WMD Terrorism: Defining ‘Mass Destruction’ in US Law
| Published date | 01 June 2011 |
| Author | Michelle Bentley |
| Date | 01 June 2011 |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9256.2011.01402.x |
| Subject Matter | Research and Analysis |
Research and Analysis
WMD Terrorism: Defining
‘Mass Destruction’ in US Lawponl_140247..54
Michelle Bentley
University of Southampton
This article examines the definition of ‘weapons of mass destruction’ in US law. Specifically, a
number of high-profile terrorist incidents have resulted in prosecution on the grounds of WMD
use, despite the fact that the weapons employed do not fit a ‘typical’ understanding of WMD as
exclusively nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological devices. In discussing this apparent con-
tradiction, it is concluded that there exists no essentialist concept of WMD and that definitional
understandings vary as a result of discrete institutional contexts and the strategic manipulation of
language by political actors. This will be discussed with reference to the conviction of 9/11 terrorist
Zacarias Moussaoui.
Did terrorists use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on 11 September 2001? The
strikes on New York and Washington, DC were clearly acts of extreme non-state
aggression, yet it is difficult to reconcile the tactics used with an orthodox concep-
tion of WMD as nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological weapons (CBRN)
only. Commercial planes do not fit easily into this classification. Subsequently, the
conviction of 9/11 terrorist Zacarias Moussaoui on the grounds of WMD use – a
reference to the hijacked aircraft – seems incongruous with this understanding. The
conviction was secured on a provision in US law that allows for certain forms of
conventional assault as WMD. This has also been applied to numerous other
high-profile terrorist cases such as the Boxing Day and Times Square bombers,
whose attempted uses of explosives have been categorised as WMD activity. Yet
despite its basis in law, this conception of WMD is problematic in that it creates a
paradox between this and the CBRN interpretation currently underpinning security
discourse on the control of mass destructive weaponry. Where CBRN lies at the
heart of US national and international security policy, the inclusion of conventional
arms and asymmetric devices not classified as weapons (i.e. planes) ostensibly
contradicts this ‘standard’ definition of WMD.
This article critically assesses that paradox through an analysis of the Moussaoui
conviction. It concludes that this contradiction is not as unqualified as it may
initially appear. First, it is argued that both ‘versions’ of WMD are the products of
discrete institutional contexts, each with its own mode of discourse. There is no
essentialist notion of WMD, only variable political construction. Specifically, this is
presented as the strategic use of language by political actors. In applying this to the
case of Moussaoui, it is claimed that the conviction was not solely the consequence
of a definitional technicality pertaining to WMD, but also the need to secure a
POLITICS: 2011 VOL 31(2), 47–54
© 2011 The Author.Politics © 2011 Political Studies Association
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