Why We Should Reject ‘Nudge’
| Date | 01 June 2012 |
| Published date | 01 June 2012 |
| Author | Tom Goodwin |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9256.2012.01430.x |
| Subject Matter | Research and Analysis |
Research and Analysis
Why We Should Reject ‘Nudge’ponl_143085..92
Tom Goodwin
University of Warwick
This article argues that the use of ‘nudge’ tactics in UK policymaking ought to be rejected. Nudge
contravenes the coalition government’s aspirations to promote ideas such as empowerment,
freedom and fairness. Moreover, it is not an effective strategy for bringing about the kind of
behavioural changes required to solve society’s ‘big problems’ – problems around climate change
and public health, for example. The article mines political theory in a way that is distinctly absent
from the current literature on ‘nudging’ and brings a fresh and insightful perspective to the nudge
debate.
The prospect of ‘nudging’ people into changing their behaviour has generated great
interest and enthusiasm among policymakers, particularly in the UK. Indeed, on
coming to power in the May 2010 general election, David Cameron established a
‘nudge unit’ tasked with resolving the classic Conservative dilemma: what to do
about the undesirable social consequences that inevitably follow from a small state
and low taxation policy (McSmith, 2010).
The term ‘nudge’ was first used in Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein’s book of the
same title to describe ‘any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s
behaviour in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly
changing their economic incentives’ (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008, p. 6). While
nudging is not a new theory – it builds upon psychology and sociology dating back
over a century to explain how environments shape and constrain behaviours – it
nevertheless has two novel elements. First, it draws on insights from behavioural
economics (Becker, 1962; Mead, 1997) and social psychology (Ross, 1977) to
explain why people behave in ways that deviate from rationality (as defined by
classic economics). And second, it is underpinned by what its authors refer to as
‘libertarian paternalism’, a philosophy that seeks to guide people’s choices in their
best interests while permitting them to remain at liberty to behave otherwise.
Politically, nudge’s roots as a policy lever can, in the UK at least, be traced back to
the previous Labour administration. In 2004, for example, the Cabinet Office
published a report (Halpern et al., 2004) which provided an overview of the ways
in which libertarian paternalism could be employed across a range of policy areas.
As a result, this document and related pronunciations facilitated the spread of
nudge-type principles and practices throughout a wide array of public policy sectors
(Jones, Pykett and Whitehead, 2011).1
However, although nudge may appeal to governments and policymakers, to what
extent is it fit for purpose with respect to tackling society’s ‘big problems’: can it be
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POLITICS: 2012 VOL 32(2), 85–92
© 2012 The Author.Politics © 2012 Political Studies Association
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