Why states inform: Compliance with self-reporting obligations in universal treaty regimes
| Author | Jan Karlas |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0192512121990575 |
| Published date | 01 September 2022 |
| Date | 01 September 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Original Research Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512121990575
International Political Science Review
2022, Vol. 43(4) 531 –546
© The Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/0192512121990575
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Why states inform: Compliance
with self-reporting obligations in
universal treaty regimes
Jan Karlas
Charles University, Czech Republic
Abstract
Why do some states largely comply with their self-reporting obligations in international institutions, while
others fulfil them only irregularly? In this article, I conduct the first large-N analysis of self-reporting that
comprises several important areas of international cooperation. This analysis relies on an original and
large dataset that covers self-reporting within 25 universal arms control, environmental and human rights
agreements. The empirical results find little evidence for an intuitive view that the support of states for
the respective treaties and the conformity of state policies with the general goals of those treaties drive
compliance with self-reporting obligations. Instead, the article reveals that this compliance is mainly influenced
by the reporting behaviour of the country’s regional peers and by national economic and administrative
capacities.
Keywords
International institutions, international cooperation, ratification, compliance, monitoring, arms control, the
environment, human rights
Introduction
For more than two decades, scholars have been discussing which factors influence the participa-
tion of states in international agreements and institutions. The existing research has primarily
focused on two issues: the ratification of agreements and the subsequent compliance with their
substantive provisions. The previous works identified several factors that determine ratification.
From the rationalist perspective, the propensity to ratify treaties primarily depends on the costs
and benefits to states and on their policy preferences (Hathaway, 2007; Sprinz and Vaahtoranta,
1994). The likelihood of ratification may also increase with the democratic character of the state
(Mansfield et al., 2002). Some authors stress that states that are more integrated into the world
polity ratify a higher number of international agreements (Bernauer et al., 2013; Wotipka and
Tsutsui, 2008).
Corresponding author:
Jan Karlas, Institute of Political Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Pekařská 16, Prague 5, 158 00,
Czech Republic.
Email: jan.karlas@fsv.cuni.cz
990575IPS0010.1177/0192512121990575International Political Science ReviewKarlas
research-article2021
Original Research Article
532 International Political Science Review 43(4)
Quite naturally, the same or similar factors can equally affect the compliance of states with the
substantive provisions of international agreements. According to rationalist approaches, the fulfil-
ment of international obligations depends on the policy preferences of states (Guzman, 2008), or
on the enforcement capabilities of international institutions (Downs et al., 1996). The so-called
managerial school of compliance associates compliance with national institutional capacity, as
well as with the assistance supplied by international institutions (Chayes and Chayes, 1995). The
type of domestic regime can also influence compliance (Simmons, 2009). Among other important
determinants of compliance, we can include transnational socialization processes (Koh, 1998) and
the legitimacy of the respective provisions (Franck, 1990).
This article deals with another important dimension of state involvement in international institu-
tions: the compliance of states with their self-reporting obligations. As with ratification and policy
compliance, we can observe that the behaviour of individual states differs considerably with regard
to the fulfilment of their reporting duties. This establishes the following puzzle: why do some states
largely comply with their reporting obligations in international institutions, while others fulfil them
only irregularly? We still know very little about the factors that influence the probability of self-
reporting. Recently, scholars have started to consider the effects of self-reporting on state behaviour
(Creamer and Simmons, 2019; Koliev et al., 2020). Yet the number of studies that explain the actual
self-reporting activity of states remains low (Creamer and Simmons, 2015; Karlas and Parízek,
2020; LeBlanc et al., 2010; Lebovic, 2006; Neumayer, 2002). Moreover, each of these studies only
deals with a single institution, or with institutions pertaining to a single-issue area.
To diminish this gap in knowledge, I conduct in this article the first large-N analysis of self-
reporting that comprises several important areas of international cooperation. This analysis relies
on an original and large dataset that maps self-reporting within 25 universal agreements. Those
agreements span three of the key areas of global regulatory cooperation, namely arms control, the
environment and human rights. Altogether, the analysis involves 25,193 cases where state parties
were supposed to report. In theoretical terms, it proceeds from some of the main perspectives on
treaty ratification and compliance. More specifically, it tests the effects of the following four
explanatory factors: a state’s support for the treaty; the conformity between a state’s policy and the
goals of the treaty; national administrative capacity; and the degree to which reporting obligations
are fulfilled by a state’s peers. In particular, many of the previous studies confirmed an intuitive
expectation that the preferences, and the costs and benefits, of states influence their attitudes to
treaty ratification and compliance. According to this expectation, self-reporting compliance should
be mainly associated with treaty support and policy conformity. However, the empirical analysis
offered in this article finds little evidence that would back this view. On the contrary, it reveals that
the factor that most consistently and strongly influences compliance with reporting obligations is
the reporting behaviour of a country’s regional peers. At the same time, the findings show that
capacity-related variables, in particular economic capabilities and to a lesser degree administrative
capacity, also substantially influence reporting behaviour.
In the first section of the article, I formulate the theoretical explanations. The second section
outlines the research design. The third section presents the major descriptive observations. The
fourth section presents the explanatory results. The fifth section summarizes the robustness checks.
In the conclusion, I summarize the main findings and suggest issues for further research.
Theoretical explanations
In this section, I will formulate theoretical explanations that seek to account for the cross-national
variation in the submission of reports. These explanations will proceed from some of the estab-
lished perspectives on treaty ratification and compliance. The first two of the proposed
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