Will Nuclear Energy Plans in the Middle East Become Nuclear Weapons Strategies?
| Author | Mark Fitzpatrick |
| Published date | 01 September 2008 |
| Date | 01 September 2008 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0047117808094184 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
WILL NUCLEAR ENERGY BECOME NUCLEAR WEAPONS? 381
Will Nuclear Energy Plans in the Middle East
Become Nuclear Weapons Strategies?
Mark Fitzpatrick, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London
Since early 2006 over a dozen countries in the Middle East have announced plans
to pursue nuclear energy programmes. Most of these plans are at the initial stage of
conducting feasibility studies. If conducted without bias, such studies are likely to
conclude that, given the economies of scale of nuclear power, the large start-up costs,
the cheaper alternative energy sources available in the region and the costs of nuclear
waste disposal, nuclear energy is not cost-competitive. This has been the conclusion
of most feasibility studies in the region for three decades. Yet there are other factors
that make nuclear energy newly attractive. Countries that have taken up the nuclear
theme speak of their growing energy needs for economic development, the need to
diversify energy sources and to conserve oil and gas supplies for export earnings, the
high energy requirements for seawater desalination, and the role of nuclear energy to
retard global warming and the attendant problematic effects of climate change.
The single most salient factor behind the nuclear resurgence in the region, how-
ever, is Iran, both as an example and as a threat. The dual-use nuclear technologies1
that Iran is developing motivate its neighbours to seek fl edgling nuclear capabilities
of their own, as a security hedge and as a domestic political selling point. This
domestic context is particularly acute for countries that have a historical rivalry with
Iran. In the eyes of much of the Arab world, Iran’s nuclear programme is a sign of
technological progress and political strength in standing up to the United States-
led West. Arab citizens, media and intellectuals criticise their governments for
weakness by contrast, giving their leaders an additional reason to pursue nuclear
power as a show of strength and independence and to bolster Arab pride. As much
as they distrust Persians and fear their hegemonic designs, many Arab leaders
secretly respect and wish they could emulate Iran’s unbending resistance to threats
and inducements. Iran’s role in Iraq, its perceived victory in the Lebanon Hezbollah
proxy war with Israel, and fears about its infl uence on Shi’ite minorities in the Gulf
exacerbate the sense of insecurity in many Arab countries. Thus the ripple effect
from Iran’s nuclear programme has become a cascade in the region.
In February 2006, Turkey revived its long-deferred quest for nuclear energy,
announcing plans to build fi ve nuclear power plants. In September 2006, Egypt
announced plans to restart its nuclear energy programme, some 20 years after it
was suspended in the wake of the Chernobyl meltdown, and invited international
bidders for the construction of a nuclear reactor that could come online in 8–10
years. Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria all separately said in 2006 that they too would
launch nuclear energy programmes. In December 2006, the six nations of the Gulf
Cooperation Council announced their intent to explore a joint nuclear development
International Relations Copyright © 2008 SAGE Publications
Los Angeles, London, New Delhi and Singapore, Vol 22(3): 381–385
[DOI: 10.1177/0047117808094184]
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