Why punishment pleases: Punitive feelings in a world of hostile solidarity
| Published date | 01 April 2018 |
| Date | 01 April 2018 |
| Author | Anastasia Chamberlen,Henrique Carvalho |
| DOI | 10.1177/1462474517699814 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Punishment & Society
2018, Vol. 20(2) 217–234
!The Author(s) 2017
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/1462474517699814
journals.sagepub.com/home/pun
Article
Why punishment
pleases: Punitive feelings
in a world of hostile
solidarity
Henrique Carvalho and Anastasia Chamberlen
University of Warwick, UK
Abstract
The argument advanced in this paper is that the motivation to punish relies on punish-
ment producing a kind of solidarity that allows individuals to pursue emotional release
together with a sense of belonging, without having to question or address why it is that
they felt alienated and insecure in the first place. This raises the possibility that the
reason why we believe punishment to be useful, and why we are motivated to punish, is
because we derive pleasure from the utility of punishment. Simply stated, punishment
pleases. It then analyses the relationship between punishment and solidarity to inves-
tigate why and how punishment pleases. We argue that the pleasure of punishment is
directly linked to the specific kind of solidarity that punishment produces, which we call
hostile solidarity. The paper explores the links between punishment and identity in
order to examine the allure of hostile solidarity and then draws implications from
this perspective and sets out an agenda for future research.
Keywords
Durkheim, emotions, Hume, identity, punishment, punitiveness, social theory, solidarity,
urge to punish, utility
Our reliance on punitive sentiments and attitudes to make sense of our world and
ourselves is a key feature of our times. In the past few years and until today, the
public has become increasingly more attuned to and reliant on punitive expressions,
feelings and strategies. These have focused on scapegoating, othering, excluding and
controlling in the name of order, security and prosperity. Not only have we been
Corresponding author:
Anastasia Chamberlen, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Sociology, University of Warwick,Coventr y
CV4 7AL, UK.
Email: a.chamberlen@warwick.ac.uk
punishing more, and more harshly, in the 2000s, but our punitive outlook has now
come to shape the way we engage with political campaigns, cope with economic
changes, and manage our international and interpersonal relations. Although a
concern with these tendencies has recently become more widely spread in public
discourse and social media, punishment and society scholars have long warned us
about the consequences of being and living in punitive societies (Garland, 2001;
Pratt et al., 2005; Simon, 2001a; Simon and Sparks, 2013).
Despite pertaining to a long tradition of scholarship on punishment and society,
the question of why we punish remains fundamentally controversial, as we still
have not reached a coherent and satisfactory understanding of why it is that we
seek punishment. The problematic character of punishment can be observed in the
diversity of efforts to offer a satisfactory account of the purpose of our punitive
practices. The explanations provided can vary widely depending on disciplinary
frameworks or methodological orientations. However, most engagements with the
question of why we punish tend to be intrinsically concerned with the question of
what punishment is for, in terms of function or utility. There is an important reason
for that, as since punishment is realised through interventions to the liberty or
property of individuals which are by their very nature coercive, and often violent
and painful, it is commonly accepted that such activities can only be legitimate and
justified if their purpose or outcomes compensate for the harms which they inflict.
Although there is an important place for these debates, this kind of perspective
on the role of punishment carries with it certain limitations, the main one being the
risk of leading to what Garland (1990a: 4) called a ‘dogmatic functionalism’.
Instead, and especially if we seek to properly scrutinise the place of punishment
in contemporary society, we should seek to understand punishment as ‘a realm for
the expression of social value and emotion as well as a process for asserting con-
trol’, and which ‘for all its necessity as an institution ... still involves a tragic and
futile quality which derives from its contradictory cultural location’ (1990a: 4). This
paper rescues Garland’s invitation to ‘rethink punishment in a way which is more
sensitive to its many dimensions and inherent contradictions’ (1990a: 12–13), by re-
investigating the relationship between punishment and social solidarity. However,
instead of departing from a position that assumes the necessity of the institution of
punishment, we deploy a critical perspective which directly enquires why we seek to
ascribe utility to punishment in the first place.
The paper starts by raising the possibility that the reason why we believe pun-
ishment to be useful, and why we are motivated to punish, is because we derive
pleasure from the utility of punishment. Simply stated, punishment pleases. It then
turns to an analysis of the relationship between punishment and solidarity to
investigate why and how punishment pleases. We argue that the pleasure of pun-
ishment is directly linked to the specific kind of solidarity that punishment pro-
duces, which we call hostile solidarity. The third part of the paper focuses on
exploring the links between punishment and identity in order to examine the
allure of hostile solidarity, while the concluding section draws implications from
the perspective developed in the paper and sets out an agenda for future research.
218 Punishment & Society 20(2)
To continue reading
Request your trial