounting for different patterns of alliance
formation in Europe and Asia, which are determined by the interactions of state foreign
policy behavior. But focusing on different US alliance strategies — state behavior — does
shed some light on the interaction outcomes of state behavior. In addition, the prospect–
threat alliance model does not deny the merits of the existing rationalist and constructivist
approaches in explaining different US postwar alliance strategies in Europe and Asia. It
does provide an alternative explanation through a psychological lens, which complements
both rationalism and constructivism in the study of alliance formation.
There are two caveats in this research. First, the prospect–threat alliance model is
more appropriate in explaining great powers’ alliance strategies than small powers’ alli-
ance behavior. Although it is important to attract support from small powers in forming
an alliance, great powers normally play the decisive role in determining the design as
well as the nature of alliances. Small or weak powers sometimes have different motiva-
tions from great powers to join alliances or alignments. Besides balancing against threats
as great powers normally do (Walt, 1987), small states may join alliances for seeking
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