William Dimes, - Appellant: The Proprietors of the Grand Junction Canal, T. E. Skidmore, A. Boham, and W. W. Martin, - Respondents

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
Judgment Date29 June 1852
Date29 June 1852
CourtHouse of Lords

English Reports Citation: 10 E.R. 301

House of Lords

William Dimes,-Appellant: The Proprietors of the Grand Junction Canal, T. E. Skidmore, A. Boham, and W. W. Martin
-Respondents

Mews' Dig. iv. 412, 430; viii. 1526; xi. 1347. S.C. 17 Jur. 73; and, below, 9 Q.B. 469; 5 Rail. Cas. 34; 16 L.J. Q.B. 107; 11 Jur. 429. Adopted, on point as to interest of judge, in Ranger v. G. W. Ry. Co., 1854, 5 H.L. C. 88; Wildes v. Russell, 1866, L.R. 1 C.P. 741; Phillips v. Eyre, 1870, L.R. 6 Q.B. 22; Todd v. Robinson, 1884, 14 Q.B. D. 745; R. v. Farrant, 1887, 20 Q.B. D. 61; and cf. L. and N. W. Ry. Co. v. Lindsay, 1853, 3 Macq. 115; City of London, etc. Co. v. London Corporation (1901), 1 Ch. 602.

The Lord Chancellor.-The argument now is this: conceding that interest disqualifies tie Lord Chancellor from being a Judge, here is the decree of the Vice-Chancellor, and the judgment of the Lord Chancellor left that decree as it stood before; and as the enrolment was made on the application of the appellant, he has nothing to complain of, for the record stood as it was before the judgment of the Lord Chancellor was pronounced upon it.

Lord Brougham.-What, by Act of Parliament?

Lord Brougham.-In the case of Serjeant's Inn all the Judges had an interest. Nothing was done there.

Interest of Judge - Vice - Chancellor - Enrolment of Decree - Practice.

DIM GRAND JUNCTION CANAL (P PRIETORS OF) {1852] in ILL.C. 158 to him as part of the purchase-money. It appears to me, that there is not the slightest foundation for that. NG man, I think, who understands the nature of these transactions, can doubt that the money was advanced upon the probability of the estate coming to Curson; and there is no. doubt in my mind, that it was so advanced to him ; not from a mere regard to this man, or from a. desire to assist him, but in the hope that it might lead thereafter to Belworthy's coming into possession of the estate. In those circumstances it is not at all surprising that the interest should not have been demanded. Indeed, I should have been surprised if it had been demanded. How could Belworthy have expected to get interest even on £20 from a man whose weekly income did not exceed eight or nine shillings, and who had a wife and family to support? The intention no doubt was, to get it paid out of the estate if ultimately that estate should come to this man in his lifetime. I think that is shown by what took place in the attorney's office; for when the subject was first mooted, the attorneys were asked whether Curson could make a title, and upon being told that he could not, Belworthy refused to purchase at that time. But he advanced as a loan a smaller sum of money, in the hope that ultimately the estate would come to this man, and that then the purchase could be effected. [758] Looking at the whole case, my Lords, my opinion is, that there is no evidence to make out the allegation in the bill. Nothing could be more correct than the transactions as they stand upon the instruments themselves. The bond is in the common form. It is filled up in the regular way, and witnessed. It was read over to the man who executed it. With a full knowledge of what he was doing, he received the money which was secured by the bond, and he never affected to deny the debt ; but allowed it to remain unquestioned. Then the contract which was entered into was also read over to him. It begins by reciting that he has now contracted to sell, not that he had contracted in 1838, to sell the property. The members of the family were talking of this contract, as is apparent from the conversations which are detailed in the evidence. This man could not neglect a day's work, and go over to the attorney's, and enter into this contract without it being the subject of conversation among his own family and neighbours ; but not a word of objection is raised, and in sixteen days afterwards the contract is carried into execution by a regular conveyance. The appellant is a pauper. The case is certainly one of hardship upon him, for this estate has been obtained for an under-value by a man of superior capacity and of higher position than himself, who may be considered, therefore, as having obtained an advantage, by securing to himself this property from one who was a pauper ; but at the same time it appears to me that the appellant has failed to make out the allegations of fraud in his bill, and therefore I advise your Lordships to dismiss this appeal. Decree and order complained of affirmed, and appeal dismissed. House of Lords' Journals, 18th June, 1852. [759] WILLIAM DIMES,ùAppellant THE PROPRIETORS of the GRAND JUNC TION CANAL, T. E. SKIDMORE, A. BOHAM, and W. W. MARTIN,ùRespondents [June 23, 24, 26, 29, 1852]. [Mews' Dig. iv. 412, 430; viii. 1526 xi. 1347. S.C. 17 Jur. 73 ; and, below, 9 Q.B. 469 ; 5 Rail. Cas. 34 ; 16 L.J. Q.B. 107 ; 11 Jur. 429. Adopted, on point as to interest of judge, in Ranger v. G. W. Ry. Co., 1854, 5 H.L. C. 88; . Wades v. Russell, 1866, L.R. 1 C.P. 741 ; Phillips v. Eyre, 1870, L.R. 6 Q.B. 22 ; Todd v. Robinson, 1884, 14 Q.B. D. 745 ; R. v. Farrant, 1887, 20 Q.B. D. 61 ; and cf. L. and 37.-W. Ry, Co. v. Lindsay, 1853, 3 Mscq. 115; City of London, etc. Co. v. London Corporation (1901), 1 Ch. 6021 Interest of JudgeùVice-ChancellorùEnrolment of DecreeùPractice. A public company, which was incorporated, filed a bill in equity against alandowner, in a matter largely involving the interests of the company. The Lord Chancellor had an interest as a shareholder in the company to, the amount of several thousand pounds, a fact which was unknown to the defendant in the 301 III H.L.C., 760 DIMES V. GRAND JUNCTION CANAL (PROPRIETORS OF) [1852] suit. The cause was heard before the Vice-Chancellor, who granted the relief sought by the company. The Lord Chancellor, on appeal, affirmed the order of the Vice-Chancellor : Held, that the Lord Chancellor was disqualified, on the ground of interest, from sitting as a judge in the cause, and that his decree was therefore voidable; and must consequently be reversed. Held also, that the Vice-Chancellor is, under the 53 Geo. 3, c. 24, a judge subordinate to, but not dependent on, the Lord Chancellor, and that, consequently, the disqualification of the Lord Chancellor did not affect him ; but that his decree might be made the subject of appeal to this House. Before a decree made by the Vice-Chancellor can be appealed against, it is re quired to be enrolled. The enrolment is the act of the Lord Chancellor : Held, that the act of enrolment, though performed by a Lord Chancellor disqualified by interest from adjudicating in the cause, was not affected by his disqualification, but was valid for the purpose of bringing up the appeal to this House. The respondents were created a corporation by the Act 33 Geo. 3, c. levy. Joseph Skidmore, since deceased, was then the owner in fee of a copyhold farm called Frogmore, and a copyhold field called Round Mead, holden of the manor of Rick-[760]-mansworth, in the county of Herts. Round Mead and three fields, part of Frogmore Farm, were all in the line of the Grand Junction Canal, and were so described in the plans and books of reference. A small part of each of these four fields was, in 1796, set out as necessary for making the canal and towing-path : four small angles or corners of them were thus cut off from the rest of Skidmore's lands. The respondents, by agreement with Skidmore, the copyholder, purchased these pieces of land, containing together 3a. 3r. 17p., for £308 10s., which they paid him, and he then executed a deed, dated 13th March, 1797, in the form prescribed by the Act, for conveying these pieces to the respondents, and undertook to indemnify them against all quit-rents, heriots, customs, and services, to be claimed by the lord in respect of the lands so purchased. The respondents, with the concurrence of Edward Fotherley Whitfield, Esq., the then Lord of the Manor of Rickmansworth, took possession of the strips and corners of land, made the canal and towing-path along them, and sold so much of them as was not wanted for the purposes of the canal to Mr. Boodle, in trust for Earl Grosvenor, and Mr. Boodle was admitted on the rolls as tenant. Skidmore continued on the rolls as tenant of the other lands. The canal was completed and opened for public traffic early in 1797. From that time until the commencement of the appellant's proceedings, the respondents and their assigns had had uninterrupted possession of these pieces of land. Whitfield died in 1813, and in 1831 the appellant became the purchaser of the manor. In May, 1835, Joseph Skidmore died intestate as to lands vested in him as a trustee for the respondents, leaving Thomas Emmett Skidmore, then a minor, his customary heir. Proclamations were then made in the Manor Court for the person entitled to admittance to come in and be ad-[761]-mitted in respect of the lands forming part of the canal, but no one appeared in pursuance of such proclamations. The appellant, as Lord of the Manor of Rickmansworth, then issued a warrant to the bailiff to seize the land, and brought an action of ejectment against the respondents ; but on the trial before the late Lord Chief Baron Abinger, at the Summer Assizes, in 1836, for Hertfordshire, he was nonsuited, on the ground that the statutory assurance of the 13th March, 1797, operated to vest the freehold and inheritance in fee of the 3a. 3r. 17p. in the respondents. Liberty was, however, given to the appellant to move the Court of King's Bench to set aside the nonsuit, and enter a verdict in his favour. He accordingly obtained a rule nisi for this purpose in November, 1836, and, on argument, this rule was made absolute on the 7th June, 1838, on the ground that the respondents had acquired an equitable estate only in the land as copyhold. The appellant having obtained possession under a writ of possession, placed a bar across the canal, and threw a large quantity of bricks into the...

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