Why Nudges Matter: A Reply to Goodwin
| Author | Chris Mills |
| Date | 01 February 2013 |
| Published date | 01 February 2013 |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9256.2012.01450.x |
| Subject Matter | Research Article |
Research Article
Why Nudges Matter: A Reply
to Goodwin
Chris Mills
University of Manchester
This article argues that, contrary to Goodwin’s recent arguments, nudges are compatible with the
coalition government’s stated aspiration to further self-empowerment. This is because, despite its
libertarian roots, nudging is compatible with the promotion of personal autonomy and thus can be
used to promote self-empowerment in a non-paternalistic fashion. Further, I argue that nudging
may play a valid role in tackling large-scale social problems in tandem with other traditional policy
measures. Consequently, Goodwin is wrong to reject choice architecture for these reasons.
Keywords: nudging; manipulation; libertarianism; autonomy; paternalism
In a recent article in these pages, Tom Goodwin (2012) proposes three reasons why
we might reject the libertarian paternalism proposed by Richard Thaler and Cass
Sunstein in their book Nudge (2008). He argues that the use of ‘nudges’ ought to be
rejected as their use would contravene the stated current UK government’s aspira-
tions to promote empowerment, freedom and fairness. What is more, Goodwin
insists that even if this were not the case, nudging is not an efficacious way of solving
society’s big problems. To support his claims Goodwin posits that: (a) the concept of
freedom that choice architects reference is overly narrow and is thus poorly equipped
to empower citizens; (b) nudging may be paternalistic, and to the extent that it is we
should be worried; and (c) nudging may be ineffective as a strategy to tackle some of
society’s major ills. He concludes that deliberative approaches to democracy may be
a better avenue for empowering citizens and strengthening society, and he invites
further discussion and investigation into some of the topics he raises.
In this article I take up his challenge and respond to three points. The first concerns
the role the concept of freedom plays in nudging and how it affects nudging’s
potential for empowerment. I argue that Goodwin misunderstands a key feature of
nudging and thus underestimates its capacity for empowerment. My second point
of reply relates to the paternalistic tendency of nudging. I argue that Goodwin has
an overly simplistic view of the relationship between paternalism, manipulation
and autonomy, and thus mistakenly condemns cases of non-paternalistic interfer-
ence as morally problematic. Finally I conclude that Goodwin is correct in his belief
that nudges are not always effective at changing either deeply ingrained behaviour
or large-scale behaviour patterns. However, the reasons he provides are mistaken,
arising from his failure to grasp a more crucial problem regarding the effectiveness
POLITICS: 2013 VOL 33(1), 28–36
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9256.2012.01450.x
© 2012 The Author.Politics © 2012 Political Studies Association
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